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1 – 10 of over 1000Mark DeSantis, Matthew McCarter and Abel Winn
The authors use laboratory experiments to test two self-assessment tax mechanisms for facilitating land assembly. One mechanism is incentive compatible with a complex tax…
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The authors use laboratory experiments to test two self-assessment tax mechanisms for facilitating land assembly. One mechanism is incentive compatible with a complex tax function, while the other uses a flat tax rate to mitigate implementation concerns. Sellers publicly declare a price for their land. Overstating its true value is penalized by using the declared price to assess a property tax; understating its value is penalized by allowing developers to buy the property at the declared price. The authors find that both mechanisms increase the rate of land assembly and gains from trade relative to a control in which sellers’ price declarations have no effect on their taxes. However, these effects are statistically insignificant or transitory. The assembly rates in our self-assessment treatments are markedly higher than those of prior experimental studies in which the buyer faces bargaining frictions, such as costly delay or capital constraints.
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The act of consolidating multiple parcels of land to form a single larger parcel is known as land assembly. Laboratory experiments have enabled researchers to explore how various…
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The act of consolidating multiple parcels of land to form a single larger parcel is known as land assembly. Laboratory experiments have enabled researchers to explore how various factors, environments, and institutions hinder or assist the aggregation process. This chapter surveys the experimental literature and highlights the experimental design used in those studies, as well as their main findings.
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R. Mark Isaac and Kurt Schnier
Motivated by both prior experimental work and by field observations, we consider the performance of two different sealed bid versions of the silent auction. These are important…
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Motivated by both prior experimental work and by field observations, we consider the performance of two different sealed bid versions of the silent auction. These are important institutional alternatives to the more familiar ascending price silent auction. In a new series of laboratory experiments, we investigate the effects of the different institutions both on aggregate efficiency and upon aggregate revenue generation.
Timothy C. Salmon and R. Mark Isaac
Traditional auction theory assumes that bidders possess values defined solely on the auctioned object. There may, however, be cases in which bidders possess preferences over the…
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Traditional auction theory assumes that bidders possess values defined solely on the auctioned object. There may, however, be cases in which bidders possess preferences over the revenue achieved by the auctioneer. We present here a comprehensive framework of price-preference valuations, unifying several phenomena ranging from preference for charitable giving to shill bidding. We compare expected efficiency and revenue of first- and second-price auctions for some specific cases of key interest. We also incorporate heterogeneous bidder preferences and examine the effects of mis-specified beliefs and show that both are crucial for understanding these situations.
Blake Dunkle, R. Mark Isaac and Philip Solimine
In this chapter, the authors conduct a robustness study for the classic experimental results of Lynch, Miller, Plott, and Porter (1986, 1991). The authors find strong support for…
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In this chapter, the authors conduct a robustness study for the classic experimental results of Lynch, Miller, Plott, and Porter (1986, 1991). The authors find strong support for the original hypotheses in an updated experimental marketplace, consisting of dichotomous product qualities, non-binding signals of product quality, fixed seller identifiers, and an end-point design of deliberate ambiguity. The authors show that fixed identifiers alone are not sufficient devices to support efficient outcomes in these updated market conditions.
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R. Mark Isaac and Douglas A. Norton
Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to serve as an introduction and motivation for Volume 13 of Research in Experimental Economics. In many cases, these introductory chapters…
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Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to serve as an introduction and motivation for Volume 13 of Research in Experimental Economics. In many cases, these introductory chapters are prefaces, limited to giving a roadmap of the volume and brief discussions of the chapters and why they were included. However, in some cases a more extensive discussion of the state of the literature and discipline can be useful. We have the same goal for this chapter.
Methodology – The methodology is that of a literature review combined with an analysis of the development of issues of endogeneity, self-selection, and formation in laboratory experimental research on public goods, charitable contributions, and nonprofit organizations.
Findings – This chapter traces the path of experimental public goods research as viewed through several lenses. There is a correspondence between the period of carefully controlled conditions in laboratory research and the framework of neoclassical economic theory (Lindahl/Samuelson). Indeed this is one of the original purposes of the earliest experiments by economists. However, there has been a distinct shift away from external control towards more endogenous evolution and selection over the past decade.
Originality – There have been several surveys of public goods research (many are referenced in this chapter). To our knowledge, this is the first to set out the history of, and the imperatives for, this new direction.