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Nucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing occurred frequently during epidemics. This paper aims to provide a viable scheme for the government to strengthen the supervision of nucleic acid testing and to provide a new condition for the punishment for the negative act of the government and the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud.

This paper formulates an evolutionary game model between the government and nucleic acid testing institution under four different mechanisms of reward and punishment to solve the issue of nucleic acid testing supervision. The authors discuss the stability of equilibrium points under the four distinct strategies and conduct simulation experiments.

The authors find that the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty outperforms the strategies of static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The results reveal the appropriate punishment for the negative act of the government can enhance the positivity of the government's supervision in the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty, while the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud cannot be too high. Otherwise, it will backfire. Another interesting and counterintuitive result is that in the strategy of dynamic reward and dynamic penalty, the upper limit of the penalty for data fraud of nucleic acid testing institution cannot be augmented recklessly. Otherwise, it will diminish the government's positivity for supervision.

Most of the existing evolutionary game researches related to the reward and punishment mechanism and data fraud merely highlight that increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help improve the government's supervision initiative and can minimize data fraud of nucleic acid institution, but they fall short of the boundary conditions for the punishment and reward mechanism. Previous literature only study the supervision of nucleic acid testing qualitatively and lacks quantitative research. Moreover, they do not depict the problem scenario of testing data fraud of nucleic acid institution regulated by the government via the evolutionary game model. Thus, this study effectively bridges these gaps. This research is universal and can be extended to other industries.

We explore how sustainable management education (SME) can help prepare future leaders to manage crises effectively. Precisely, the intricacies of articulating moral and economic imperatives for businesses in a manner that engages students in sustainable behavior are a serious challenge for SME. We study how to integrate reminders of moral and economic imperatives in a socially responsible investment (SRI) stock-picking simulation created for SME.

Adopting an experimental design, we analyzed how the reminders affected the average environment social governance (ESG) integration in the portfolios of 127 graduate students in finance over a twelve-week period.

Our results show how essential it is to balance the two imperatives. The highest level of sustainable investment is attained when utilizing both reminders.

Our findings have practical implications for implementing and organizing SME in business schools to educate responsible leaders who are able to effectively manage crises. Learning responsible management is most effective when students are exposed to the inherent tension between moral and economic imperatives. Hence, our findings corroborate the win-win conception of SME.

No management decision study has experimentally measured the effects of SME practices on students' actual behavior. Our research fills this gap by complementing previous studies on the effectiveness of teaching practices, first by drawing on behavioral sciences and measuring changes in students' actual sustainability behavior and second by introducing moral and economic imperatives into an innovative teaching resource (TR) dedicated to SME.

The core of the successful implementation of the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode is to establish a high-quality relationship of cooperation, trust and sharing among participants. This paper proposes recommendations to improve the relationship quality of participants from the owner's perspective. The results provide the theoretical basis and practical guidance for the popularization and application of the IPD mode.

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship among participants in IPD mode based on supply chain theory and similarity theory. A tripartite game model of the owner, designer and the contractor is constructed to obtain the evolutionary equilibrium strategies under different parameter constraints. Then, numerical simulations under various scenarios are conducted to explore the dynamic evolution and the influencing factors of the relationship quality among the participant in the IPD mode.

The results show that (1) the relationship quality under certain conditions gradually improves as the project progresses until stable and high-quality cooperation is formed and (2) the owner's positive supervision cost, the distribution coefficient of incentive and punishment of participants and the scale of incentive pool are important factors influencing the relationship quality.

This study incorporates the following three innovations. First, analyzing the relationship quality among the participants of IPD mode based on supply chain theory. Second, the evolutionary game theory is applied to the relationship quality analysis. Third, conclusion innovation. The authors conclude that the relationship quality may progress, decrease or cycle with the progress of the project and targeted recommendations are presented based on the results.

This study analyzes the role of cooperative behavior in facing the risk of encouraging innovative agricultural production projects by small-scale farmers in the context of farmers in developing countries.

A within-subjects field experiment was conducted with small-scale Colombian panela cane farmers. The authors used the collected data to run the regression analyses.

The results suggest that when small farmers can follow cooperative behavior by joining a group and pooling resources to face risk, they are more willing to invest in a novel and profitable alternative, albeit riskier. However, the possibility of cooperating with a group to invest in a novel production project depends on its expected risk level.

These results will help develop agricultural policies for sustainable development. Establishing informal networks for small-scale farmers to deal with unpredictable risks may aid in developing innovative systems.

Agriculture is highly vulnerable to climatic impacts, which, combined with the inherent risk of innovation, may reduce small farmers' willingness to adopt innovation. Cooperation appears to be a mechanism for pooling resources and facing risk.

Research has focused on experimentally testing the effect of cooperative behavior when facing risk. The authors contribute to the literature by demonstrating the impact of the ability of small-scale farmers in rural areas to collectively manage risk on investment in innovative projects.

There is growing scholarly interest in the use of penalty in employment contracts which reduce employees' pay if the employee's performance does not meet a pre-specified performance threshold. Prior accounting research has focused exclusively on the effect of penalty on employee performance. In this study, the authors extend earlier research by examining how penalty affects the employers' wage offers. Prior research suggests that employers' generous wage offers in employment contracts are normally translated as trust by employees who in turn reciprocate with higher effort. The authors present a theory that predicts penalty reduces employers' wage offers. Then, the authors propose unrestricted communication between employers and employees as a potential moderator for the negative effect of penalty on trust and reciprocity.

The authors implement a controlled lab experiment with a 2 × 3 experimental design (Penalty: Present and Absent; and Communication: None, One-Way and Two-Way).

The authors develop their predictions by utilizing insights from motivational-crowding and organizational communication theories. The authors hypothesize and find evidence that employers' ability to penalize employees can reduce employers' motivation to offer generous wages. As a result, reduced trust demotivates employees to provide high effort. However, the authors find that a two-way communication moderates the negative effect of penalties by restoring trust, thereby, increasing reciprocity. Finally, the authors find evidence that relationship-oriented messages explain the moderating effect of communication.

This study is subject to limitations inherent in all experimental studies. The decisions in the study experiment are less complex than those found in practice. Moreover, there are significantly higher costs and potential benefits to shirk on effort in practice. The authors encourage future research on other organizational features that would influence the generalizability of their theory and results. Nonetheless, this study makes an important contribution to the literature on trust, reciprocity, gift-exchange contracts, managerial controls and communication.

This paper has several important implications for theory and practice. The authors show that the presence of penalty may not automatically result in increasing employees' effort level, contrary to traditional economic theory predictions. This effect is driven mainly by the crowding out effect of a penalty on employers' desire to signal trust. Therefore, the presence of an open communication channel may become an important tool to reverse the psychological effect of reduced trust when penalty is present. Therefore, the study's findings contribute to the trust–reciprocity literature on how management control system influences employers' and employees' behavior. These findings are especially germane given the trend in the workplace toward establishing open communication at different levels within the firm hierarchy. The study also contributes to the literature on trust–reciprocity as critical informal controls and social norms in accounting practices (Bicchieri, 2006; Stevens, 2019), shedding light on how firms may influence employees' reciprocity in management control practices and induce them to act in line with the firm's objectives by opening communication channels.

Prior accounting research document that penalty in employment contracts increases employee performance due to loss aversion. The study, however, demonstrates that the positive effect of penalty is not sustained in a gift-exchange contract. Specifically, the study's experimental results provide evidence that the availability of penalties can psychologically change the way employers perceive their decisions on offering generous wages (i.e. trust) and consequently reduce employees' reciprocation of high effort levels. Yet, the authors propose a two-way communication as a restorative mechanism for the lost trust. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

This study aims to determine website quality, young adult socialization and dark triad personality as the factors influencing the real estate purchase decision. In addition, this study also measures the mediating effects of young adult socialization on real estate purchase buying behavior.

Related literature, quantifiable variables with a five-point Likert scale, hypothesis testing and mediators are used to study the model. A systematic questionnaire that was divided into four sections was used. A total of 336 valid responses were collected and analyzed through a structural equation model.

The results suggest that dark triad personality and young adult socialization considerably affect real estate purchase decisions. The development proves website quality does not significantly impact real estate purchase behavior.

This study is limited to a few young consumers’ responses. Future studies could be more widespread globally and should include more variables and offline methods of purchasing behavior.

As per the review of existing literature, this research is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to determine the factors affecting the real estate purchase decision with factors like website quality, dark triad personalities and young adult socialization involving it.

Emotions, understood as evolving mental states, are pivotal in shaping individuals“' decision-making, especially in ambiguous information evaluation, probability estimation of events, and causality analysis. Public–private partnership (PPP) projects represent a confluence of “economic–environmental–social” dimensions, wherein stakeholder behavior follows the sequential progression of “cognition–emotion–action.” Consequently, comprehending the effects of emotional shifts on stakeholder's decision-making processes is vital to fostering the sustainability of PPP projects.

The paper utilizes rank-dependent expected utility and evolutionary game theory to systematically examine the influence of emotional factors on stakeholders' behavior and decision-making processes within PPP projects. The paper integrates three emotional state functions—optimism, pessimism and rationality—into the PPP framework, highlighting the intricate interactions among the government, private sector, surrounding public and the media. Furthermore, the paper amalgamates the evolutionary pathways of environmental rights incidents with the media's role. Through equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, the paper delves into the diverse interplay of emotions across different phases of the environmental rights incident, assessing the impact of these emotions on the evolutionary game's equilibrium results.

Emotions significantly influence the microlevel decisions of PPP stakeholders, adapting continually based on event dynamics and media influences. When the private sector demonstrates optimism and the surrounding public leans toward rationality or pessimism, the likelihood of the private sector engaging in speculative behavior escalates, while the surrounding public refrains from adopting a supervisory strategy. Conversely, when the private sector is pessimistic and the public is optimistic, the system fails to evolve a stable strategy. However, when government regulation intensifies, the private sector opts for a nonspeculative strategy, and the surrounding public adopts a supervisory strategy. Under these conditions, the system attains a relatively optimal state of equilibrium.

The paper develops a game model to examine the evolutionary dynamics between the surrounding public and private sectors concerning environmental rights protection in waste incineration PPP projects. It illuminates the nature of the conflicting interests among project participants, delves into the impact of emotional factors on their decision-making processes and offers crucial perspectives for the governance of such partnerships. Furthermore, this paper provides substantive recommendations for emotional oversight to enhance governance efficacy.

This study aims to help develop “business principles for stakeholder capitalism” in two steps. First, the study defines internal logic of three theories of capitalism and two variants within each theory. Second, it examines approaches to integration into modern democratic capitalism. Treating the three theories as substitutes identifies relative strengths and weaknesses; complementarity and partial overlap approaches to integration study the institutional settings within which stakeholder capitalism operates. Empirical outcomes reflect competition between market and stakeholder businesses for participants, with institutional conditions determining the scope of collective action.

The approach aligns three typologies in a unique conceptual arrangement defining the three theories of capitalism: forms of capitalism, potential failures of each form and associated types of goods. The first method examines the internal logic of each theory of capitalism. The second draws on traditional narrative review of references documenting each theory of capitalism and variants together with modern Marxist anti-capitalism.

Three typologies align uniquely with the theories of capitalism, each having two variants. Both variants of stakeholder capitalism are compatible with compassionate capitalism, constitutional government or polycentric governance but not with self-interest capitalism, dictatorship or Marxism. A theory of modern democratic capitalism allocates roles for private, club and social goods with empirically variable mixes occurring across countries. Competition among different types of enterprises provides an empirical test for comparative advantages of stakeholder capitalism. Future research should consider approaches for testing the proposed conceptual scheme in practice concerning capacity to deal with grand challenges, wicked problems and black swan events.

Research approach is limited to logical examination of theories and literature documentation without direct empirical confirmation. The study does not address practical implications for managers and public officials or social implications concerning private incentives, stakeholder cooperation or collective action.

Originality lies in shifting terms of debate about stakeholder capitalism from advocacy of substitute theories to understanding of its relationship to market capitalism and collective action capitalism. Value lies in explaining desirability of theoretical integration of three types of capitalism into a comprehensive framework for modern democratic capitalism.

This research paper aims to explore how social intrapreneurs use serious games to generate social innovation. In particular, the study depicts the coproduction process between caregivers acting as intrapreneurs, patients and other stakeholders, and unveils the contributions of serious games and their key features in producing social innovation within healthcare facilities.

Through an original case study, the article analyzes a social innovation initiated by caregivers in the French care eco-system. Primary and secondary data were used to observe and examine the successful implementation of a serious game. Specifically, caregivers in hospital designed a game that helps children overcome the stress and anxiety inherent to their hospital journey.

Results unveil the role of social innovations as catalyst of social intrapreneurship and the coproduction of services. In the healthcare setting, serious games both participate in improving the stay of child in hospitals, and in facilitating the working conditions of caregivers.

This article brings together the theoretical background of social intrapreneurship, social innovation and serious games. The successful implementation of social innovation depends on the intrinsic features of social intrapreneurs, coupled with those pertaining to serious games. The positive outcome of social innovation benefits both internal and external stakeholders. Such innovation improves the end users' experience, as the latter participate in the coproduction of their own care.

Building a smart city is a necessary path to achieve sustainable urban development. Smart city public–private partnership (PPP) project is a necessary measure to build a smart city. Since there are many participants in smart city PPP projects, there are problems such as uneven distribution of risks; therefore, in order to ensure the normal construction and operation of the project, the reasonable sharing of risks among the participants becomes an urgent problem to be solved. In order to make each participant clearly understand the risk sharing of smart city PPP projects, this paper aims to establish a scientific and practical risk sharing model.

This paper uses the literature review method and the Delphi method to construct a risk index system for smart city PPP projects and then calculates the objective and subjective weights of each risk index through the Entropy Weight (EW) and G1 methods, respectively, and uses the combined assignment method to find the comprehensive weights. Considering the nature of the risk sharing problem, this paper constructs a risk sharing model for smart city PPP projects by initially sharing the risks of smart city PPP projects through Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) to determine the independently borne risks and the jointly borne risks and then determines the sharing ratio of the jointly borne risks based on utility theory.

Finally, this paper verifies the applicability and feasibility of the risk-sharing model through empirical analysis, using the smart city of Suzhou Industrial Park as a research case. It is hoped that this study can provide a useful reference for the risk sharing of PPP projects in smart cities.

In this paper, the authors calculate the portfolio assignment by EW-G1 and construct a risk-sharing model by TOPSIS-Utility Theory (UT), which is applied for the first time in the study of risk sharing in smart cities.