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This paper aims to identify and examine valid project termination reasons and the rebidding strategies of road construction project. Rebidding strategies is one of the measures to restructure terminated/troubled road construction project.

An instrument which comprised 82 items entitled “Project Termination and Rebidding Strategies in Road Construction Projects in Nigeria” (PTRS) was developed to evaluate 60 randomly sampled road projects using qualified project/site managers and engineers as project respondents for the purpose of securing valid information on the terminated and rebid road construction projects. Mean, standard deviation and factor analysis shall be used as analytical tools in identifying valid termination reasons and rebidding strategies and as well as the relationship between them through regression analysis.

The paper’s findings revealed major project termination reasons and rebidding strategies. It further indicated significant relationship between variables which constitutes project termination reasons and rebidding strategies through regression analysis.

The outcome of the paper could be of immense benefits during the procurement phase of public project, especially regarding road construction. Stakeholders involved in the road procurement should seek relevant information concerning the road project reprocurement from the expert prior to contractual obligations.

Major challenges confronting the road construction project involve inappropriate procurement practices which frequently culminate into late deliveries of project. Rebidding strategies serve as a model through which cost, time and quality needs of the project client can be reassured in restructuring a terminated/troubled project.

Seek to compare the consequences of single‐source versus multiple‐source lending for a borrower who has loans that can be prematurely terminated.

The considered model framework is an option‐theoretic firm value model similar to Merton (1974) but where lenders have the additional right to prematurely terminate the loans. The single lender is a monopolist, while multiple lenders are represented by a continuum without individual impact on the aggregate termination decision.

The model explains that, if the borrower is in financial distress but has positive net present value projects, a single lender has a higher incentive to save the firm and therefore terminates fewer loans than multiple lenders. In the opposite case where the firm is not under financial distress, it is the other way round and multiple lenders terminate fewer loans than a single lender. As a result, equity holders are better off by having a loan from a single‐source under financial distress but multiple‐source lending is advantageous in the absence of financial distress.

To focus on the origin for arising differences from single‐source and multiple‐source lending, consideration is given to the simple case with perfect information and without monitoring and renegotiation. These market imperfections can be incorporated into the model in a straightforward way.

While other models in the literature require market imperfections to explain the relevance of the bank relationship, this paper indicates that even in the absence of market imperfections the lending relationship is fundamental as long as lenders have the right for early terminations.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

The purpose of this paper is to provide the top ten reasons of process improvement projects termination or failure to Lean and Six Sigma professionals and researchers.

The top ten reasons of process improvement projects termination or failure are based on literature, interaction of authors with Lean Six Sigma Master Black Belts, consultants, practitioners and trainers on various topics of Lean, Six Sigma, general quality management and continuous improvement along several years’ experience of the authors.

The top ten reasons in our opinion include lack of commitment and support from top management; poor communication practices; incompetent team; inadequate training and learning; faulty selection of process improvement methodology and its associated tools/techniques; inappropriate rewards and recognition system/culture; scope creepiness; sub-optimal team size and composition; inconsistent monitoring and control; and resistance to change.

The top ten reasons mentioned in this study are based on only literature and authors’ opinion. The authors of this paper have been pursuing a global study to critically evaluate the reasons behind process improvement projects failure based on a case-study approach.

The chief operations officers and senior executives of various businesses can use these top ten reasons to develop project failure risk mitigation strategies and save significant cash-savings associated with such project terminations or failures in some other cases.

Early termination of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in China is caused by various risk factors, resulting in significant losses. This study aimed to clarify the key factors and identify the causal relationships among these factors.

Social network analysis (SNA) was used to analyze 37 risk factors that were summarized from 97 early terminated PPP cases and to identify the relationships among these key risk factors. Interpretive structural modeling (ISM) was conducted to explore the causal relationships. Data were collected from case documents, questionnaires and interviews.

A total of 17 key risk factors were identified and distributed in a hierarchical structure with six tiers. Among these key risk factors, the root causes affecting the early termination of PPP projects were government oversight in decision-making, local government transition, policy and law changes and force majeure. The direct cause was insufficient returns. Furthermore, local government and private sector defaults were essential mediating factors. Local government transition and the low willingness of the private sector were highlighted as potential key risks.

The cases and experts were all from China, and outcomes in other countries or cultures may differ from those of this study. Therefore, further studies are required.

This research provides knowledge regarding the key risk factors leading to the early termination of PPP projects and guidance on avoiding these factors and blocking the factors' transmission in the project lifecycle.

This study contributes to the knowledge of risk management by emphasizing the importance of local government transition, the low willingness of the private sector and project cooperation and operation, whose significance is ignored in the existing literature. The proposed ISM clarifies the role of risk factors in causing early termination and explains their transmission patterns.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the determinants of the early termination of infrastructure projects implemented under public–private partnerships (PPP), concessions or privately managed divested assets.

Cross-section and duration model estimations were applied to a sample of 2,655 infrastructure projects implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean for the period 1993–2017. Estimation techniques consist of a logistic model and cox proportional hazards model (CPHM) applied to alternative specifications, including diverse causal factors.

Evidence is found that early termination of infrastructure projects is determined by intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Among the intrinsic factors, the main characteristics of projects that increase the likelihood of failure are the size or scale of the project, the sector in which the project is developed (transport and water and sanitation) and being investments in divested assets. Extrinsic factors that showed a negative impact on the risk of early termination are good regulatory quality and domestic macroeconomic stability. Likewise, external real and financial shocks also contribute importantly to explain the likelihood of early termination of infrastructure projects.

The results reveal that particular care must be put in design and supervision of large-scale projects, either in transport or water and sanitation. As well, risks associated with external shocks must be explicitly acknowledged in project design, with appropriate remedies and safeguards. The prevalence of relatively high rates of early termination in projects in divested assets in contrast with PPP suggests the importance of introducing simpler way out mechanisms for concessionaires. Finally, the results show the key importance of institutional factors like regulatory quality in determining project failure on economic performance of infrastructure projects.

In contrast to the previous literature, the analysis shows the decisive role played by financial external factors and institutional factors of Latin American and Caribbean countries in early termination of private participation in infrastructure projects. As well, the finding of a higher likelihood of failure in projects that involve investments in divested assets versus concession or PPP suggests the need of investigate further the tradeoffs regarding the balance that must exist among guarantees offered to investors in infrastructure projects and the need to keep contractual decisions in line with market signals.

Purpose – The aim of this study is to inquire into the circumstances and mechanisms that drive temporary systems to become permanent organizations.

Methodology/approach – This study is based on a retrospective longitudinal case study (1980–1995) and informed by research on organizational path dependence. Our research object is SEMATECH, the leading global semiconductor manufacturing consortium.

Findings – This longitudinal case study of the research and development consortium SEMATECH shows how and under what conditions a project, once its initial objective had been achieved, managed to turn itself into a permanent organization, that is, it terminated its institutionalized termination. Based on our findings, we argue that the postponing of this specific project's institutionalized termination can be understood by adopting a path dependence perspective that allows for the capturing of self-reinforcing processes to account for the stability of the (once temporary) system.

Originality/value of the paper – In this chapter, we question the certainty put forward in organizational studies of projects concerning the ephemeral nature of projects due to their built-in termination mechanism.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the real option theory is applicable to evaluation of cases of escalation and premature termination of Management Information Systems (MIS) projects.

The paper compares the implications of psychological and economic escalation theories with lessons from the real option theory as applied to MIS projects. Then, it examines published case studies, and discuss when project continuation enhances and reduces value for the manager and the firm.

Escalation of commitment is continuation of an investment project after receiving negative signals. Escalation was identified as a significant problem in MIS projects often explained by the desire of the manager to avoid recognizing mistakes and to protect reputation. The opposite problem of premature termination of certain investment projects was also identified. This study argues that accurate application of real option theory is critical to distinguish between escalation and premature termination. Under the real option theory, an investment project is analogous to a financial option, in that there is an opportunity to continue the project, but no obligation. Continuation has value when there is uncertainty and new information about the project may be revealed. Failure to account for the real options in a project is value‐reducing as it may lead to mistakes in premature termination of projects when projects with real option value are labeled as cases of irrational escalation.

The paper details the implications of real option theory to evaluating project continuation in the MIS setting.

This paper applies insights from real option theory to studies of escalation in MIS. Continuing a project may be seen as escalation when it actually has value for the firm, as new information received by continuing the project reduces uncertainty.

The purpose of this study is to develop penalty measures against concessionaires’ defaults as a mechanism for protecting the interests of parties (public and private) in public–private partnership (PPP) contracts for enhancing project delivery.

The research methodology is a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. This study commenced with an in-depth literature review, which provided the basis for identification of penalty measures in construction contract management. The qualitative assessment was based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews, which were aimed at identifying the underlying pattern of the penalty measures, and the quantitative assessment was based on a structured questionnaire. In both cases, respondents were stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the southwestern region of Nigeria. These include industrial practitioners from government-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks, etc. The sample size was selected using a respondent-driven sampling approach, as the comprehensive lists of the participants in PPP contracts are not readily available in the Nigerian construction industry. Responses from the interview were analysed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti7. The quantitative data were analysed using percentile for flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms.

This study developed mechanisms that defined the rights of the public party to redress underperformance of PPP contracts consequent to the defaults of the private party. “Step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts” were preferred against specific cases of “delayed execution”, “abandonment of the project”, “bankruptcy of the concessionaire” and “non-compliance with design and specifications”. With respect to “shortfall in performance against established dates”, the results converged on “monetary fine” and diverged on “step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts”.

The study contributes to literature on mechanisms for enforcing PPP project performance. Besides, defining rights and obligations of the parties in specific events of underperformance of the concessionaires in PPP contracts is a significant step towards the development of standard conditions of contract for managing PPP projects in which the model is being newly adopted.

Project management studies on PPP were extended by defining the liabilities that are consequent to the defaults of the private party and the mechanisms for their enforcement.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.