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This study aims to seek to fill a gap in regulatory impact assessment in developing countries by presenting an analysis of how formal regulation impact on the efficiency and productivity of financial non-governmental organisations (FNGOs) in Ghana. Much has been written about the formal financial sector, but very little is known about the lower end of microfinance and the impact of formal prudential regulation on FNGOs providing microfinance services. The Bank of Ghana (BOG), nevertheless, in the year 2011, extended formal prudential regulation to FNGOs without any empirical basis. This study uses regulatory theories and empirical evidence to aid in the evaluation of whether formal prudential regulation is appropriate for FNGOs operating within the microfinance sector.

Empirical evidence derived from FNGOs, regulatory agents, consumers and financial lawyers within the Greater Accra and Ashanti Regions of Ghana served as the basis of the analysis in this study. Descriptive statistics, frequency counts and percentage scores, were used to analyse the data collected.

The existing structures of FNGOs in Ghana are unsuitable for formal prudential regulation. The BOG does not have adequate staffing and funding to supervise and monitor the microfinance activities of FNGOs. Formal prudential regulation could impede growth and efficient delivery of microfinance services.

The BOG is the only regulatory agency responsible for regulating the financial market in Ghana, thus access to officers with knowledge in the regulatory regime was very limited.

The study revealed in depth information about FNGOs, microfinance and the impact of formal prudential regulation on FNGOs.

The study is the first to use empirical studies and theories of regulation to assess the impact of extending formal prudential regulation to FNGOs in Ghana. Data from the regulator, the regulated and consumers, the key players in any regulatory process, served as the basis of the analysis in the study resulting in the unravelling of in-depth information on the regulation of FNGOs.

This article aims to provide insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe.

First the authors define the potential changes in financial markets and then the tools available for the regulator to tame them. Finally, they build five scenarios according to the main evolutions observed on the financial markets and on the tools used by the regulator to modify these trends.

Among the five scenarios defined, two present highly unstable features since the regulator refuses to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance in order to preserve financial stability. Three of them achieve financial stability. However, they are more or less efficient or feasible. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst, because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the “European government” might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.

Foresight studies on financial markets and regulation are quite rare. This may be explained by the difficulty to forecast what will be their evolution in the coming decades, not least because finance is fundamentally unstable. This paper provides a framework to consider what could be the best strategy of regulators in such an unstable environment.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in relation to Basel accords implementation. As a risk manager practitioner at a financial institution and in-charge of Basel implementation in a Basel accords environment of banking regulation, the author has been intrigued by the theoretical basis of the design of Basel accords. The objective was to investigate a theoretical model in the literature according to which the accords were designed. In case of deficiency in the literature of this model, the author seeks to provide a juxtaposition to the theoretical model that explains the accords adoption and implementation by regulators.

This paper presents a review of existing literature.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize and provide commentary on the US Department of Treasury's Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, issued on March 31, 2008.

The paper summarizes and comments on the short‐, intermediate‐, and long‐term recommendations laid out in the Blueprint. The short‐term recommendations are to modernize the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, principally by broadening its focus to include the entire financial sector; to address gaps in mortgage origination oversight, principally though creating a federal Mortgage Origination Commission; and to enhance the Federal Reserve Board's current temporary liquidity provisioning process. The Treasury's intermediate‐term recommendations are intended to modernize the regulatory structure and to eliminate duplication. They are to phase out and transition the thrift charter to the national banking charter; to merge the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); to establish a uniform, comprehensive regulatory system for, and create a federal charter for, “systemically important” payment and settlement systems; and to create an optional federal charter for insurers. The Blueprint's long‐term optimal regulatory structure envisions an “objectives‐based” regulatory approach in which three primary regulators would be established to focus individually on market stability regulation, prudential financial regulation and business conduct; three types of charters for financial institutions: federal insured depository institutions, federal insurance institutions, and federal financial services providers; the Federal Reserve Board assuming the role of market stability regulator; a prudential federal regulatory agency to regulate financial institutions with some type of explicit government guarantee associated with their business operations; and a conduct‐of‐business regulatory agency to regulate the business conduct of all financial institutions. In addition to the three objectives‐based regulators, the Blueprint recommends establishing two other regulatory entities: a federal insurance guarantee corporation and a corporate finance regulator.

The Blueprint finds that substantial regulatory reform is necessary to respond to significant developments including globalization of the capital markets, innovative and sophisticated new financial products and trading strategies, growing institutionalization of the capital markets, and convergence of financial service providers and financial products. Among the areas where one may see action and debate in the near future are: broadening the scope and membership of the President's Working Group on Capital Markets, adoption of uniform minimum licensing standards and the creation of a mortgage origination commission, further discussion of the terms and conditions attached to non‐depository institutions' access to the Federal Reserve discount window, continuing debate around the possible merger of the SEC and the CFTC, and updating by the SEC of the self‐regulatory organization (SRO) rule‐making process.

The paper is a clear and concise summary with commentary from expert securities lawyers.

The EU prudential regime for investment firms comprising the Directive (EU) 2019/2034 (IFD) and Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 (IFR) introduces a fit-for-purpose capital framework for investment firms. The capital impact on the practice of investment management can be material depending on firms’ specific business models and risk profiles, which may require them to take strategic decisions with respect to the services they provide. Despite the importance of this issue for the practice of investment management, there exists no study among the existing studies that focuses on this issue. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature.

This paper reviews the calibration approaches the European Banking Authority (EBA) has used by exploring the deficiencies of the regime with respect to the calibration of categorization thresholds and coefficients that are used by the EBA to calculate regulatory capital requirements.

This paper sets out that the choice of the relevant percentile for setting the firm categorization thresholds was not based on any theoretical rule. It also discusses that the calibration of the K-factors was subjective and lacked consistency. In addition, it criticizes the sample that the EBA used for business model coverage on the grounds that it was unbalanced, resulting in certain K-factors driving the overall capital impact.

Further research is needed on the calibration of thresholds as this will remain a crucial factor for the effectiveness of the new regime. In particular, a more data-driven and transparent approach would be necessary to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the thresholds.

This paper leads to the policy implication that, despite its merits that overweigh its shortcomings, potential market competition and financial stability issues that may stem from inconsistencies and a general lack of objectivity in certain aspects of the regime should not be underestimated by the EU policy makers.

The present paper contributes to the existing knowledge primarily by reviewing the EBA’s calibration approaches with respect to the K-factor coefficients and firm categorization thresholds, concluding that lack of objectivity and precision in the relevant methodologies could distort capital allocation decisions in the practice of investment management.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the regulatory and other responses to the recent credit crisis with particular emphasis upon likely regulatory reform.

The paper is based upon an analysis of recent papers, speeches and articles to draw together common themes for regulatory reform across the European Union (EU). It pays particular attention to two key papers, that from the Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority (The Turner Report) and from the senior EU Group, the de Larosiere Report.

It is suggested that some nine or ten common themes emerge for regulatory reform from the many authoritative writings on the subject and that the timeframe for change is very likely to be much shorter that is the norm for international action. However, some areas of debate are noted, for example, how the role of national vs international regulators is to be resolved.

All regulated financial services firms, whether banks or not, should expect a far higher level of regulatory intervention and with change occurring more quickly that would normally be expected.

In pulling together and analysing most of what has been written to date on the topic of regulatory reform the paper gives a unique overview of likely future developments. By identifying common themes it shows regulated firms the areas where more intervention is most likely to occur and highlights the timescale for that.

This paper describes the problems of bank regulation and supervision found in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, highlighting the institutional weaknesses facing bank regulators. It also reviews the recent banking regulation and supervision reforms designed to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory capacity of the central bank in all three countries and discusses the efficacy of the reforms in mitigating financial distress. It concludes that, while significant strides have been taken in all three countries, there is an important aspect of these reforms that needs to be addressed — the practical problem of differentiating between appropriate and inappropriate regulations for developing economies.

The purpose of this paper is to review the development of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and examine the manner in which this has been implemented for investment firms in Malta. The paper also assesses the challenges that small and medium‐sized investment firms may face as a consequence of the proposed CRD IV, which seeks to safeguard the stability of the European banking sector.

A literature review of relevant EU and Malta legislation and policy documents has been carried out. The arguments made in the paper are the result of the author's reflections on the subject and discussions held with other policy experts on capital adequacy in Malta and the UK.

The paper considers the CRD from the perspective of small and medium‐sized investment firms and sheds light on the challenges faced by Malta with regards to the implementation of the CRD for these type of firms. It also examines the approach taken by the Malta Financial Services Authority in order to address these challenges.

Possible future challenges that might arise in view of CRD IV are also considered. It is a central argument of this paper that capturing investment firms, particularly small and medium‐sized firms, within the scope of regulation, the main purpose of which is to address systemic risk, may result in over‐regulation.

This paper aims to focus on a number of unexpected disclosures by major Australian banks, to highlight the subjectivity of financial reports and their failure to present an accurate portrayal of the underlying realities, and to propose that corporate governance disclosures are required to provide reassurance that financial reports are trustworthy.

Mouck's institutional framework of financial regulation portrays financial reporting as a “game” played within a set of rules. It provides insights about the subjectivity of financial reports which are illustrated with archival evidence from banks' reports and activities.

The banks' financial reports were shown, in the light of later revelations, to portray an unrealistic view of their operations. Disclosures about corporate governance practices play a strong legitimising role, enhancing perceptions that financial reports correspond with organisational realities.

This study considers a narrow population of companies within one industry. By extending the focus, greater evidence could be provided that accounting standards and financial reporting requirements have lost their connection with business practices.

In spite of financial reporting reforms, financial reports are becoming less reflective of companies' activities and performance. This questions the usefulness of accounting standards, and the effectiveness of regulatory systems. Future reforms to accounting standards need to address these issues.

The paper demonstrates the contention that the financial reports of several Australian banks fail to match the realities that lie beneath is really a broader challenge to the usefulness and credibility of Australia's system of financial reporting and regulation.

The Independent Banking Commission (Vickers) Report is not only one of the most significant developments in the banking regulatory and supervisory context in the UK in recent times but is also one that would considerably impact banking and capital markets functions and trends in this decade. The purposes of this paper are two‐fold: to analyse the interim Vickers Report within the larger paradigm of the prudential banking regulatory approach in the UK, particularly in the context of the debate of bailing out banks that are too‐big‐to‐fail; and to critically examine the recommendation of the Report in the context of the failure of Northern Rock in 2007. The central focus of the paper is to analyse the probable impact and shortcomings of the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, i.e. requirement to hold an additional capital buffer in order to separately ring‐fence retail functions and retail deposits of universal banks and financial institutions operating in the UK.

The method used is a combination of legal examination and case‐study based analysis. This paper sees the failure of Northern Rock as essentially a consequence of supervisory lapses by the FSA and raises relevant critical questions as to the efficacy of the recommendation of the Vickers Report in the context of such supervisory lapses and failures. While relying primarily on official publications in the public domain, journal articles, academic writings, and, newspaper articles, this paper explores the related regulatory and financial implications of the Vickers Report recommendation in the backdrop of the banking crisis in the UK.

The paper concludes that the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, to ring‐fence retail functions universal banks operating in the UK, goes only mid‐way in securing the twin objectives of stability and safety that the Report has set out to achieve.

The present Report is an interim one and the final version of the Report is expected in September. Further, various oversight reports and recommendations by the FSA and other bodies are expected as a follow‐up to the final Report. The key recommendation of the requirement for universal banks operating in the UK to hold additional capital for ring‐fencing their retail functions and deposits is not expected to undergo any substantial modification or revision in the final Report.

This paper is of immense significance to bankers, supervisors, lawyers, auditors, consultants, researchers, jurists, and, those engaged in or with various issues and sectors in financial and banking regulation.