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Nucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing occurred frequently during epidemics. This paper aims to provide a viable scheme for the government to strengthen the supervision of nucleic acid testing and to provide a new condition for the punishment for the negative act of the government and the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud.

This paper formulates an evolutionary game model between the government and nucleic acid testing institution under four different mechanisms of reward and punishment to solve the issue of nucleic acid testing supervision. The authors discuss the stability of equilibrium points under the four distinct strategies and conduct simulation experiments.

The authors find that the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty outperforms the strategies of static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The results reveal the appropriate punishment for the negative act of the government can enhance the positivity of the government's supervision in the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty, while the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud cannot be too high. Otherwise, it will backfire. Another interesting and counterintuitive result is that in the strategy of dynamic reward and dynamic penalty, the upper limit of the penalty for data fraud of nucleic acid testing institution cannot be augmented recklessly. Otherwise, it will diminish the government's positivity for supervision.

Most of the existing evolutionary game researches related to the reward and punishment mechanism and data fraud merely highlight that increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help improve the government's supervision initiative and can minimize data fraud of nucleic acid institution, but they fall short of the boundary conditions for the punishment and reward mechanism. Previous literature only study the supervision of nucleic acid testing qualitatively and lacks quantitative research. Moreover, they do not depict the problem scenario of testing data fraud of nucleic acid institution regulated by the government via the evolutionary game model. Thus, this study effectively bridges these gaps. This research is universal and can be extended to other industries.

This paper aims to describe and analyse Swiss prisoners’ and experts’ views on collective punishment, the practice where a group is punished for one person’s transgression.

A series of qualitative interviews with prisoners and stakeholders are reported following thematic analysis.

Despite being forbidden by the Geneva Convention and other international instruments, participants from this study expressed the view that collective punishment continues to be practiced in some form in prisons in Switzerland, violating the rights of prisoners via unjust and arbitrary decision-making, unjust rules, inequalities in prison structures and continuation of incarceration based on the behaviour of others. Families can also be both victims and vectors of collective punishment, and prolonging the detention of prisoners who would otherwise have been released because of rare high-profile cases of reoffending can also be considered a form of collective punishment.

These significant findings suggest that collective punishment in various forms continues to be used in Swiss prisons.

This study aims to investigate the situational factors that intensify the impact of leader bottom-line mentality (BLM) on employee pro-self-unethical behavior. In particular, the moderating role of contingent rewards and punishments is evaluated under the lens of situational strength theory.

Data were collected from 218 full-time employees working in the USA in a time-lagged study and analyzed using SPSS Process Macro.

Statistical analysis reveal contingent rewards and punishments significantly moderate the positive relationship between BLM and pro-self-unethical behavior.

This paper highlights the need for more balanced reward systems that incorporate moral conduct into work performance. It also emphasizes the role of robust accountability and monitoring systems in minimizing employees’ unethical behavior.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the moderating role of contingent rewards and punishments on the relationship between leader BLM and subordinate pro-self-unethical behavior. Moreover, it provides significant empirical support to situational strength theory.

In recent decades, the use of capital punishment has declined, but in its place, a ‘new death penalty’ has arisen: life without parole (LWOP), which is being used far more frequently and for more crimes than capital punishment ever was. Yet, LWOP has received far less scholarly attention than the death penalty. Because of its greater scale, assessing the effects of LWOP on crime has important policy implications and is a better test of extreme penalties. Existing studies of LWOP focus on humanitarian issues and ignore its potentially reciprocal relationship with crime. Therefore, we use available LWOP data to fill these gaps in the literature, using models specifically designed to control for potential reciprocal effects. The results indicate there is no reciprocal causation between LWOP and violent crime and, at best, LWOP’s impact on crime is small, temporary, and, most importantly, no greater than the impact of life with parole.

This chapter argues that the concept of ‘mass supervision’, and indeed the concept of ‘mass incarceration’ from which it derives, is both quantitatively and qualitatively indeterminate when applied outside of the context of the US. However, the qualitative indeterminacy of mass supervision only holds so long as one treats the word ‘mass’ as being an analogy to mass consumption. This chapter therefore considers an alternative construction of ‘mass’ punishment in terms of mass production. Comparing the philosophies of production associated with Henry Ford and William Morris with the scholarship of Michel Foucault and Fergus McNeill reveals that mass supervision can authentically claim to be qualitatively ‘massive’, given the bespoke and one-on-one nature of traditional supervision. It is thus possible to speak coherently of ‘mass supervision’ in an international context, although this negative conception of a problem invites questions about the best solution that it generally leaves open.

The economic theory of crime states that crime can be prevented by either increasing the probability of being detected or increasing penalties. However, individual responses to fines and imprisonment may vary, and corruption can reduce both the probability of being detected and punishment costs. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of corruption on crime prevention.

This study used an experiment to investigate the effects of criminalisation and corruption. This study tested whether individuals respond differently to variables on the probability of being detected and punishment costs and whether corruption affects these variables.

The results of this study demonstrated that increasing the probability of being detected initially reduces crime rates more efficiently than increasing penalties, then the efficiency gradually reduces, and that corruption reduces the effectiveness of detection and punishment.

Ineffective corruption prevention is not solely attributed to corrupt police, as illicit payments and personal connections also contribute to corruption.

Policymakers and law enforcement agencies should focus on preventive measures by increasing the chance of being detected, creating transparency and encouraging public participation to address corruption problems thoroughly.

This research conducted in Thailand investigates the effectiveness of crime-prevention mechanisms and considers the impact of corruption. This study offers insights into how criminals perceive detection and punishment costs under different social-political environments.

This study aims to examine the relationship between exposure to the Fulani herdsmen attacks among Igbo adolescents in Southeastern Nigeria and depression. Although previous research suggests a direct relationship between armed conflict and depression to exist, it is not known from the literature whether there are indirect paths involved. In a conditional process analysis, it was examined whether physical punishment mediated and gender moderated this relationship.

A sample of 385 secondary school students (227 girls, 157 boys; M_age = 16.3; SD = 1.35) completed a questionnaire during class. Variables in the analysis were measured with reliable scales. The conditional process analysis was conducted with PROCESS.

Exposure to the Fulani herdsmen attacks predicted depressive symptoms among the adolescents, and the effect was partially mediated by the experiences of physical punishment at home. The indirect effect on depression via physical punishment at home was stronger for girls than boys, whereas the direct effect of exposure to the Fulani herdsmen attacks on depression was stronger for boys than girls.

Because the research design was cross-sectional and not longitudinal, interpretations about causal relationships should be made with caution.

The novel findings suggest that living in an environment of armed conflict may exacerbate parents’ use of physical punishment, which in turn may lead to increased levels of depressive symptoms in adolescents.

Over a decade since the Special Criminal Court (SCC) was established in Cameroon, hundreds of individuals have been indicted, tried and convicted. Sentences have been imposed, most of which include a term of imprisonment (principal punishment/penalty) and confiscation as accessory penalty or punishment. Research focus has not been directed at the sentences which, as argued in this paper, are inconsistent, incommensurate with the amounts of money stolen and a significant departure from the Penal Code. This paper aims to explore the aspect of sentencing by the SCC.

To identify, highlight and discuss the issue of sentencing, the paper looks at a blend of primary and secondary materials: primary materials here include but not limited to the judgements of the SCC and other courts in Cameroon and the Penal Code. Secondary materials shall include the works of scholars in the fields of criminal law, criminal justice and penal reform.

A few findings were made: first, the judges are inconsistent in the manner in which they determine the appropriate sentence. Second, in making that determination, the judges would have been oblivious to the prescripts in the Penal Code, which provides the term of imprisonment, and in the event of a mitigating circumstance, the prescribed minimum to be applied. Yet, the default imposition of an aggravating circumstance (being a civil servant) was not explored by the SCC. Finally, whether the sentences imposed are commensurate with the amounts of monies stolen.

This research unravels key insights into the functioning of the SCC. It advances the knowledge thereon and adds to the literature on corruption in Cameroon.

The prosecution and judges at the SCC should deepen their knowledge of Cameroonian criminal law, especially on the nature of liberty given to judges to determine within the prescribed range of the sentence to be imposed but also consider the existence of an aggravating factor – civil servant. They must also consider whether the sentences imposed befit the crime for which they are convicted.

The paper is an original contribution with new insights on the manner in which sentencing should be approached by the SCC.

This book brings together an international group of scholars whose chapters, analytically and/or empirically, engage with, challenge, and further advance our understanding of ‘mass supervision’ across jurisdictions. In this introductory chapter, we describe the impetus for and purpose of this book and briefly outline each chapter’s contribution. Together, contributors to this book provide contextualised insight into what ‘mass supervision’ is, how it works, and what effects it has on individuals and communities. The chapters span macro-examinations of the socio-political origins and developments of probation and community-based supervision across jurisdictions and micro-examinations of how people perceive and experience punishment in the community both as its practitioners and as its subjects.

The Scandinavian penal exceptionalism literature has focused largely on imprisonment but has yet to explore other aspects of the penal field in detail. This chapter provides an overview of the penal field in Norway and how community sanctions and measures have evolved within it. The author uses the work of Wacquant and Bourdieu to argue that there are three important levels within the Norwegian penal field: political, policy and practice. The author also discusses how drivers from the political and policy levels are affecting community-based penal practice. Using McNeill’s dimensions of mass supervision, the author discusses the implications of these changes for three less-explored aspects of punishment in Norway: the serving of short sentences at home on electronic monitoring, supervision of people under 18 and ‘punishment debt’ enforcement.