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In this study we aim to examine a Durkheimian solution to the problem of social cooperation. Drawing on relevant literature on rituals and social solidarity, we make a case that both synchronous and complementary ritualistic acts can promote social cooperation by strengthening solidarity.

We used a lab experiment in which participants performed either synchronous, complementary, or uncoordinated group drumming. After the drumming, they self-reported their positive affect, feeling of being in the same group and trust. Then they played a five-round public goods game in which their levels of cooperation were observed.

We found both synchrony and complementarity help sustain group cooperation. Participants who drummed synchronously or complementarily contributed more to the public good than those in the baseline condition, especially in later rounds of the game. Individuals in the synchronous and complementary conditions also showed stronger feelings of being in the same group. Mediation analysis confirmed that the effects of ritual performance on cooperation are partially mediated by feelings of same-groupness.

Results of our study imply that ritual performance based on either members’ similarities or complementary differences can promote group solidarity and cooperation.

The study supports the classic Durkheimian solution to the problem of social cooperation. Consistent with recent research, we find the causal effect of synchrony on cooperation. Moreover, our new test of the effect of complementarity shows that being different but mutually supportive can effectively enhance solidarity and cooperation as well.

Due to the non-rivalrous and non-excludable characteristics of properties classified as being part of the cultural heritage of a city, owners of these properties face a lower incentive to maintain them. Many studies have advocated the participation of the local community in the maintenance of such “public” properties because community demands and tastes are better reflected through direct participation than through government intervention. One of the main factors that may determine whether or not such participation would be forthcoming is whether the community identifies with elements that the cultural heritage building represents. The purpose of this paper is to examine the cultural effects of the Chinese community with regard to the preservation of the heritage buildings that reflect the community’s early presence in George Town, Penang.

An experimental method was used to invoke feelings of social identity through historical and cultural photos about these buildings associated with the community. The authors attempted to create an emotional attachment to the cultural and historical values in a laboratory.

The authors found that information increased the participants’ positive feelings toward their historical and cultural backgrounds. This positive emotion might explain why the subjects appeared more willing to contribute to the public pool to maintain these buildings. The findings suggest that the incorporating cultural and historical information about heritage buildings may encourage more pro-social behaviors.

Although community participation and discussions can help to align the conservation objectives of diverse stakeholders, the divergence between individual and collective interests may cause individuals to shirk from their commitment, given the public nature of the goods. Therefore, investigating whether a factor that aligns diverse interests or the nature of the game can influence behavior is important to the development of strategies used in the provision of public good.

Although the impact of social identity on social dilemma has been widely studied, the empirical proof and its application to preservation of cultural heritage has not been studied. As far as the authors know, this is the first paper that experimentally proves the importance of social identity and its role in provision of social goods.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on conditional cooperation and investigate whether the difference in contributions between Partners and Strangers designs in linear public goods experiments can be explained by differences in beliefs.

The author conducted linear public goods experiments by using Partners and Strangers designs with belief eliciting their group member’s contributions.

The author shows that the difference in the magnitude of the responsiveness of contribution to belief (i.e. the marginal contribution to belief) creates different contribution levels in Partners and Strangers designs.

The presented results imply that having a strategic motive increases contributions by increasing the magnitude of the responsiveness of contribution to belief rather than by raising belief level.

The main claim of this paper is that “marginal contribution to belief” rather than “belief level” causes the difference in contribution levels between Partners and Strangers. This is the first proven evidence of a difference in belief between Partners and Strangers.

Blockholders can behave opportunistically because small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. In this chapter, we investigate the features of small shareholder voting using a theoretical framework. Specifically, we investigate when defeating a blockholder’s resolution is optional for shareholders. Regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication between small shareholders or focus on institutional investors and corporate governance tools that alter or add the threshold in the voting game also contribute to solving the coordination problem. These corporate governance initiatives can increase the relevance of AGMs in Europe.

We review the existing laboratory experimental studies on corruption that have generated results with clear policy implications. We present and discuss experimental findings on the role that both monetary incentives and nonmonetary motivations may play in corruption decision-making, and, hence, in the fight against corruption.

What is behavioral economics? This chapter explores a mismatch between what is included in the field of behavioral economics and some of the most visible Austrian critiques of behavioral economics. While paternalism, nudging, and a focus on irrationalities and biases are a big part of modern behavioral economics, the portrayal of the field of behavioral economics as being focused predominately upon those areas leaves a swath of low-hanging fruit that would be beneficial for Austrian scholars to consume and use in their own work.

Purpose – Motivated by new models of nonprofit organizations, we study a voluntary contributions environment in which the productivity of the public goods process is chosen endogenously by a manager. The experimental treatments incorporate two institutions of transparency in the organization, which we conjecture will assist the manager in achieving an outcome superior to the standard free-riding prediction.

Methodology – The chapter uses the methodology of laboratory experimental economics.

Findings – The findings demonstrate that transparency institutions can be important for assisting the manager and the stakeholders achieve relative stable and efficient outcomes.

Limitations – We discuss obvious areas for further investigation including environments in which firm productivity is only stochastically related to the decisions of the manager.

Practical and Social Implications – The chapter is oriented to real-world issues in the organization of nonprofit enterprises, which were a once ubiquitous and now re-emerging source of charitable activity. The chapter is written so that it should be accessible to informed practitioners in nonprofit organizations.

Originality – The study of endogenous environments and institutions in the provision of charitable and public goods is a relatively new advance and is indeed the theme of Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 13, “Charity with Choice.”

Are people more or less likely to use their power if they have high social status? This chapter discusses how having status affects the use of power by those in positions of power in exchange relations or small groups. Although status and power are typically assumed to be mutually reinforcing, there is growing recognition that having status may actually inhibit the use of power under certain conditions.

I review relevant research findings and consider three variables in particular that may moderate the effects of status on the use of power: legitimacy of status, achieved versus ascribed status, and individualist versus collectivist cultures.

While status and power are close correlates, there is growing recognition – particularly in organizational psychology – that, under certain conditions, having status may inhibit the use of power or that lacking status increases power use. These studies shed new light on how status interacts with power in hierarchical groups and challenge the pervasive view of power and status as mutually reinforcing forces that perpetuate inequalities. Understanding more precisely when and why status and power have convergent or divergent effects on power use is an important task for scholars of group processes.

The possibility that status and power can have distinct consequences, let alone opposite effects, presents an intriguing opportunity for scholars of group processes to rethink and extend our understanding of social hierarchies in a new light.

Purpose – We delineate how the concept of reputation has been used in different literatures. We develop some formal definitions of observers and reputation that bring together the different literatures. We then ask how noncooperative or “bad” reputations might be repaired. Based on the developed definitions and past research, we suggest some possibilities for reconciliation. We also work on developing an experimental paradigm to investigate reputation.

Methodological/Approach – We review research from different disciplines, develop definitions, and design an experiment.

Findings – We suggest that, under certain conditions, group reconciliation can occur. However, these conditions are quite specific.

Practical Implications – When the goal is to solve a social dilemma, reconciliation is an important part of the process. Without reconciliation, group integration is problematic.

Social Implications – Reconciliation can be a powerful process that encourages cooperation. We suggest some ways that reconciliation might be possible.

Originality/Value of the Chapter – This chapter suggests a new formalization to connect different conceptualizations of reputations.