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The purpose of this paper is to use exchange rate theory to compare how white-collar offenders and property offenders rank the severity of various correctional sanctions.

The authors use survey data from 160 inmates incarcerated for white-collar and property crimes in a Midwestern state to compare how white-collar inmates differed from property inmates in ranking the goals of prison and the punitiveness of prison as compared to other alternatives.

White-collar offenders were no different than property offenders in terms of their assessment of the punitiveness of prison compared to the punitiveness of the four sanctions under consideration here. White-collar offenders were significantly more likely than property offenders to believe that the goal of prison is to rehabilitate rather than deter individuals from further crime.

Because the authors defined white-collar offenders by their crime of incarceration, they may have captured offenders who are not truly white-collar offenders. Focusing on offenders who were in prison did not allow them to fully examine whether similarities between white-collar and property offenders can be attributed to adjustment to prison or some other variable.

Alternative sanctions may be useful in punishing white-collar offenders in a less expensive manner than prison. Results suggest white-collar offenders may be more amenable to rehabilitation than property offenders and may not experience prison much differently than other types of offenders.

This research is important because it is the first of its kind to compare white-collar offenders’ views about the punitiveness of prison and the goals of incarceration with those of property offenders.

In this chapter I discuss judicial contributions to Italian penality. I look at the penal incentives produced by interactions between judicial and political classes, and ask whether judges and prosecutors have been forces for punitiveness or moderation. I discuss the relevance of the Italian case for broader analyses of Western penality.

My chapter offers a political-sociological account of judicial contributions to punishment. I analyse the penal incentives created by different national institutional set-ups, specifically addressing judicial contributions to penality using a framework developed by Joachim Savelsberg and Nicola Lacey. The framework examines judicial structure in the institutional context looking at the penal implications of bureaucratisation of the judiciary and the capacity for co-ordination between judges and politicians. I include judicial legitimacy as an additional dimension in this framework.

I conclude that the Italian judiciary have been forces for punitiveness and moderation. Their contributions can be systematised by looking at the waxing and waning of judicial legitimacy, and the consequent expansion and contraction of judicial powers. I claim that judicial legitimacy is also relevant to other (‘non-Italian’) analyses of judicial contributions to contemporary Western penality.

By adding legitimacy to investigations of judicial contributions to penality I provide an organising principle with which to analyse the penal role of Italian judicial actors. I thus allow Italy to be kept in conversation with existing comparative models, without assuming that it either conforms to the models entirely, or that the models should otherwise be eschewed. I use the Italian case to demonstrate the relevance of legitimacy when analysing judicial contributions to Western penality, arguing that changing legitimacy affects the terms and effect of interaction between judicial and political classes.

Using administrative, longitudinal data on felony arrests in Florida, we exploit the discontinuous increase in the punitiveness of criminal sanctions at 18 to estimate the deterrence effect of incarceration. Our analysis suggests a 2% decline in the log-odds of offending at 18, with standard errors ruling out declines of 11% or more. We interpret these magnitudes using a stochastic dynamic extension of Becker’s (1968) model of criminal behavior. Calibrating the model to match key empirical moments, we conclude that deterrence elasticities with respect to sentence lengths are no more negative than − 0 . 13 for young offenders.

Across the Americas, public discussions of crime and penal practices have become increasingly punitive even as political struggles have resulted in a broad shift toward Constitutional democracy. In this chapter, we suggest that the spread of tough anti-crime talk and practice is, paradoxically, a response to efforts to expand and deepen democracy. Punitive crime talk is useful to political actors seeking to limit formal and social citizenship rights for several reasons. First, it ostensibly targets problematic behavior rather than particular social groups, and thus appears to be consistent with democratic norms. At the same time, crime talk often acquires coded meanings that enable those who mobilize it to tap into inter-group hostility, anxieties, and fear. In addition, the emphasis on the threat of crime and disorder offers those seeking to limit democratic expansion a way to legitimate truncated visions of the rights and entitlements of citizenship. Tough anti-crime rhetoric often resonates with those who have experienced or fear the loss of symbolic and/or material benefits as a result of democratic reform. In short, the broad shift toward hyper-penality is, at least in part, a consequence of struggles over political democracy, citizenship and governance across the Americas.

The past several decades have seen a tremendous increase in the U.S. incarceration rate, with varying trends in other advanced industrial democracies. These developments have only recently begun to attract the attention of political scientists. This chapter provides a critical review of recent literature on mass incarceration by both political scientists and scholars in related disciplines, and a discussion of directions for further research. I argue that further work in this area should involve theoretically informed analysis of interactions between criminal justice experts and professionals, elected politicians, and the public at large, with particular attention to how public concerns about crime are parsed and interpreted by public officials in the making of penal policy.

This chapter aims to examine the ways in which gender has featured in Hong Kong’s prison system from its colonial origins to its contemporary form as a politically autonomous region of China. We conclude with a discussion on the reasons for these recent trends of imprisonment.

We draw from the concepts of patriarchy and colonialism to examine how gender has operated and shaped Hong Kong’s prison system. Our analysis is based on historical and contemporary government reports and other documents and secondary data.

Similar to other locales around the world, Hong Kong’s prison system was designed for and by men in its early colonial days, as expected given that most prisoners were male. Although a few prison administrators attempted to provide some programs for women and voiced concern over the conditions of women’s imprisonment to colonial authorities during the latter part of the 1800s, it was not until the 1930s that the first female prison was established. Since then, Hong Kong prison authorities have faced the challenge of a phenomenal and rapid growth in women’s imprisonment, which resulted in a historical reversal of shifting male prisoners to alternate accommodation to make room for their female counterparts.

This study is among the few which have examined how gender operates in the context of imprisonment in a colonial and postcolonial context. This chapter does this by examining how colonial authorities managed competing political debates about the purpose of punishment and cultural understandings of race and difference, and the limited recognition of gender and difference. It also examines how, in postcolonial Hong Kong, authorities have placed gender center stage and the reasons for this in coping and dealing with the growth in women’s imprisonment.

The focus of this study is to examine Indian police officers' punitiveness toward violators of criminal sanctions attached to COVID-19 mitigation laws enacted by the Indian Penal Code. The authors draw from the conceptual frameworks and correlates typically employed in traditional crime and justice research and adapt them to the context of the pandemic. Additionally, the authors examine whether officers' punitive attitudes are related to their belief in self-legitimacy and their job assignment (civilian vs. armed personnel) in a country with inherited colonial policing legacies.

Data for the study came from 1,323 police officers in a northern state of India.

Findings suggest that officers with vicarious fear of COVID-19 infections (e.g. infection of family members) find the sanctions associated with the new laws harsh. Additionally, officers who subscribe to the classical attributions of offenders feel that the laws are not punitive enough. In contrast, those with deterministic views perceive the sanctions as excessively harsh. Findings also suggest that officers' self-legitimacy, and belief in the authority and responsibility vested in them, is a key predictor of their punitive attitudes. Finally, officers assigned to police lines are more punitive than those designated to patrol/traffic work.

Data or prior research on officers' punitive attitudes toward other violations (non-COVID-19 violations) is unavailable for comparison with this study’s findings.

No prior research has examined the relationship between police officers' perceptions of self-legitimacy, their belief in the authority vested in them by the state, their belief in their role as police officers and their relationship to their punitive attitudes.