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The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

We explore the driving forces behind the channel choices of the manufacturer and the platform by considering asymmetric selling cost and demand information.

This paper develops game-theoretical models to study different channel strategies for an E-commerce supply chain, in which a manufacturer distributes products through a platform that may operate in either the marketplace channel or the reseller channel.

Three primary models are built and analyzed. The comparison results show that the platform would share demand information in the reseller channel only if the service cost performance is relatively high. Besides, with an increasing selling cost, the equilibrium channel might shift from the marketplace to the reseller. With increasing information accuracy, the manufacturer tends to select the marketplace channel, while the platform tends to select the reseller channel if the service cost performance is low and tends to select the marketplace channel otherwise.

All these results have been numerically verified in the experiments. At last, we also resort to numerical study and find that as the service cost performance increases, the equilibrium channel may shift from the reseller channel to the marketplace channel. These results provide managerial guidance to online platforms and manufacturers regarding strategic decisions on channel management.

Although prior research has paid extensive attention to the driving forces behind the online channel choice between marketplace and reseller, there is at present few study considering the case where a manufacturer selling through an online platform faces a demand information disadvantage in the reseller channel and sales inefficiency in the marketplace channel. To fill this research gap, our work illustrates the interaction between demand information asymmetry and selling cost asymmetry to identify the equilibrium channel strategy and provides useful managerial guidelines for both online platforms and manufacturers.

This paper studies the optimal decision-making and coordination problem of a dual-channel fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain. The purpose is to analyze the impact of information sharing on optimal decisions and propose a coordination mechanism to encourage supply chain members to share information.

The two-echelon dual-channel FAP supply chain includes a manufacturer and a retailer. By using the Stackelberg game theory and the backward induction method, the optimal decisions are obtained under information symmetry and asymmetry and the coordination contract is designed.

The results show that supply chain members should comprehensively evaluate the specific situation of product attributes, coefficient of freshness-keeping cost and network operating costs to make decisions. Asymmetric information can exacerbate the deviation of optimal decisions among supply chain members and information sharing is always beneficial to manufacturers but not to retailers. The improved revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism.

The conclusions can provide theoretical guidance for supply chain managers to deal with information asymmetry and improve the competitiveness of the supply chain.

This paper combines the three characteristics that are most closely related to the reality of supply chains, including horizontal and vertical competition of different channels, the perishable characteristics of FAPs and the uncertainty generated by asymmetric demand information.

The purpose of the study is to explore the association of disclosures for the performance of banks in India.

Panel data analysis (utilising static and dynamic models) is applied on the data of 34 Indian banks (for time-frame 2015–2019) to explore the association of disclosures (as transparency and disclosure index) with the performance of banks (as profitability, risk-taking and technical efficiency (TE)). The regulation, competition and ownership concentration variables are taken as control variables.

None of the banks' performance measures applied in the study is significantly associated with the disclosures. This situation implies that disclosures do not impact the performance of the banks in India. The reason is that disclosures and performance are two different activities that aim at different purposes.

This study does not provide output for the association between disclosures and the value of the banks and confines itself to explore the association between disclosures and performance of the banks only. This limitation can be the future scope of the study.

There is no other study that solely focuses on exploring the association of disclosures with the performance of the banks. Disclosure has more significant importance in banks because of the inherent nature of opaqueness in banking operations. Therefore, the current study's findings have substantial implications for policymakers, managers and investors of the banks.

Different information sharing mechanisms and online platform information sharing to different charging models are compared and analyzed.

This paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decisions.

The results show that: (1) the retailer's pricing strategy is the highest when both of them obtain information, while the manufacturer's pricing strategy is affected by the related attributes of different products, such as the sensitivity of consumers to product prices; (2) in the online platform sales model, the demand information data sharing owned by the online platform can bring more expected profits to the whole supply chain and the members of the supply chain, and the higher the accuracy of the information, the higher the expected profit; (3) when the cost of obtaining demand information is zero, that is, the online platform shares the information data about market demand free of charge, the retailer and manufacturer tend to obtain information; (4) for the online platform, charging a certain fee can achieve higher expected profits than free sharing.

Based on the single platform online sales model, this paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decision of a manufacturer and a retailer selling products through the same online platform.

Eco-innovation products, which means achieving more efficient and responsible use of resources and reducing the detrimental impact on the environment, can win a competitive advantage for the enterprises. But it is not easy to implement due to the high cost of eco-innovative technologies development, the uncertainty of market needs and return risk of investment. Many enterprises seek collaborations from their upstream suppliers to jointly carry out eco-innovation, such as Apple, IBM and Nike. A unique feature of collaboration is that efforts by one party enhance the marginal value of the other party's efforts. However, the collaboration will make the partner know the eco-innovation technology and prompt the partner to encroach the market to sell competitive products by herself. Motivated by this observation, this paper considers the optimal collaboration strategy on eco-innovation between upstream and downstream supply chain member and the optimal encroachment strategy of upstream supplier in a supply chain.

This paper models a supply chain wherein a supplier provides products or materials for her manufacturer and cooperates with her manufacturer in eco-innovation. Also, the supplier could encroach on the market to sell similar products by herself. Then this paper uses game theory and mathematical modeling to do relative analysis.

The analysis reveals several interesting insights. First, eco-innovation collaboration makes supplier encroachment no longer only rely on the encroachment cost. The delayed realized eco-innovation efficiency information also plays a vital role. Second, different from previous research, the authors find the manufacturer's preference for supplier encroachment depends on the uncertainty of eco-innovation efficiency and potential market demand. Third, both partial and full encroachment strategies of the supplier can effectively improve the eco-innovation level.

The paper is the first to take the interplay between collaboration and encroachment into account in a supply chain. The results caution enterprises and policymakers to take vertical collaboration and delayed realized information into account in the competitive supply chain before making any operational decisions. Furthermore, the authors propose that governmental intervention aimed at stimulating supplier encroachment in appropriate circumstances can contribute to the improved environmental performance of products.

In recent years, private brands for e-commerce platforms have experienced rapid growth. However, whether these platforms developing private brands should share their demand information with others and how such information sharing affects the sales format selection of national brand manufacturers have puzzled firm managers in practice. This paper aims to investigate the information-sharing strategy for the e-commerce platform and its influence on the sales format selection in the presence of the private brand.

The authors use a game-theoretical model to examine the interaction between the information-sharing strategy and sales format selection in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a platform that operates a private brand.

The equilibrium results show that when the commission rate is low, the manufacturer favors agency selling, and the platform shares demand information with the manufacturer; when the commission rate is high, the manufacturer prefers reselling, and the platform does not share the information. This preference is affected by information forecasting accuracy; as the information forecasting accuracy increases, the manufacturer prefers to adopt agency selling, and the platform tends to share the information. Interestingly, under agency selling, sharing information with the manufacturer can increase the platform’s profit from selling the private brand and achieve a win-win situation for them. Furthermore, we show that the manufacturer can inspire the platform to share the information with himself by adopting agency selling, whereas the platform sharing the information improves the probability that the manufacturer adopts agency selling. Moreover, the manufacturer may have a first-mover advantage. In particular, the manufacturer moving first increases the likelihood that the manufacturer chooses agency selling and the platform shares the information.

This paper contributes to sales format literature by exploring the effect of information sharing strategy on sales format selection in the presence of the private brand and can help manufacturers and platforms to make suitable decisions regarding information sharing and sales format selection.

An increasing number of Danish municipalities wish to minimize tax avoidance due to profit shifting in their public procurement. To facilitate this effort, this study aims to develop a firm-level indicator to assess the potential risk of profit shifting (PS-risk) from Danish subsidiaries of multinational corporations to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.

Drawing from previous research, PS-risk is assumed to depend on the maximum difference in the effective corporate tax rate between the Danish subsidiary and other subsidiaries under the global ultimate owner, in conjunction with the tax regulations relevant to profit shifting. The top 400 contractors in Danish municipalities from 2017 to 2019 are identified and their relative PS-risk is estimated by combining information about corporate ownership structure with country-specific information on corporate tax rates, tax regulations and profit shifting from three independent data sets.

The PS-risk estimates are highly significantly positively correlated across the data sets and show that 17%–23% of the total procurement sum of the Danish municipalities has been spent on contracts with corporations having a medium to high PS-risk. On average, PS-risk is highest for large non-Scandinavian multinational contractors in sectors such as construction, health and information processing.

Danish public procurers may use the indicator to screen potential suppliers and, if procurement regulations permit, to ensure high-PS-risk bidders document their tax practices.

The PS-risk indicator is novel, and to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the analysis provides the first estimate of PS-risk in Danish public procurement.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the profit efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs) based on predicted future information to solve the lag problem of improvement benchmarks given by the traditional profit efficiency model.

This paper proposes a two-step profit efficiency evaluation method. The first step predicts the future input and output information of DMUs through the past time-series data, obtaining a likely production possibility set (PPS) and profit frontier for the next period. The second step calculates DMUs' profit efficiency based on the predictions obtained in the first step and provides predictive benchmarking for DMUs.

The empirical results show that the proposed method yields good solutions for the lag problem of benchmarks given in ex-post evaluation, enabling bank managers to use predicted future information to achieve better improvement. Besides, compared with the technical efficiency measure, profit efficiency can better reflect the financial situation of DMUs and give the specific gap between the evaluated and optimal DMU.

For bank managers, the authors' new technique is advantageous for grasping the initiative of development because this technique accounts for the future development of the whole industry and sets forward-looking targets. These advantages can help banks improve in a more favorable direction and improve the asset management ability of banks.

This paper combines the data envelopment analysis (DEA) profit efficiency model with performance prediction and proposes a new two-step profit efficiency model, filling a gap in previous studies.

This study examines how the strong emphasis placed on the purposes of budgeting, referring to a comprehensive focus on budgeting, is related to top managers' education and tenure while controlling for their functional positions in their respective firms and ages, as well as several company-specific predictors (information quality, firm size, information technology, importance of profit and strategy).

Survey data were collected from senior managers of large manufacturing firms in Finland and Sweden.

The results suggest that academic business education is positively associated with a comprehensive focus on budgeting, but tenure as well as functional position in the company (Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or not) and age are not. Overall, the company-specific control variables in general and information quality in particular are shown to have greater explanatory power than the top management characteristics analyzed.

This study identifies several empirically supported factors that seem to contribute to a comprehensive focus on budgeting. The effects of information quality, business education, the importance of profit and firm size could be considered in future research.

Academic business education matters more than the other top management characteristics analyzed. If organizations want to make comprehensive use of budgets, they should employ business graduates and be mindful of company-specific variables.

This study is the first to address a comprehensive focus on budgeting and some of its determinants. Future research could investigate a broader set of such determinants in different contexts.