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Money laundering is established as a criminal offence and, to date, the prosecution of money laundering has been the responsibility of the Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). However, the Financial Services and Markets Bill will provide the Financial Services Authority (FSA) with the power to bring a prosecution for offences under the Money Laundering Regulations. This may result in some confusion as to who should prosecute, particularly as it is established that all three bodies cannot prosecute the same crime since this would allow the defendant to claim double jeopardy. It should be noted that the FSA has stated that it will only prosecute for failing to maintain adequate controls against money laundering and that prosecutions for money laundering itself will be left to the criminal prosecution authorities. Despite this limitation there will still be an overlap between offences that the CPS, SFO and FSA may prosecute. The situation is further clouded, as the FSA will also be able to undertake a disciplinary action. A disciplinary action for money laundering has not been specifically mentioned in the Financial Services and Markets Bill. However, the FSA is most likely to introduce an and money‐laundering statement of principle, particularly as the reduction of financial crime is one of the objectives of the FSA. If a regulated person or institution is found to breach this, they will be subject to a penalty imposed under disciplinary proceedings. In addition, a blanket provision of ‘misconduct’ would also trigger the imposition of a penalty. Therefore, the possibility arises of a criminal prosecution by the FSA for failing to maintain adequate controls against money laundering, a prosecution by the CPS or SFO for money laundering itself and for failure to maintain adequate controls as well as an FSA disciplinary action.

‘Recovering the Proceeds of Crime’, a report by the Performance and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office, observed that, historically, there have been very few prosecutions for money laundering in England and Wales. Indeed, in the 12‐year period 1987 to 1998, there were only 357 prosecutions. By way of comparison, in 1995 there were 2,034 prosecutions for money laundering in the USA alone. Given that it is generally accepted there is a significant amount of money laundering in the UK, why is the number of prosecutions so low? There are, arguably, four principal factors which have an impact on the prosecution rate for any criminal offence and each of the four affects the prosecution rate for money laundering.

This paper aims to highlight the persistent influence of the concept of “predicate offence” in respect of how the crime of money laundering is conceived and discussed, and to discuss how this inhibits the ability to prosecute the crime even where, as is the case in the UK, “predicate offence” is not a requirement of the relevant legislation.

Discussion of a recent UK Supreme Court judgment, R v GH, in particular, how the import of it appears to contrast with perceptions offered by the experience of two recent money laundering convictions on Scotland, where no evidence was led on establishing the money was criminal before the criminal act was libelled as money laundering. Design of modern money laundering schemes are illustrated and assessed in terms of how they can be prosecuted in the context of prevailing interpretations of the law.

The effectiveness of the UK money laundering offences as set out in the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002 requires revaluation. Clarification is required in respect of how criminality in such cases can be proved. Consideration should be given to introducing new legislation targeted at the transmission of money or value under the cover of false documentation.

Clarification is required on how the concept of “irresistible inference” as established by R v Anwoir can be applied to money laundering cases in light of the R v GH judgement of the UK Supreme Court.

Upgrade of law enforcement knowledge base and investigation skills is required to prosecute existing money laundering offences more effectively, but the lack of clarity as to what will suffice as proof of criminality serves to inhibit the investigation of these crimes as well as their prosecution.

Protection of democracies, democratic institutions and the communities they serve from the corrupting influence of laundered criminal money through more effective prosecution of money laundering offences.

To encourage discussion on whether the relevant legislation remains fit for purpose and what practical measures can be taken to improve it.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the complicity of wives/girlfriends of a criminal if she benefits from the proceeds of the criminal's illicit activities.

The paper presents analysis of 62 investigations into organised crime through interviews.

Although spouses/wives benefit from the criminal proceeds of their husbands, they are hardly ever prosecuted on this basis alone. Only if they are actively involved in money laundering, are they more likely to be prosecuted.

Analyzing police data has certain drawbacks. Socio‐economic data are often non‐existent.

Relatively, few of the wives/girlfriends were tried in connection with these crimes. This paper indicates several possible reasons for this.

This paper points out a logical consequence of the legal interpretation of money laundering.

Since the end of the Second World War, American society has seen the emergence of technology promising to make life easier, better and longer lasting. The more recent explosion of the Internet is fulfilling the dreams of the high‐tech pundits as it provides global real‐time communication links and makes the world's knowledge universally available. Privacy concerns surrounding the development of the Internet have mounted, and in response, service providers and website operators have enabled Web users to conduct transactions in nearly complete anonymity. While anonymity respects individual privacy, it also facilitates criminal activities needing secrecy. One such activity is money laundering, which is now being facilitated by the emerging Internet casinos industry. These casinos can be physically located anywhere with websites available worldwide. Internet casinos were a target of legislation by the US Congress, but the legislation, the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, failed to pass. So, at the moment, Internet casinos are a virtually unregulated mechanism for laundering illegal funds.

The purpose of this paper is to assert that the exclusive use of predicate offence as a means of proving money laundering is an inadequate response to the level of threat presented by the crime. It aims to promote the concept of “irresistible inference” from UK case law as a basis for establishing international consensus that this provides an alternative and possibly more effective means of prosecuting the crime.

The paper considers academic research into the incidence of money laundering and the effectiveness of anti‐money laundering measures; it considers the efficacy of current UK legislation on money laundering; assesses legal views on recent developments in UK case law relating to the concept of “irresistible inference”; identifies what “irresistible inference” looks like and asserts its practical value as an alternative basis for proving criminality of funds in money laundering prosecutions.

An effective international response to the increasing threat to international institutions posed by money laundering requires development of new approaches to proving criminality of funds. The use of irresistible inference as an alternative to predicate offence, however, requires development of the international understanding of what it looks like in order that relevant policy makers and legal decision makers can deploy it with confidence so that it is able to make the significant contribution to the international effort against money laundering it is capable of.

To facilitate the necessary international consensus, it may be necessary in some jurisdictions to amend legislation where it currently relies on predicate offence for the prosecution of money laundering cases.

A failure to effectively combat international money laundering implies acceptance of an attitude of complacency in the face of increasing exposure to levels of threat in the form of political and social corruption, organized crime and terrorism that ought to be unacceptable to the international community.

International acceptance of “irresistible inference” as a means of proving criminality in money laundering cases would deliver a radically more hostile environment for international money launderers. This paper is designed to open up thinking along these lines across international borders.

The purpose of this paper is to examine money laundering cases investigated by the Central Bank of Malaysia under the Anti‐Money Laundering and Anti‐Terrorism Financing Act 2001.

This study analyzes the contents of public releases by the enforcement division of the Central Bank for period 2007 to 2011. Analysis of data is carried out based on three categories: the predicate offence, the perpetrators and current status of the cases.

Findings reveal that most cases investigated by the Central Bank relate to sec 4(1) of AMLATFA 2001 and the main predicate offence related to the money laundering charges are on illegal deposit taking. Further it is found that directors of companies are the leading group of people charged under the Act for money laundering. In addition, findings also show that only half of the cases investigated have been charged in court.

Data from this research only come from enforcement releases from the Central Bank of Malaysia. Since AMLATFA2001 is administered by multiple agencies, the research may not provide a comprehensive view of all the cases investigated. Future research should look at other agencies and in particular the Royal Police of Malaysia.

Findings from the study suggest that prosecuting money laundering cases by Bank Negara Malaysia are limited to cases with predicate offence of illegal deposit taking. The agency should explore other predicate offences and the concept of “irresistible inference” to increase its effort in prosecuting money laundering activities in the country.

The paper documents and analyzes the actual cases being investigated for money laundering offences. It provides basis for the standard setters to evaluate their effort to curb money laundering activities in Malaysia.

In October 1995, the Singapore Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) with the assistance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the US Drug Enforcement Administration, uncovered a multi‐million dollar global money‐laundering syndicate run by a North American drug syndicate using a Singapore bank. The CAD recovered S$5.4m stashed in the bank. It was Singapore's largest money‐laundering case. The joint investigators found that the drug syndicate used couriers to smuggle money physically into Singapore between 1989 and 1992. The cash was laundered through money‐changers in Singapore and in the Middle East. Some of the illegal cash found its way into a secret Asian Currency Unit (ACU) account in the Singapore bank. The ACU account was in the name of an account holder who was arrested in Canada for drug trafficking. He surrendered the balance of S$5.4m found in the ACU account to the CAD after a Confiscation Order was issued by the Subordinate Court. The Canadian authorities believe this amount is ‘just the tip of the iceberg’. Since money laundering is not an extraditable offence, the account holder was not prosecuted in Singapore. The bank used by the syndicate was also not prosecuted for money laundering.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the various means available to US authorities for obtaining foreign evidence and other types of international assistance in money laundering cases. The means analysed here include mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and similar processes; multilateral treaties; tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and tax treaties (for a narrow range of money laundering offences); court‐sponsored procedures for taking foreign depositions, including letters rogatory; the use of unilateral compulsory measures, such as subpoenas, for obtaining foreign evidence, and the use of FinCEN and Interpol resources. The initiatives of the G7, the Financial Action Task Force and the OECD regarding international cooperation in money laundering matters are also briefly treated.

Regulators have a duty to enforce anti-money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism regulation. However, in doing so, they should not to be overzealous especially in carrying out investigations into suspicious money laundering transactions. This does not mean that oversight agencies should not carry out the required investigations with due diligence. This study aims to propose that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless environment; however, there is a need ensure that businesses are able to operate with minimal regulatory interference.

Data was collected from primary and secondary sources such as Uganda’s Anti-Money laundering Act 2013 (amended 2017), Patriot Act 2001, Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 International legal instruments, case law, books, websites, journal papers, policy documents and scholarly debates and evaluated to foster the objectives of the paper accordingly. The paper has also been enriched by empirical experiences of countries in Europe, Africa and within countries on money-laundering regulation and its intricacies. There was a wealth of online data sources and in print, which were reviewed and internalised to foster the objectives for writing the book.

Regulation of businesses against money laundering and financing of terrorism imposes a heavy cost burden on poorer countries and should be funded by developed economies for some countries to easily operate desired International AML standards. It also needs to be noted that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless business environment, which makes money laundering an international and national security issue.

The thesis of this paper was drawn from the author’s presentation to security agencies in Kampala in August 2019. In his presentation, the author opined that investigations into money-laundering offences should be triggered when a financial institution forms suspicions of potential money-laundering offences to have been committed. Some of the questions he sought to answer during the presentation was whether sharing information on “accountable persons or the regulated sector” in Uganda’s AML 2013 with newspapers before investigations are concluded does not amount to tipping off presumed money-laundering culprits? How should investigations be conducted?