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There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

Purpose – The cost of new drug development is increasing every year. Pharmaceutical companies use R&D joint ventures, mergers, and outsource different stages of pharmaceutical R&D activities for a faster and cost minimizing method of innovation. Pharmaceutical companies outsource R&D activities to independent small biotech or pharmaceutical companies that specialize in different stages of pharmaceutical R&D. This chapter examines the determinants of the payment structure of research contracts between large bio/pharmaceutical companies and specialized research firms.

Methods – Determinants of R&D contracts are analyzed using detailed R&D contract data between bio/pharmaceutical companies and independent research firms for 10 years. A multinomial logit model is used in order to understand the determinants of three different types of contracts; royalty contracts, fixed payment contracts, and the mixed contracts.

Findings – Under uncertainty, the likelihood of a royalty contract rises for the early stages of the research and with the patent stock of the research firm. It is more likely to observe both royalty and fixed payment if the pharmaceutical client has past contracts with the same research firm. The results also suggest that if Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is more stringent in any disease area in reviewing the new drug application, then the likelihood of signing pure royalty contract decreases.

Implications – Understanding the nature of R&D contracts and the effects of FDA's behavior on the pharmaceutical R&D contract is important because these contracts not only affect the cost of new drug invention but also the quality and the rate of invention.

Value – Results are useful for both the pharmaceutical companies and the economic/business researchers.

This paper focuses on how the producer inspires his cooperative research partner to reduce carbon emission, by developing a menu of incentive contracts both in research and development (R&D) stage and recycling stage.

The proposed mechanism combines the researcher with the producer in a two-staged closed-loop system. Based on the concept that the producer takes the environmental responsibility, this paper designs a dynamically updating contract for the producer to encourage low-carbon efforts. Meanwhile, the producer offers a menu of contracts against the asymmetric information, that is, the R&D partner owns private information on his low-carbon R&D capability. According to incentive mechanism, the researcher decides whether to tell the truth and how much effort she would exert in R&D and recycling stages.

Discriminating between different types of researchers hurts the producer’s profit. But the updated screening contract can inspire researchers to tell the truth and is beneficial in reducing carbon emissions in the two stages. The results give the optimal solutions of the incentive mechanism. The low-type researcher only obtains reservation profit, whereas the high-type is given more to induce the information.

This paper proposes a strategy of updating the contract factors for avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard. Considering the environmental responsibility of waste products, the producer would like to encourage low-carbon designs among the R&D partners in a closed-loop supply chain.

The study aims to investigate how pre-commercial procurement (PCP) influences the activities, capabilities and behaviours of actors participating in the innovation process. Unlike much of PCP research underpinned by a market failure theoretical framework that evaluates the additionality of innovation inputs and outputs, this paper focusses on the role and capacity of PCP in addressing systemic failures impeding the process of innovation.

PCP effects on the innovation process were studied through a qualitative study of the UK small business research initiative (SBRI) programme. Data collection comprised 33 semi-structured interviews with key informants within 30 organisations and analysis of 80-plus secondary data sources. Interviewees included executives of technology-based small businesses, managers within public buying organisations and innovation policymakers and experts.

The UK SBRI improves connectivity and instigates research and development (R&D) related interactions and cooperation. Through securing government R&D contracts, small firms access relevant innovation ecosystems, build up their knowledge and capabilities and explore possible routes to market. Public organisations use the SBRI to connect to innovative small firms and access their sets of expertise and novel ideas. They also learn to appreciate the strategic role of procurement. Nonetheless, SBRI-funded small business face commercialisation and innovation adoption challenges because of institutional constraints pertaining to rules, regulations and public-sector norms of conduct.

The study contributes to existing PCP research by demonstrating innovation process-related effects of PCP policies. It also complements literature on small business-friendly public procurement measures by highlighting the ways through which PCP, rather than commercial procurement procedures, can support the development of small businesses other than just facilitating their access to government (R&D) contracts.

The study identifies several challenge areas that policymakers should address to improve the implementation of the UK SBRI programme.

The study demonstrates the effects of PCP on the activities, capabilities and behaviours of small businesses and public buying organisations involved in the innovation process.

The purpose of this paper is to define co-exploitation, co-exploration, and alliance ambidexterity from the perspective of organizational learning; to analyze how knowledge bases, structural arrangements, and control mechanisms of R&D alliances influence co-exploitation and co-exploration; and to discuss how to achieve alliance ambidexterity by managing paradoxes around knowledge bases, structural arrangements, and control mechanisms.

This is a conceptual paper focussing on how to balance exploitation and exploration at the alliance level through managing three paradoxes of cooperation: similarity vs complementarity, integration vs modularity, and contracts vs trust.

While technological similarity, structural integration, and contracts are more likely to promote co-exploitation, technological complementarity, structural modularity, and trust are more likely to facilitate co-exploration. Alliance ambidexterity, which is beneficial for alliance performance, derives from either the combination of technological complementarity, structural integration, and contracts, or the combination of technological similarity, structural modularity, and trust temporally.

Researchers should analyze the possibility of building alliance ambidexterity in other types of interorganizational relationships, and find other possible antecedents of interorganizational learning.

Managers should not simply treat R&D alliances as one of exploratory interorganizational relationships, but pay equal attention to co-exploitation and co-exploration. To achieve this balance, practitioners should combine technological complementarity with structural integration and contracts, or integrate technological similarity with structural modularity and trust.

This paper is one of the first contributions that analyze how an R&D alliance could gain its ambidexterity through the management of nested cooperation paradoxes.

This study investigates the conditions that shape the contractual structure of pharmaceutical-biotechnology R&D agreements and whether these collaborations have produced measurable impact on the overall R&D productivity of pharmaceutical companies. In one section, the effect of uncertainty due to the advances in technology on the structure of R&D contracts is discussed. Specifically, it is shown that newer technologies associated with higher uncertainty result in the choice of more hierarchical contract structures. In addition, the significance of R&D collaborations on the overall innovation process of pharmaceutical companies is evaluated. The results indicate that only some types of R&D alliances, signed in earlier stages of research, have a significant role in the patent production and drug discovery process.

The purpose of this study is to enhance the comprehensive understanding of the roles of resource investments, explicit contracts and three components of guanxi (i.e. renqing, ganqing and mianzi) in asymmetric research and development (R&D) partnerships. Treating dependence asymmetry as a multidimensional construct, this study examines the moderating effects of these elements on the relationships between resources and information asymmetry and opportunism.

The study was executed by issuing questionnaires to R&D managers participating in R&D projects and collaborations in the Shanghai and Jiangsu provinces via e-mail and face to face surveys. A multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The empirical test generally supported the conceptual model and produced the following findings: first, resources and information asymmetry significantly and positively affect opportunism. Second, the partner’s resource investments can weaken the effect of resources and information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism. Third, explicit contracts can reduce the impact of information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism. Fourth, renqing and ganqing but not mianzi can weaken the influence of information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism.

This study provides a comprehensive and clear understanding of how opportunism can be curbed by jointly considering resource investments, explicit contracts and guanxi in asymmetric R&D cooperative relationships. Moreover, dependence asymmetry and guanxi are measured as a multidimensional construct and reveal their underlying structure, which expands previous understandings of risk management in R&D collaborations.

It is well known that a player in a non-cooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game’s outcome. We explore what happens when external parties – who we call “game miners” – discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various structured bargaining games among such miner(s) and players that determine such an outcome-contingent contract before the start of the original game. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another as in the original game, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclusivity and first-mover advantage. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit and bounds on the game miner’s profit. We also find that game miners can lead to both efficient and inefficient equilibria.

In the Information Age, an increasing number of firms and researchers focus on consumer privacy. Meanwhile, many firms that collect consumer information through, information disclosure, consumer privacy, agency model, distribution contracts products or services often adopt the agency contract or the wholesale contract to sell through the online platform. This study aims to examine how different distribution contracts affect supply chain decisions when the firm can profit from disclosing consumer information.

The authors use Stackelberg model to describe the relationship between consumer privacy and distribution contracts. Solve the model and analyze the monotonicity of the equilibrium results. The optimal contract choice and win-win conditions are obtained by comparing the profits under different contracts.

The authors find that when consumers’ maximal valuation is low in the market, the firm prefers to profit from disclosing consumer information under both the agency contract and the wholesale contract. As consumers’ maximal valuation increases, the firm turns to profit from product sales. Under the agency contract, the platform only generates profit when the consumers’ maximal valuation is high. By comparing the profits of the platform under the two types of contracts, the authors find the platform’s optimal contract choice under different consumers’ maximal valuations and platform commission rates. Combined with the comparison results of the firm’s profit, the authors provide the win-win conditions under the agency contract and wholesale contract.

This study analyzes the supply chain decision under the agency contract and wholesale contract, and it helps deepen the understanding of the interaction between consumer information disclosure and channel distribution contract.

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which federal acquisitions motivate private-sector partner firms’ investment in innovation.

Archival, Empirical.

This study finds that federal acquisitions are positively associated with contractors’ R&D spending but that the intensity of R&D spending is indistinguishable between firms’ government and private sectors (non-government) contracts. This study also develops a novel measure of the intensity of contractor R&D spending on public sector relative to private-sector clients and assesses construct validity of the measure.

Cultivating innovation is an explicit goal of federal procurement. Innovation is critical to addressing the nation’s collective problems. The results should be of interest to scholars and practitioners, particularly acquisition personnel, one of whose responsibilities is to efficiently steward tax revenues to the most productive (contracting) use.

This study is descriptive in nature and helps to illuminate the extent and conditions under which federal acquisition activity motivates investment in innovation by private-sector partners. These results speak to how effectively government contracting motivates private-sector innovation, which clearly has implications for fiscal stewardship. Additionally, private-sector innovation affects stock price formation. Collectively, these results imply that the extent to which acquisitions motivate innovation has material implications on our country’s fiscal health.