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Emotions, understood as evolving mental states, are pivotal in shaping individuals“' decision-making, especially in ambiguous information evaluation, probability estimation of events, and causality analysis. Public–private partnership (PPP) projects represent a confluence of “economic–environmental–social” dimensions, wherein stakeholder behavior follows the sequential progression of “cognition–emotion–action.” Consequently, comprehending the effects of emotional shifts on stakeholder's decision-making processes is vital to fostering the sustainability of PPP projects.

The paper utilizes rank-dependent expected utility and evolutionary game theory to systematically examine the influence of emotional factors on stakeholders' behavior and decision-making processes within PPP projects. The paper integrates three emotional state functions—optimism, pessimism and rationality—into the PPP framework, highlighting the intricate interactions among the government, private sector, surrounding public and the media. Furthermore, the paper amalgamates the evolutionary pathways of environmental rights incidents with the media's role. Through equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, the paper delves into the diverse interplay of emotions across different phases of the environmental rights incident, assessing the impact of these emotions on the evolutionary game's equilibrium results.

Emotions significantly influence the microlevel decisions of PPP stakeholders, adapting continually based on event dynamics and media influences. When the private sector demonstrates optimism and the surrounding public leans toward rationality or pessimism, the likelihood of the private sector engaging in speculative behavior escalates, while the surrounding public refrains from adopting a supervisory strategy. Conversely, when the private sector is pessimistic and the public is optimistic, the system fails to evolve a stable strategy. However, when government regulation intensifies, the private sector opts for a nonspeculative strategy, and the surrounding public adopts a supervisory strategy. Under these conditions, the system attains a relatively optimal state of equilibrium.

The paper develops a game model to examine the evolutionary dynamics between the surrounding public and private sectors concerning environmental rights protection in waste incineration PPP projects. It illuminates the nature of the conflicting interests among project participants, delves into the impact of emotional factors on their decision-making processes and offers crucial perspectives for the governance of such partnerships. Furthermore, this paper provides substantive recommendations for emotional oversight to enhance governance efficacy.

The paper aims to elucidate effective strategies for promoting the adoption of green technology innovation within the private sector, thereby enhancing the value of public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operational phase.

Utilizing prospect theory, the paper considers the government and the public as external driving forces. It establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government regulators, the private sector and the public. The paper uses numerical simulations to explore the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and the determinants influencing each stakeholder.

The paper demonstrates that government intervention and public participation substantially promote green technology innovation within the private sector. Major influencing factors encompass the intensity of pollution taxation, governmental information disclosure and public attention. However, an optimal threshold exists for environmental publicity and innovation subsidies, as excessive levels might inhibit technological innovation. Furthermore, within government intervention strategies, compensating the public for their participation costs is essential to circumvent the public's “free-rider” tendencies and encourage active public collaboration in PPP project innovation.

By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the paper comprehensively examines the roles of government intervention and public participation in promoting green technology innovation within the private sector, offering fresh perspectives and strategies for the operational phase of PPP projects.

This study investigates the media activities of firms issuing private equity placements and seasoned equity offerings in Taiwan, as firms have incentives to manage media coverage to influence their stock prices during private equity placement.

We collect a corpus of news stories and transform the news into term sets based on the part of speech. Then, we refer to Cecchini et al. (2010) to classify the news terms into positive, negative, and usual categories. Next, we employ the SVM algorithm to perform the classification tasks and the term frequency method to perform the text mining task. In last, we use a multiple regression model to verify the hypotheses.

We determine that issuing firms in a private placement have substantially more positive news stories and fewer negative news stories than those in public offerings. Furthermore, we evidence that the media management effects of postequity issues are more active than those of preequity issues. Finally, our results demonstrate that the timing and content of financial media coverage among different equity issuance methods may be biased by firm management. According to previous studies, they may attempt to manipulate stock prices to increase the number of highly profitable insider stakeholders.

To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate that if private placement will associate with more active media management than the public offerings. According to our results of the difference-in-means test, the public offerings market may control news coverage; however, this result is inconsistent with that of the regression results. The private placements market may also exercise media management in the “before announcement day” and “after announcement day” periods by increasing positive news and reducing negative news.

Public-private partnership (PPP) power projects are associated with varying risk factors. This paper aims to develop a fuzzy quantitative risk allocation model (QRAM) to guide decision-making on risk allocation in PPP power projects in Ghana.

A total of 67 risk factors and 9 risk allocation criteria were established from literature and ranked in a two-round Delphi survey using questionnaires. The fuzzy synthetic evaluation method was used in developing the risk allocation model.

The model’s output variable is the risk allocation proportions between the public body and private body based on their capability to manage the risk factors. Out of the 37 critical risk factors, the public sector was allocated 12 risk factors with proportions = 50%, while the private sector was allocated 25 risk factors with proportions = 50%.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research presents the first attempt in Ghana at endeavouring to develop a QRAM for PPP power projects. There is confidence in the model to efficiently allocate risks emanating from PPP power projects.

The optimal payment in the whole operation and maintenance period of water environment treatment PPP projects has become the main approach to realize sustainable development of projects. This study is aimed at constructing an effective payment model for the whole life period of projects to achieve win-win among all stakeholders, so as to provide a theoretical reference and managerial implications for the public sector in the whole operation and maintenance period.

In the whole operation and maintenance period of water environment treatment PPP projects, this article investigates how the public sector optimizes the payment in the whole operation and maintenance period of projects. Firstly, the projects' whole operation and maintenance period is divided into several stages according to the performance appraisal period. And then, the multi-stage dynamic programming model is constructed to design the payment construct model for the public sector in each performance appraisal stage. The payment from the public sector is the decision variable, and the deduction from the private sector is a random variable.

The optimal payment model showed that the relatively less objective weight of public sector leaded to its relatively more total payment and vice versa. Therefore, the sustainable development of the projects can only be ensured when the objective weights both of them should be balanced. Additionally, the deduction from the performance appraisal of private sector plays an important role in the model construction. The larger deduction the private sector undertakes, the smaller profits private sector has. Since the deduction at each stage is a random variable, the deduction varies with the different probability distributions obeyed by the practical deduction in each stage.

The findings from this study have provided theoretical and application references, and some managerial implications are also given. First, the improvement of the pricing system of public sector should be accelerated. Second, the reasonable profit of the private sector must be guaranteed. While pursuing the maximization of social benefits, the public sector should make full use of the price sharing mechanism in the market and supervise the real income situation of the private sector. Third is increasing the public to participate in pricing. Additionally, it is a limitation that the deduction is assumed to conform to a uniform distribution in this study. Other probability distributions on deduction can be essentially further sought, so as to be more line with the actual situation of the projects.

The optimal payment in whole operation and maintenance period of the projects has become an important issue, which is a key to project success. This study constructs a multi-stage dynamic programming model to optimize payment in the whole period of projects. Additionally, this study adds its value through deeply developing the new theories of optimal payment to more suitable for the practical problems, so that to optimize the design of payment mechanism. Meanwhile, a valuable reference for public and private sectors is provided to ensure the sustainable development of the projects.

The aim of this paper is to explore the family firms' propensity to undertake R&D investments after going public, showing how it varies due to the ownership structure.

The analysis is based on a sample of 132 French and Italian family and nonfamily IPOs in the period 2013–2018.

The empirical findings show a positive relationship between the quantity of post-IPO shares retained by family owners and R&D investments. Furthermore, the abovementioned relationship is negatively affected by the generational stage and positively by the presence of a lone founder.

Outside investors of family firms may be assured in buying shares of founding family firms after going public because they are stimulated to undertake R&D investments and therefore create overall value in the long term. Furthermore, external managers of lone-founder and first-generation family firms can adopt innovation investments without fear of being replaced as a consequence of a hostile takeover. Lastly, private equity should support later generation family IPOs, providing them with capital and managerial skills in order to generate value for shareholders.

Past studies have mostly shown family firms' reluctance to undertake R&D investments; however, scholars have focused on private or public family firms, ruling out the analysis of family firms' innovation behaviour within the setting of an IPO. To the best of the author's knowledge, this study represents the first empirical attempt to investigate the relationship between family firms and post-IPO innovation investments, when the capital infusion relaxes the financial constraints of family firms.

Promoting technological innovation is important to address the complexity of major engineering challenges. Technological innovations include short-term innovations at the project level and long-term innovations that can enhance competitive advantages. The purpose of this study is to develop an incentive mechanism for the public sector that considers short-term and long-term efforts from the private sector, aiming to promote technological innovation in major engineering projects.

This study constructs an incentive model considering the differences in short-term and long-term innovation efforts from the private sector. This model emphasizes the spillover effect of long-term efforts on current projects and the cost synergy effect between short-term and long-term efforts. It also explores the factors influencing the optimal incentive strategies for the public sector and innovation strategies for the private sector.

The results indicate that increasing the output coefficient of short-term and long-term efforts and reducing the cost coefficient not only enhance the innovation efforts of the private sector but also prompt the public sector to increase the incentive coefficient. The spillover effect of long-term innovation efforts and the synergy effect of the two efforts are positively related to the incentive coefficient for the public sector.

This research addresses the existing gap in understanding how the public sector should devise incentive mechanisms for technological innovation when contractors acting as the private sector are responsible for construction within a public-private partnership (PPP) model. In constructing the incentive mechanism model, this study incorporates the private sector's short-term efforts at the project level and their long-term efforts for sustained corporate development, thus adding considerable practical significance.

The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

The purpose of this paper was to first identify and then model the impact of critical success factors (CSFs) of public–private partnership (PPP) power projects.

Review of empirical literature came out with 20 CSFs which were ranked by experts and industry practitioners through a two-round Delphi questionnaire survey.

These CSFs were grouped into CSF groups (CSFGs) using component analysis, and they served as the input variables for fuzzy analysis. The six components were collaboration and transparency, guarantee and permits, socio-political support, expected profitability, technical feasibility and risk allocation (RA). Overall success index of PPP power projects in Ghana was 5.966 and showed there is high impact of CSFGs on project success. Fuzzy analysis also confirmed RA as the most significant CSFG.

The model developed can serve as a multi-dimension CSF framework that can be used as a success attainment tool for PPP power projects. For policy developers and stakeholders, the model serves as a pointer to issues which the government/public sector must focus on to attract huge investments from the private sector in the power sector.

This chapter aims to contribute to the literature on sustainability in the public sector by discussing how human resource and human resource management can help to integrate environmental management into organizations and improve environmental performance. Public sector scholars have neglected the study of Green Human Resource Management (GHRM) until now. Nevertheless, implementing such practices could lead to positive outcomes regarding awareness of environmental issues, organizational reputation and attractiveness, job satisfaction and organizational performance. The authors discuss the relevance and the necessity of developing a field of research on GHRM in public organizations. Starting from a conceptual review of the main literature on GHRM, this chapter provided some directions for future research.