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This paper discusses the nominal and real convergence regarding Greece being a country-member of the European Union (EU), and of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We argued that nominal convergence is relative to Maastricht criteria when real convergence has been investigated through six different axes: (1) the five Maastricht Criteria, (2) the GDP per capita in PPP prices, (3) the real GDP growth rates, (4) the minimum wages, (5) the HDI index development, and (6) the unemployment rates. We concluded for the case of Greece that by utilizing alternative indicators, such as the Maastricht criteria, and the above criteria only nominal convergence exists while real convergence appears to be a long-term target with many obstacles. In particular, Greece has managed to achieve the criteria proposed by the EMU (Maastricht Criteria) for membership, decisively different levels of unemployment, wages, and GDP growth rate/GDP per capita in PPP prices, and different human development indexes appear for the case of Greece.

This chapter is devoted to fiscal policy theory and to how its evolution influenced the policy principles implemented from the end of the World War II to the present. It shows how the theoretical foundations evolved, from the Keynesian theory according to which public expenditure was conceived as an instrument to sustain aggregate demand and achieve full employment, to the present theoretical framework in which, following the intertemporal approach, it has been downgraded to an external shock. The public debt issue is examined with the aim of explaining why sound public finance represents a primary policy objective in the Eurozone.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the nominal and real convergence of Czechia. The importance of the convergence of Czechia with the euro area is linked to the future intention of joining the Economic and Monetary Union after the Maastricht criteria are met. This chapter covers the period from 2004 to 2021. We argue that nominal convergence is relative to the Maastricht criteria, when real convergence focuses on different areas: the Maastricht criteria, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power standards and real GDP growth rate, labour market (minimum labour costs and unemployment rates. Findings suggest that Czechia has reported the strongest real convergence in the area of relative economic level, moderate convergence of labour costs and divergence of unemployment. The nominal convergence analysis suggests that Czechia will not meet the Maastricht benchmarks in the near future and is not ready to join the euro area given its high inflation rate and the state of public finances.

In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.

In its recommendation on the 2004 update of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), the European Commission (2004) issued country-specific recommendations for fiscal policy in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that have recently joined the European Union (EU) (henceforth the EU-10 countries). All countries except Estonia and Slovenia were urged to reduce their general government deficits, or to pursue low budget deficits in a credible and sustainable way within the multi-annual framework of EU budgetary surveillance. Some countries have received additional recommendations (the Czech Republic to reform its health care and pension systems, Estonia and Lithuania to avoid pro-cyclical policies, and Poland to reform its pension system). Most new Member States will consequently have to reduce their fiscal deficits and/or will have to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies to comply with the BEPGs, but also because of the required convergence within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Bearing in mind that the government balance for the new Member States was –5.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003, the required reduction of fiscal deficits will not be easy. This has been acknowledged by the Commission, which has argued that the need to reach and maintain sound budgetary positions will require an appropriate time path between the necessary consolidation and the appropriate fiscal stance supporting the transition. Particular attention will also need to be given to country-specific circumstances, in particular to initial budgetary positions, to ongoing structural shifts in the new Member State economies, and to the possible risks resulting from current account imbalances and strong credit growth.

This chapter aims to analyze whether member countries of the Pacific Alliance agreement showed economic and financial convergence during the 2010–2016 period. The sample consists of four Latin American countries that are members of the Alianza del Pacífico (Pacific Alliance): Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. We use an economic convergence index (ECI) to classify the degree of the countries’ convergence regarding a given monetary area, considering the size of their economy, and compute three criteria: (1) nominal variables (used to define the Maastricht criteria), which are inflation, long-term interest rates, public debt, fiscal deficit as percentages of gross domestic product (GDP), and exchange rate volatility; (2) real and cyclical variables such as real GDP growth, gap between real GDP and potential GDP, unemployment, current account balance as a percentage of GDP, and short-term interest rates; and (3) a conditional combination that unequally weights nominal and real variables. We also use correlation analysis to compare coefficients. The results can be analyzed in the medium term in terms of descriptive statistics of their real and nominal variables, convergence indexes, and correlation analysis. The results show that the countries of the Pacific Alliance under study are converging in terms of nominal variables such as interest rate, exchange rate, fiscal deficits, and government debt. Also it can be observed that convergence occurs in real and weighted variables, although to a lesser magnitude. In relation to real variables related to GDP growth and foreign trade, these variables adjust less quickly than nominal ones.

This paper is concerned to show how the Danish political elite interpreted and responded to the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis for the Danish economy. In particular, the paper describes how this interpretive construction focused primarily on three features of the Danish context to the exclusion of other perspectives; the first was an emphasis on the problems of the financial sector, of interest rates and state finances; the second was that Danish productivity increases were falling behind other comparable countries and part of the solution required new strategies towards labour and unemployment benefits; thirdly, the adverse effects of the crisis were causing an increase in government expenditure and a decline in government revenues which was rapidly becoming unsustainable. As a consequence, the Danish elite fell into the broader interpretation of the crisis embedded in the dominant view within the EU institutions as well as among the international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, that a period of austerity and fiscal consolidation was the required remedy, even though this was likely to be pro-cyclical in its effects. However, the paper shows that alternative data which is more reflective of Denmark’s position in the global economy and the trajectory and form of its growth over the last decade reveals that the interpretation of the Danish elite has been too narrow and neglects the distinctive roots of Denmark’s competitive strengths. Indeed, by responding in the way which they have, the Danish elite is in danger of undermining the very conditions of Denmark’s competitiveness.