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This Chapter is written in an era in which the United Nations (UN) routinely deploys Missions to environments that satisfy the armed conflict threshold. Such Missions often require personnel to employ significant levels of force, whether to safeguard mission and humanitarian personnel, to protect civilians, to neutralise violent armed groups or, in pure self-defence. But use as well as non-use of force can readily frustrate the very objectives these troops are deployed to uphold, in turn creating gaps between the Promises they make and the Outcomes they actually secure. On the other hand, current Missions such as MINUSMA in Mali have proven to be amongst the deadliest for UN troops in the entire history of UN Peacekeeping. The thin line between use and non-use of force must therefore be trodden with utmost care. This Chapter tries to find answers to this dilemma from a moral perspective and considers how the peculiar nature of the morality of resort to force by the UN influences that of its use of force. It assesses why the latter should be calibrated or adjusted to comply with the former, and how this can consequently channel UN troop conduct towards the objectives pursued through deployment. It is only where these realities are understood and addressed, the Chapter submits, that the aforementioned Gaps between Promises and Outcomes can be redressed and closed.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the current limitations in compensating the civilian victims of armed conflicts and to examine the possibility of extending this practice.

Methodology/approach – The first half of the chapter employs legal and political analysis of the current framework of international law and the practice of the United States. The latter half of the chapter examines the literature on theory of liability in economics and philosophy.

Findings – The framework of international law, which does not require compensation for the victims of lawful attacks, is increasingly at odds with the current trend in which military force is used by a powerful state against a much weaker state on the grounds that the local population would benefit from the operation. The system developed by the United States is the most extensive and can form a model for other states and international institutions. Keating's analysis of enterprise liability can be applied to compensation of victims in military operations that are deemed to be beneficial to the population. Economic analysis, on contrary, suggests that compensation of civilian victims has minimal effect on the level of risks.

Originality/value – This chapter makes a unique contribution by applying theory of liability to a situation that widely diverges from the context in which the theory has developed. It critically examines the current practice and proposes a morally preferable and economically sustainable alternative model.

I intend to provide an understanding of the possibilities that exist for the judgment of wartime rape at the international, domestic and in-between levels.

What is required is an examination of prosecutions and judgments of the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), the SCSL (Special Court for Sierra Leone) and the ICC (International Criminal Court). I employ an international law and gender studies approach.

To count as a crime against humanity, war rape must have been committed as part of a widespread attack on a civilian population. This reflects the idea that war rape is not based solely in the violation of a woman’s body. The problem is that war rapes occur absent the explicit purpose to destroy a community. This chapter provides insight to the historical background of wartime rape to scholars, feminist legal theorists, sociologists, NGOs and lawyers.

By alerting us to the fact that the international community appears to elevate violations of groups or communities over the violation of individual women during conflict, the chapter suggests that the human rights of women may not be fully protected.

Purpose – This chapter examines the impact of armed conflict and three forms of militarization on child mortality rates cross-nationally. Previous theorizing argues that praetorian militaries create conditions particularly adverse to the well-being of civilians, but the effects of praetorian militarization are likely confounded both by economic and social militarization, and by armed conflict, economic development, and political regime.

Methodology – This study conducts a cross-national panel study of the impact of armed conflict and militarization on civilian life chances using data from 175 countries with populations 200,000 or larger. Analyses employ a fixed-effects model, which controls for stable country characteristics; the analyses also control for time-varying characteristics of countries that influence the impact of armed conflict and militarization on life chances.

Findings – Praetorian militarization appears to increase child mortality, as does social militarization (particularly during years of internationalized internal armed conflict), once stable country effects and other variables are controlled. This chapter is the first to systematically examine the impact of praetorian militarization on social development (indexed by child mortality rates).

Women in Africa increasingly bear greater burden of conflicts in which they rarely contribute to the outbreak. Historically, the Geneva Convention of 1949 and their Additional Protocol of 1977 acknowledge women as the most vulnerable members of the population and explicitly contain special measures to protect women during armed conflicts. Rape and sexual violence continue at an alarming rate in the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Rapes and other forms of sexual violence are being used as weapons of war to humiliate, punish, control, inflict fear, and displace women and their communities. These acts constitute grave violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, including war crimes against humanity. It should be noted that African women face shelling, famine, epidemics, forced displacement, detention, torture and execution like other civilians caught up in the maelstrom of war. Mass rapes in Darfur effectively terrorize women, break their will, and destroy the fabric of the society. Rape also has serious economic and social consequences in Darfurian society by making the victims ineligible for marriage and ostracized by the community and the family members. The economic and political implications of war are also noticeable in the way women that are internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees are being forced to exchange sexual favors in desperation for goods and services by the Sudanese security forces, including police deployed to protect them. It is pertinent to note that documented cases of rape or sexual violence in war time only represent the tip of the iceberg. In war and also during peace time, the stigma associated with rape and the victim's self-blame mean that the vast majority of cases go unreported. Therefore, sympathetic care and counseling for victims are essential to regain their self-esteem, dignity, and to facilitate their reintegration into society and family life. There should be greater recognition of the scourge of sexual violence, as well as public condemnation, with strict enforcement of existing national and international laws.

This chapter aims to present the implementation of the United Nations 1325 resolution about the rights of women, including their protection against violence. This resolution is the main international instrument which incorporates and mandates a gender perspective in all aspects of peace building, from prevention to conflict resolution. It is part of a necessary evolution of gender relations in peace building since 1975 and the Conference of Mexico. More broadly, this text would lead to improve the women’s representation presence in the social and economic sphere and their important role in development.

Cameroon’s contemporary legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk management (DRM) encapsulate the concept of Civil Protection (CP). Diverse disaster risk profile and high incidence/frequency of co-occurring natural and human-induced hazards are intimately linked to increasing vulnerability and fragile economy, transforming hazards into emergencies, crises and disasters, with dire livelihood consequences. To curb growing disaster risks, the Cameroon government instituted basic legislative and institutional frameworks for DRM, through top-down hierarchical, and ex post decision-making processes. Existing frameworks combine multi-hazard, multi-stakeholder and multidisciplinary/agency approaches. Inertia, limited foresight and proactiveness, innovation capacity and limited stakeholder involvement have rendered DRM ineffective. Existing DRM instruments are vague and not explicit. DRM lags behind a rapidly evolving disaster risk profile, and implementation is scattered across ministries/agencies, rendering cross-sectoral cooperation and coordination difficult. Although Cameroon is a signatory to many international disaster risk reduction (DRR)/DRM frameworks, and frequently participates in international DRR/DRM events, implementation of international agreements leaves much to be desired. The Directorate of Civil Protection – Cameroon’s sole legislative DRM institution is marred by bureaucracy, centralisation and insufficient power to perform. There is an urgent need to overhaul existing legislation and institutional frameworks for effective DRM in Cameroon.

An influential strand of human rights theory explains human rights through appeal to their function. Such ‘function’ theories highlight the role human rights play in international practice and discourse as standards for appropriate state treatment of individuals. But standards in what sense? Standards to be promoted and encouraged through public critique, bilateral pressure, institutional censure or legal culpability? Or standards to be protected and defended through all necessary means? I argue that function theorists conflate (what states themselves recognize as) the important distinctions between these standards. Worse still, many function theorists argue that a major – even definitive – role of human rights involves demarcating permissibility conditions for humanitarian intervention. I argue that this claim gravely mischaracterizes international practice and discourse – in particular it fails to recognize the independent significance of other functional norms operating within the global context. The theorists correctly perceive that we have powerful reasons for wanting this role (of threshold conditions for military intervention) fulfilled, but by mistaking the norms that in fact fulfil it, they distort the actual function of human rights.