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Nucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing occurred frequently during epidemics. This paper aims to provide a viable scheme for the government to strengthen the supervision of nucleic acid testing and to provide a new condition for the punishment for the negative act of the government and the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud.

This paper formulates an evolutionary game model between the government and nucleic acid testing institution under four different mechanisms of reward and punishment to solve the issue of nucleic acid testing supervision. The authors discuss the stability of equilibrium points under the four distinct strategies and conduct simulation experiments.

The authors find that the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty outperforms the strategies of static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The results reveal the appropriate punishment for the negative act of the government can enhance the positivity of the government's supervision in the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty, while the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud cannot be too high. Otherwise, it will backfire. Another interesting and counterintuitive result is that in the strategy of dynamic reward and dynamic penalty, the upper limit of the penalty for data fraud of nucleic acid testing institution cannot be augmented recklessly. Otherwise, it will diminish the government's positivity for supervision.

Most of the existing evolutionary game researches related to the reward and punishment mechanism and data fraud merely highlight that increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help improve the government's supervision initiative and can minimize data fraud of nucleic acid institution, but they fall short of the boundary conditions for the punishment and reward mechanism. Previous literature only study the supervision of nucleic acid testing qualitatively and lacks quantitative research. Moreover, they do not depict the problem scenario of testing data fraud of nucleic acid institution regulated by the government via the evolutionary game model. Thus, this study effectively bridges these gaps. This research is universal and can be extended to other industries.

This study aims to investigate the situational factors that intensify the impact of leader bottom-line mentality (BLM) on employee pro-self-unethical behavior. In particular, the moderating role of contingent rewards and punishments is evaluated under the lens of situational strength theory.

Data were collected from 218 full-time employees working in the USA in a time-lagged study and analyzed using SPSS Process Macro.

Statistical analysis reveal contingent rewards and punishments significantly moderate the positive relationship between BLM and pro-self-unethical behavior.

This paper highlights the need for more balanced reward systems that incorporate moral conduct into work performance. It also emphasizes the role of robust accountability and monitoring systems in minimizing employees’ unethical behavior.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the moderating role of contingent rewards and punishments on the relationship between leader BLM and subordinate pro-self-unethical behavior. Moreover, it provides significant empirical support to situational strength theory.

Ratees' reactions to performance appraisal (PA) system suggest how effective the system is. However, there is less clarity about those different reactions that good versus poor performing ratees show vis-à-vis their performance appraisals. This paper seeks to examine the possible PA responses (PA fairness and PA satisfaction) of the ratees for the cases where they receive equitable versus equal performance-based rewards and punishments.

Two studies were designed. Study 1 was a scenario-based experiment in Pakistan (N = 100 students) and Study 2 was based on surveys in Japan (N = 123 employed students) and Pakistan (N = 111 full-time working professionals). Data were analyzed using one-way repeated measures (Study 1) and structural equation modeling (Study 2).

Overall, good performers considered PA fairer and more satisfying under equity than under equality. However, poor performers considered PA fairer under equity than under equality.

The study has value for PA theorists and managers, as it offers: (a) an understanding on the differential effect of equity versus equality, on employees' perceptions of fairness and satisfaction in a PA setting; (b) clarity about the likely disparity between good and poor performers' reactions toward perceived fairness and satisfaction; and, (c) ratee reactions from both organizational and social perspectives contributing to the philosophical debate questioning whether both distributive fairness and retributive fairness should operate under similar or different normative principles.

This research focuses on the distinct group of high-status employees commonly referred to as workplace vigilantes, and conceptually investigates how unethical requests by these individuals impact the behavior and attitude of other employees over time using the social identity theory.

For developing a conceptual model, literature from the domains of social identity, organizational behavior and general management was searched through Google Scholar. To search the literature, some key terms such as “unethical activities”, “Islamic work ethics” and “social identity” were searched and analyzed.

Using the social identity theory, a conceptual process model is developed which suggests that when high-status employees propose unethical requests to employees, individuals with high morality are likely to refuse those unethical requests to protect their self-categorizations. However, taking the unfair advantage of their illegitimate powers, high-status employees are likely to eventually make wrong judgments and give unnecessary punishments to moral employees. It is further argued that consistent victimization is likely to negatively impact the social identity of such employees and leads to irritability in moral employees, particularly when such individuals are unable to get the requisite social support from their leaders.

While a considerable body of literature has focused on the antecedents and consequences of intense unethical business practices and the crucial role of leaders in such activities, limited attention has been given to the role of other employees and how they engage in mild unethical misconduct regularly, which is the key focus of this research. The novel conceptual framework needs to be tested in diverse contexts for further development and validation.

This research investigates whether focal firms employ strategic supply chain information disclosure, focusing on the concealment of supplier and customer identities, as part of their supply chain environmental risk management strategies (supplier sustainability risk and customer loss risk, respectively).

Using a panel dataset of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2019 and utilizing the suppliers’ environmental punishment of peer firms (peer events) as an exogenous shock and employing ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, this study conducts a regression analysis to test how focal firms disclose the identities of their suppliers and customers.

Our results indicate that focal firms prefer to hide the identities of their suppliers and customers following the environmental punishment of peer firms’ suppliers. In addition, supplier concentration weakens the effect of withholding supplier identities, whereas customer concentration strengthens the effect of hiding customer identities. Mechanism analysis shows that firms hide supplier identities to avoid their reputation being affected and hide customer identities to prevent the deterioration of customers’ reputations and thus impact their market share.

Our study reveals that reputation spillover is another crucial factor in supply chain transparency. It is also pioneering in applying the anonymity theory to explain focal firms’ information disclosure strategy in supply chains.

The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

In China, information-based construction management (ICM) has not obtained the expected results because of the benefit game between construction enterprises and the government. Promoting ICM is a long-term, complex and dynamic game process. Therefore, an evolutionary game model is established to promote ICM.

MATLAB was used to conduct evolutionary game analysis on the behavioural strategies of two parties. System stability analysis and numerical simulation were conducted. The variables affecting ICM realization were analysed and comprehensively considered. The optimal stability strategy and key variables were obtained.

The results show that the system includes four evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) with 10 decisive parameters. Information technology costs, benefits, reputation, the government intervention level, the enterprise ICM level and the degree of reward and punishment determine the ideal ESS. Increasing tangible benefits, enhancing corporate reputation, improving the level of government guidance and reducing intervention costs can promote ICM implementation. Rewards are more effective than punishments, and appropriate rewards should be determined.

First, reducing labour disputes, accidents and environmental pollution brings great social and ecological benefits; hence, the recognition of external benefits and the establishment of a benefit compensation mechanism by the government will be a future focus of research (Jia et al., 2020). Second, this study considered only the government and construction enterprises, and there may be other stakeholders, such as owners and the public, in the ICM adoption process, which needs further analysis (Zhang and Li, 2022). Third, this research is based on the specific context of government intervention in ICM. The selection of parameters and the determination of values were based on the national conditions in China. Therefore, the generalizability of the research results to other countries and other political contexts needs to be further improved (Hardie et al., 2013; Martínez-Román et al., 2017). Fourth, the empirical data were collected from Shandong Province and a pilot project, and the universality of the data remains to be verified. Nevertheless, the data were used only for the initial values of the simulation, which did not affect the simulation path.

(1) This study comprehensively summarized the benefit and cost indexes for the government and enterprises to promote ICM and constructed the payment matrix model. (2) This study determined the theoretical relation that the parameters should meet when system evolves into a certain strategy, and the research findings provide recommendations for overall control for the government and enterprises to synergistically adopt the ICM. (3) The study determined the influence of the main parameters on system evolution path and identified the core parameters, thus providing targeted improvement recommendations for the government and enterprises.

Real-time data-based management can ensure product quality and production safety and improve decision-making and efficiency. For the government, ICM can effectively reduce project quality and safety accidents, labour disputes, supplier mix-ups and environmental pollution, thus reducing the government's management costs and improving social benefits.

(1) Based on the challenges of ICM implementation, the payment matrix is constructed, with the cost and benefit parameters fully considered. (2) This study determines the theoretical relationship that should be met when both parties coordinate their implementation and when enterprises implement independently, and the optimal strategy is specified. (3) Incorporating an actual case, a simulation is conducted to clarify the influence of a single parameter on the evolutionary path of behaviours. (4) A decision-making basis for governments and enterprises to control and improve ICM is provided.

This study argues that online user comments on social media platforms provide feedback and evaluation functions. These functions can provide services for the relevant departments of organizations or institutions to formulate corresponding public opinion response strategies.

This study considers Chinese universities’ public opinion events on the Weibo platform as the research object. It collects online comments on Chinese universities’ network public opinion governance strategy texts on Weibo, constructs the sentiment index based on sentiment analysis and evaluates the effectiveness of the network public opinion governance strategy adopted by university officials.

This study found the following: First, a complete information release process can effectively improve the effect of public opinion governance strategies. Second, the effect of network public opinion governance strategies was significantly influenced by the type of public opinion event. Finally, the effect of public opinion governance strategies is closely related to the severity of punishment for the subjects involved.

The theoretical contribution of this study lies in the application of image repair theory and strategies in the field of network public opinion governance, which further broadens the scope of the application of image repair theory and strategies.

This study expands online user comment research to network public opinion governance and provides a quantitative method for evaluating the effect of governance strategies.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/OIR-05-2022-0269

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the symbiotic evolution decisions of digital innovation enterprises, research institutes and the government in the digital innovation ecosystem.

Based on innovation ecosystem theory and an evolutionary game model, this study constructs a tripartite symbiotic evolution game model of digital innovation ecosystems with digital innovation enterprises, research institutes and the government as the main bodies and analyzes the influencing factors as well as the evolution paths of the different behavioral strategies of each subject through numerical simulation.

The research shows that the digital innovation ecosystem has the characteristic of self-organization, which requires the symbiotic cooperation of each subject. The government plays an active role in any stage of symbiotic evolution, and the system cannot enter symbiosis under a low level of subsidies and penalties. Only when the initial willingness to cooperate of digital innovation enterprises and scientific research institutes is at a medium or high level is the system likely to become symbiotic. While digital innovation enterprises are more sensitive to government subsidies and punishments, scientific research institutes are more sensitive to the distribution proportion of cooperation income.

This study includes government regulation into the research scope, expands the research mode of the digital innovation ecosystem and overcomes the difficulties of empirical research in collecting dynamic large sample data. It vividly and systematically simulates the symbiotic evolution process of the digital innovation ecosystem, which provides a theoretical and practical reference for digital innovation ecosystem governance.

This research aims to conceptualize online shaming discourse in virtual communities and to serve as a practical guide for online community managers and members.

This conceptual study explores the construction of meanings in human interaction in online communities by presenting a conceptual model, “The Triple-Responsibility Model in Online Communities,” that is based on Kantian ethics.

The model includes characterizing the roles of core participants in online communities: writer, reader and group manager; and delineating four ethical principles – truth, necessity, proportionality and caution – that can help society find the golden mean between social change and respecting human dignity and concern for an individual’s public image and provide a theoretical contribution and practical guidelines.

It addresses shaming in virtual communities by suggesting a balance of several key principles, including truth, necessity, proportionality and caution. This is a new conceptualization of online shaming relevant to today's digital arena.

The guidelines can contribute to the ongoing political debate over what constitutes appropriate and justified regulation. Moreover, Facebook community leaders are responsible for formatting the group’s identity, the technical facets of group management and for setting group boundaries and determining the rules of participation. The posited rules may affect social media group managers, as they are called upon to leverage their privileged position and channel their media power into influencing online discourse.

The current study provides insights into how shaming can be used as a legitimate tool in society by implementing an ethical approach, resulting in guidelines that restrict online discourse for participants in virtual communities and affect the work of social media group managers and policymakers.

By presenting a new conceptual model, the authors suggest that ethics are a helpful tool and offer insights into how online communities' participants and managers should use their voice and balance between shaming and maintaining the dignity of the individual.