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1 – 10 of over 58000Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some…
Abstract
Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.
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The “economic” (Chicago School) theory of regulationfails to explain many important features of regulatory history in theUSA, such as the periodicity of regulatory innovation, the…
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The “economic” (Chicago School) theory of regulation fails to explain many important features of regulatory history in the USA, such as the periodicity of regulatory innovation, the role of the organized consumer movement, and the roots of reform, including deregulation. J.Q. Wilson′s political theory of regulation accounts for these phenomena when interpreted in historical context. The widely‐held social values of Wilson′s theory are identified with the values articulated by the consumer movement. This theory suggests that regulation can indeed serve the public interest as understood from the perspective of consumerist values.
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Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely…
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Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.
This paper examines the various theoretical issues in regulation with a view to enhancing understanding of the regulation arena. Special emphasis has been placed on the banking…
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This paper examines the various theoretical issues in regulation with a view to enhancing understanding of the regulation arena. Special emphasis has been placed on the banking industry. The paper shows how regulation serves different purposes for different interest groups on different occasions. It further argues that because of the ever shifting concept of ‘public good’, shifting individual and group interest and, perhaps the entwinement of individual and public good, neither the capture theory or the public good theory has yet fully explained the rationale for regulation. A clear understanding of the theoretical issues involved in regulation is therefore important if the forces that drive regulation are to be appreciated fully.
The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and…
Abstract
The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.
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DAVID MCNICOL and ALMARIN PHILLIPS
INTRODUCTION During the past dozen years a relatively large theoretical literature has grown out of the models proposed by Averch‐Johnson (2) and, to a lesser extent, Wellisz…
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INTRODUCTION During the past dozen years a relatively large theoretical literature has grown out of the models proposed by Averch‐Johnson (2) and, to a lesser extent, Wellisz (90). Averch‐Johnson (here‐after A‐J) pointed out the now famous overcapitalization effect‐that a monopoly subject to rate of return regulation has an incentive to use more than the cost minimizing value of capital. The A‐J model was at first regarded as simply a theoretical explanation of what was long thought to be a significant cost of regulation. After languishing in this state for several years, the model achieved some popularity as a vehicle for theoretical explorations of various aspects of rate regulation. To date, the A‐J model has given rise to nearly forty papers on what has come to be called “the theory of regulatory constraint.”
This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of research in…
Abstract
This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of research in the field. The paper discusses the origins of the field and the roles of nonmarket strategy. The political economy framework is used and contrasted with the current form of the resource-based theory. The paper argues that research should focus on the firm level and argues that the strategy of self-regulation can be useful in reducing the likelihood of challenges from private and public politics. The political economy perspective is illustrated using three examples: (1) public politics: Uber, (2) private politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup, and (3) integrated strategy and private and public politics: The Fast Food Campaign. The paper concludes with a discussion of research issues in theory, empirics, and normative assessment.
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Musa Mbago, Joseph M. Ntayi and Moses Muhwezi
The purpose of the study is to develop and test an integrated compliance model using constructs derived from the legitimacy, deterrence, institutional and stewardship theories. A…
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The purpose of the study is to develop and test an integrated compliance model using constructs derived from the legitimacy, deterrence, institutional and stewardship theories. A Cross-sectional survey design was used to collect data from a sample of 97 out of the population of 129 Procuring and Disposing Entities which are regulated by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority Act (PPDA). Measurement items were derived from a critical review of literature and found to be both valid and reliable with Cronbach Alpha coefficient of 0.7. The findings reveal that legitimacy and stewardship behavior are significant predictors of compliance to the PPDA Act, Rules and Regulations. We therefore recommend that Procuring and Disposing Entities should continue legitimizing the procurement law through involvement of all stakeholders and promote stewardship behaviors among public employees.
Marianne Johnson and Martin E. Meder
X = multiple interpretations