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Since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, focus has shifted to its implementation at national level. In this regard, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that every state party needs an independent human rights institution for children which should, whatever its form, be able independently to monitor, promote and protect children’s rights. Ireland established its Ombudsman for Children in 2004, with a founding law that gives the institution a wide range of powers associated with the duty to promote children’s rights. These include the express duty to advise Government, raise awareness, undertake research, and consult with children about matters that concern them. The Ombudsman for Children also has the power to receive complaints from children and investigate actions of public bodies that have adversely affected a child in areas of social and health services, child protection and education. This chapter considers the exercise by the Ombudsman for Children of these statutory powers against the backdrop of international standards on independent institutions for children. It illustrates how the Ombudsman for Children has advanced children’s rights in Ireland by taking a proactive and strategic approach to its legislative mandate, and notes in particular the role that soft power – derived from the Ombudsman’s independence, legitimacy and influence – has helped to maximize the potential of the institution.

Hisbah is one of the distinguished institutions that had emerged since the early days of the Islamic empire. Based on its cardinal duty to enjoin good and prohibit evil, over time, its functions gradually expanded, and its responsibilities increasingly grew. In light of the contemporary trend in establishing institutional framework for consumer protection, entrusting an agency with multifarious tasks may not be the best and effective way in handling consumer protection issues. Thus, this chapter attempts to explore the new paradigm of hisbah as a consumer protection institution in Malaysia with a special reference to the Islamic consumer credit industry. While utilising the doctrinal legal research methodology, relevant sources of law have been examined and analysed. This research finds that the classical hisbah institution provides a good reference point in establishing regulatory agency and dispute management body. Nevertheless, some modifications are required to remain relevant especially in terms of specialisation of role and function. Likewise, it is viewed that adjustment of the hisbah institution is also necessary regarding the characteristic of the muhtasib (ombudsman).

In the academic year 2000–2001, I visited the U.S. What I found out concerning the “standards reform” in public education intrigued me. I had a conception of public schooling in the U.S. as a very decentralized system, mainly governed by local school boards. But during my stay, people talked about public schooling in terms of centralization, not only referring to the standards reform but also to other issues of state control, like tests and development projects. Some years earlier I had been made aware of changes in England that also were talked about in terms of centralization. Local school authorities lost much of their power in policy and decision-making to the central power of the state, and a national curriculum was introduced.

Chapters 2–6 have dealt in turn with how Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore have been effective in curbing corruption, as manifested in their rankings and scores on the five international indicators of the perceived extent of corruption. In contrast, Chapter 7 focuses on India’s ineffective anti-corruption measures and identifies the lessons which India can learn from their success in fighting corruption. The aim of this concluding chapter is twofold: to describe and compare the different paths taken by these six countries in their battle against corruption; and to identify the lessons which other countries can learn from their experiences in combating corruption. However, as the policy contexts of these six countries differ significantly, it is necessary to begin by providing an analysis of their contextual constraints before proceeding to compare their anti-corruption strategies and identifying the relevant lessons for other countries.

In Hungary, soon after the democratic transition in 1989/1990, the institution of the general ombudsman was established, based on the Swedish model, possessing broad oversight. Since 2012, with the Fundamental Law (new constitution) and a new ombudsman act entering into force, the defense of children’s rights has become one of the legal obligations of the general ombudsman. In this chapter, the author examines the historical background of this “hybrid” institution¹ and the performance of the last three commissioners based on the child rights approach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC).

The UN CRC represents the “whole child” approach, a holistic view of a child which also informs the work of independent children’s rights institutions (ICRIs). Hence, the four guiding principles of the UN CRC² (the right to non-discrimination; the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and the right to participation) can be seen as analyzable elements of an ICRI’s performance. There are also “informal” factors that can influence the performance of an ICRI – even a stand-alone – for example, social and political recognition of the institution, the societal and legal regard of children (are their rights widely recognized or not, etc.), the personal motivation and drive of the ombudsman, the ombudsman’s own interests and background, the financial constraints of the office and the overall political atmosphere and various political influences around. These factors can play a vital role, but their existence can only be assumed in cases where the institution’s more exact outputs based on the UN CRC guiding principles can be seen: the appearance of children in its work, attention to vulnerable groups and cases related to non-discrimination, the number of complaints submitted to the commissioner (including those by children) and the appearance of best interests of children in cases. The author has found differences between the last three commissioners’ performances based on the guiding principles, which are also not independent from informal factors too.

The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity to review net neutrality and the notion that bright light rules are necessary to hold broadband providers from exercising market power. The 2015 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Open Internet Order asserted that broadband providers have the capability and incentive to harm their customers and third-party service providers. It imposed a set of rules to control broadband providers’ offers, prices, and traffic management. The 2017 FCC vacated all but the transparency provisions of the OIO, restoring the oversight of broadband to the FTC.

This paper offers a review of the evidence regarding the effects of net neutrality regulation, including an investigation of the incidence of violations, or lack thereof, during the 2020 pandemic in the United States. It provides a review of the net neutrality literature and the international research on broadband provider behaviour during COVID-19. The paper presents original research conducted with FCC and FTC reports and a survey of news stories. Brief reviews of federal data on network performance and broadband adoption provide additional context. Given the limited incidence of violations that could be uncovered for the period, the paper suggests why broadband providers behaved opposite to regulatory advocates’ predictions. Contrary to many policy assertions, broadband providers did not block or throttle service, nor did they increase prices arbitrarily or decrease quality. Broadband providers appeared to expand availability, lower broadband prices, and make more networks available, frequently without customer charge. The paper suggests how policy could be updated to reflect the actual behaviour of broadband providers.

Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, states have the obligation to implement and monitor children’s rights. A key element thereof is the creation of independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of children rights (independent children’s rights institutions – ICRIs). All over the world a wide variety of such institutions can be found. In this chapter, the authors aim at providing a broader understanding of how to research ICRIs’ capacity to monitor and promote children’s rights. The authors use the case of the Dutch Children’s Ombudsman and an evaluation of this institute to draw out key elements of such research. This chapter shows the importance of studying the political process behind the establishment of an ICRI, and conceptualize and measure the autonomy of an ICRI in a comprehensive way. Moreover, the chapter sketches how an ICRI is part of a wider “children’s rights landscape” engaging with children’s rights actors at different levels. Multidisciplinary research is needed to grasp these elements and conduct a comprehensive assessment of an ICRI.