Search results

We examine the effect of firm ownership status on three environmentally relevant variables: energy efficiency, toxic emissions, and spending on pollution abatement. Prior research has demonstrated that public firms invest less than private firms and suggests this difference is due pressure from investors to strongly favor short over long-term earnings. We extend this logic to other firm behavior, examining whether publicly owned facilities invest in energy efficiency and pollution reduction differently than privately owned facilities. Using data from the US Census of Manufactures from 1980 to 2009, information on pollution from the Environmental Protection Agency Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and pollution abatement spending from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey, we find that facilities switching to public ownership are less energy efficient and spend less on pollution abatement than their privately owned counterparts. However, we also find that facilities switching to public ownership have lower toxic emissions than other facilities. We also examine how different sources of external pressures alter these results and find that increased regulatory scrutiny is correlated with increased energy efficiency, toxic emissions, and abatement spending. More concentrated institutional ownership in public firms is associated with lower energy efficiency as is a greater brand focus. These latter results are broadly consistent with the idea that publicly owned firms respond to pressures from investors with a reduced focus on environmentally relevant variables. However, since facilities switching to public ownership have lower toxic emissions, this suggests that there are two competing pressures in publicly owned facilities: cost pressures, consistent with lowered energy efficiency, and public perceptions, consistent with lower toxic emissions, particularly since TRI data became available. In this sense, the combination of ownership and transparency of information appears to influence how firms prioritize different stakeholders.

This paper studies the impact of ownership structure on performance in European banking both prior and during the recent crisis. We use a panel of European banks during the period 1996–2011 and utilize random effects estimations in order to identify differences in bank performance (profitability, loan quality, and cost efficiency) due to differences in ownership structure. Both stakeholder and shareholder banks have distinct advantages, shareholder banks showing better profitability before the crisis but stakeholder banks having higher loan quality before and during the crisis. Differences in profitability and loan quality between stakeholder and shareholder banks before the crisis are especially pronounced in countries that experienced a banking crisis after 2007. There is strong a heterogeneity in performance between different stakeholder ownership groups. With the exception of private savings banks, profitability and loan quality of stakeholder banks has improved relative to that of general shareholder banks during the crisis years. The paper contributes to the previous literature by comparing pre-crisis and crisis performance and includes more refined ownership classifications. The results indicate that the survival of the stakeholder model is due to its competitive advantages. Our findings provide support for those arguing that the diversity of organizational structures is worth preserving. Ownership pluralism should become a policy objective in the banking industry.

Managers of a sample of private and public banks in Greece were surveyed through the vehicle of agency theory. It was found that managers in private banks showed greater alignment of interests with those of the bank, their pay related to outcomes and they were more mobile in their jobs. Private banks also used more control mechanisms to align interests of their managers with those of the bank and displayed a different working climate. Given evolving organisation structures resulting from deregulation, the convergence of information technology and communications and the entry of firms from other industries, the implications of the findings for governance are important.

A growing literature links oil to conflict, particularly civil war. Greed/opportunity, grievance, and weak state arguments have been advanced to explain this relationship. This chapter builds on the literature on oil and conflict in two important ways. First, I examine a novel dependent variable, domestic terrorism. Much is known about the effect of oil on the onset, duration, and intensity of civil war, though we know surprisingly little about the potential influence of oil on smaller, more frequent forms of violence. Second, I treat oil ownership as a variable, not a constant, coding oil rents based on ownership structure. This is contrary to other related studies that assume oil is necessarily owned by the state. Using a large, cross-national sample of states from 1971 to 2007, several key findings emerge. Notably, publicly owned oil exhibits a positive effect on domestic terrorism. This positive effect dissipates, however, when political performance and state terror are controlled for. Privately owned oil, on the other hand, does not correlate with increased incidences of terror. This suggests that oil is not a curse, per se.

The transition from a product driven to market driven culture has enforced changes in management style in previously nationalised companies. This article examines the background to the phenomenon of privatisation in the United Kingdom and explores current practice. The transition to change over two decades has brought about more demanding and value conscious customers along with a technological revolution in information technology. Corporate culture is seen as the litmus test in shaping changes in performance, and a strong culture is an important factor in unifying the social dimensions of an organisation. Privatisation has seen changes emerge in some companies more dominantly than in others. The principal purpose of this paper is to use this background as a building block to describe the detailed empirical research that has been conducted within three previously nationalised companies. This research is reported in the next issue of this journal.

The purpose of this paper is to show the different attitudes to bank ownership and regulation, residential lending and eviction in the UK and France, with their effects in the credit crunch and how these factors are connected. UK non‐interventionism stems from a history of private banking, where competition produced plentiful finance but high risks for borrowers, where eviction is certain and fairly quick, but not necessarily disastrous for borrowers within a flexible system. The French history of post‐war interventionism for reconstruction and cautious banking has had successes and failures, culminating in large‐scale special loans to lower‐income borrowers, improving lending liquidity and stability. The French lower lending levels, intervention and caution can be partly explained by the disastrous effects of French debt and eviction processes on borrowers, but with overlay of delay and social protection.

The paper uses a historical institutionalist approach, calling on historical materials, statistics (where available) and the law and procedure of banking, mortgages, eviction and insolvency. Quantitative comparison of mortgage evictions is difficult, but procedures illuminate this.

National approaches to banking are path dependent and this effect is underestimated, particularly concerning attitudes to public intervention and eviction. Awareness of these connected effects could improve comparative research to assist lending to lower income groups, particularly concerning special French loans.

This can improve open‐mindedness, and promote ideas to house young people rather than simply calling for heavy regulation in the UK, or criticising French interventionism.

Comparative evictions related to the history of banking intervention are considerably understudied. The paper addresses the issues.

What are the trade-offs between public and private ownership in the business and how does this impact industries responsible for providing and offering services on critical national infrastructure? The privatisation of British Telecom (BT), the UK telecommunications provider that was initially part of the British Post Office, is used to explore this question. By broadening the business perspective beyond the political goals and economic consequences of privatisation; this study aims to approach management history provides new perspectives of the benefits and challenges offered by both public and private ownership.

To fulfil its purpose, this paper examines how the UK telecommunications incumbent proactively adapted from being an organisation shaped by its unique position within the public sector, to one embracing the challenges offered by the private sector. The analysis is synthesised by linking an understanding of the customer’s requirements, services and technology with surveys of the secondary literature, supported where applicable by archival material, combining perspectives from authors both within the organisation and external to it. Sources include specialist and more general academic material and contemporary and reflective publications from practising engineers and managers; supplemented by material held at the BT Archives and the Guildhall Library in London. It links the debate on ownership to the evolution of the market under study and provides a balanced view across the business, its market, competition and technology.

The arguments surrounding public or private ownership, are complex, in particular, it is difficult to separate effects due to liberalisation and privatisation. Whilst the former provided the impetus for beneficial change, the latter reduced the level of detrimental entanglement with government policy and enabled the technology and structural changes that took the market forward.

A new and balanced view of the privatisation of BT is taken, with an emphasis on how the company needed to change to thrive in a liberalised market, noting how technological change both required organisational change and enabled it. In contrast to many studies, the emphasis is on what was driving the organisation rather than the policy of privatisation and its effectiveness.

A special type of interaction and relationship exists between owners and public companies. Applying the business relationship perspective to owner relationships has some interesting implications. Contemporary theory assumes that the role of the owner is mainly providing financial resources (funding). Taking the business network perspective, the owner’s relationships are also important as these influence and shape interaction patterns including business relationships and thus the business network. Prior research has shown that the owner – especially if it is a business unit – can be directly involved in both the choice and development of specific customer and/or supplier relationships. These influences from owners can be much more important for the development of the company in question than providing financial resources. One consequence of applying this relationship view on ownership is that it offers the possibility of discussing public ownership in a similar way as private ownership.

I begin with a dispute over a fox hunt, by which to understand the law of tangible property, then develop that metaphor for the major types of intellectual property. I start with domestic U.S. patent law for the sake of concreteness, and generalize to other jurisdictions and types of intellectual property. In the latter parts of the paper I discuss the international implications of intellectual property, including especially the effects of information spillovers. The last part of the paper describes the hazards in analogizing “trade” in intellectual property rights to trade in goods, and particularly in interpreting international patent data. These hazards motivate the search for a structural model specially adapted to the purpose of valuing international intellectual property rights and rules. The goal is to give economists a simple and integrated framework for analyzing intellectual property across time, jurisdiction and regime type, with an eye towards eventually developing other incentive systems that have the advantages of property (such as decentralized decision-making), but fewer of the disadvantages.