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This study aims to investigate the relative weight of financial and non-financial performance measures used to evaluate production managers (such as shop floor managers or foremen) in a modern manufacturing setting.

Using survey data from Japanese factories, the paper examines the association between the choice of profit, cost, and non-financial performance measures with two characteristics of manufacturing systems: interdependence and multi-tasking.

The results indicate that interdependence has a significant and positive association with the importance of profit information, while multi-tasking is associated negatively with the importance of profit information, and positively with non-financial information for performance evaluation.

In recent years, a significant shift has been observed in Japanese production management with many companies now focusing on profit information instead of cost information. For example, the past studies show that large Japanese manufacturing companies are now using micro-profit centres and include profit information when evaluating factories. However, little empirical evidence is available on performance measurement at the shop floor foreman level, and even less is known about the importance of profit information in the evaluation of these lower level managers.

Information exchange is a significant factor in the achievement of integrative agreements in negotiation. However, it is not clear what factors govern information exchange. While tutoring negotiators in information exchange has clearly been shown to be effective, the experiment reported here was concerned with less directive interventions. Negotiators were either (a) alerted to the possibility that the other party's issue priorities were not the same as their own—and hence the problem not fixed pie in nature—(Priority condition); or (b) made aware of the need to look at problems from another's perspective (Perspective condition). Interest was in how these interventions would effect negotiators' spontaneous exchange of potential outcome information, their understanding of the integrative nature of the problem, and their joint outcome from their negotiated agreement, as compared with a control condition. In addition, the role of negotiator firmness in the achievement of integrative agreements was examined. It was found that Priority negotiators engaged in more information exchange, tended to be more accurate in their understanding of the nature of the bargaining problem, and achieved higher joint profits in their agreements than did control negotiators. Pairs whose summed perspective‐taking ability was higher made agreements with higher joint profits than those with lower perspective‐taking ability. Negotiator firmness was higher for the Priority condition than for the control condition. It was concluded that (a) spontaneous exchange of outcome information does occur when negotiators are cued to doubt the fixed pie hypothesis about possible outcomes of negotiation; (b) this exchange is associated with higher joint profits, i.e., with more integrative bargaining; but (c) firmness as well as information exchange appears to play an important role in integrative bargaining; in addition, (d) perspective‐taking does seem to encourage integrative bargaining, but it is difficult to induce, and how it operates is unclear.

In the Information Age, an increasing number of firms and researchers focus on consumer privacy. Meanwhile, many firms that collect consumer information through, information disclosure, consumer privacy, agency model, distribution contracts products or services often adopt the agency contract or the wholesale contract to sell through the online platform. This study aims to examine how different distribution contracts affect supply chain decisions when the firm can profit from disclosing consumer information.

The authors use Stackelberg model to describe the relationship between consumer privacy and distribution contracts. Solve the model and analyze the monotonicity of the equilibrium results. The optimal contract choice and win-win conditions are obtained by comparing the profits under different contracts.

The authors find that when consumers’ maximal valuation is low in the market, the firm prefers to profit from disclosing consumer information under both the agency contract and the wholesale contract. As consumers’ maximal valuation increases, the firm turns to profit from product sales. Under the agency contract, the platform only generates profit when the consumers’ maximal valuation is high. By comparing the profits of the platform under the two types of contracts, the authors find the platform’s optimal contract choice under different consumers’ maximal valuations and platform commission rates. Combined with the comparison results of the firm’s profit, the authors provide the win-win conditions under the agency contract and wholesale contract.

This study analyzes the supply chain decision under the agency contract and wholesale contract, and it helps deepen the understanding of the interaction between consumer information disclosure and channel distribution contract.

Contemporary literature reveals that, to date, the poultry livestock sector has not received sufficient research attention. This particular industry suffers from unstructured supply chain practices, lack of awareness of the implications of the sustainability concept and failure to recycle poultry wastes. The current research thus attempts to develop an integrated supply chain model in the context of poultry industry in Bangladesh. The study considers both sustainability and supply chain issues in order to incorporate them in the poultry supply chain. By placing the forward and reverse supply chains in a single framework, existing problems can be resolved to gain economic, social and environmental benefits, which will be more sustainable than the present practices.

The theoretical underpinning of this research is ‘sustainability’ and the ‘supply chain processes’ in order to examine possible improvements in the poultry production process along with waste management. The research adopts the positivist paradigm and ‘design science’ methods with the support of system dynamics (SD) and the case study methods. Initially, a mental model is developed followed by the causal loop diagram based on in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and observation techniques. The causal model helps to understand the linkages between the associated variables for each issue. Finally, the causal loop diagram is transformed into a stock and flow (quantitative) model, which is a prerequisite for SD-based simulation modelling. A decision support system (DSS) is then developed to analyse the complex decision-making process along the supply chains.

The findings reveal that integration of the supply chain can bring economic, social and environmental sustainability along with a structured production process. It is also observed that the poultry industry can apply the model outcomes in the real-life practices with minor adjustments. This present research has both theoretical and practical implications. The proposed model’s unique characteristics in mitigating the existing problems are supported by the sustainability and supply chain theories. As for practical implications, the poultry industry in Bangladesh can follow the proposed supply chain structure (as par the research model) and test various policies via simulation prior to its application. Positive outcomes of the simulation study may provide enough confidence to implement the desired changes within the industry and their supply chain networks.

A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of an option contract within a one-period two-echelon supply chain in the presence of asymmetric cost information.

Based on the principal-agent model, the retailer, acting as a Stackelberg leader, offers a menu of option contracts to mitigate the risk of uncertain demand and reveal asymmetric production cost information. The optimal contract in asymmetric and symmetric information scenarios is derived. Finally, the impact of production costs on the optimal contracts and the actors’ profits is explored by numerical experiments.

By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, the authors show that asymmetric cost information has a large impact on the optimal option contract and profits. In addition, information rent is affected by the type differential. The results prove that the level of information asymmetry plays a vital role in option contracts and profits.

Different from the existing literature on private demand information, this paper considers a supply chain with asymmetric cost information in the context of option contracts. Interestingly, not only the production cost but also the probability of a low production cost can affect the option strike price. In addition, from the perspective of the manufacturer, a high cost does not always bring a high information rent. These findings can provide some guidance to decision-makers.

Recognition of a profit opportunity requires a framework of knowledge to place information about a profit opportunity in a context where it can be recognized. The same information about a profit opportunity could be revealed to many people, yet only a few with the appropriate knowledge will be able to place this information into a context that suggests to them a profit opportunity. This paper discusses how entrepreneurs gain knowledge to enable them to be more entrepreneurial, and shows how an economy generates information about entrepreneurial opportunities. Entrepreneurship adds to an economy’s knowledge base, making it easier to recognize profit opportunities when they arise.

The non‐profit sector is a large, vital part of the US economy. Many researchers and librarians face research questions dealing with non‐profit organizations, especially questions about the fundraising, lobbying, and administrative expenses of specific non‐profits. This selective bibliography identifies sources to assist both librarians and researchers in locating information on specific not‐for‐profit organizations. It focuses principally on three main types of non‐profits: charities, foundations, and associations.

The paper aims to explore how the participants in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) select collecting strategies under the scenarios of information symmetry and asymmetry, and to investigate the value of corporate social responsibility (CSR) cost information for participants.

This paper constructs a two-echelon CLSC Stackelberg game consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer undertakes CSR and is responsible for the remanufacturing of used products. First, the authors establish two collecting models under information symmetry: manufacturer-collecting and retailer-collecting. Second, the authors construct two collecting models under information asymmetry and propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the participants’ profits. Finally, the authors make a numerical analysis to verify the results.

Under information symmetry, the profit of the participant who does not undertake collecting is positively related to the collecting rate, and the other participant may not benefit from the increase in the collecting rate. Under information asymmetry, the manufacturer will still select the retailer-collecting channel. Asymmetric information only affects the retailer’s selection. In addition, the manufacturer’s private CSR cost information is always valuable to the retailer.

This paper first explores the influence of the CSR cost information value on the selection of collecting channel under information asymmetry in the CLSC. The results can help company managers choose optimal collecting channel under information symmetry or under information asymmetry.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value.

The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis.

First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information.

The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

This longitudinal study aims to analyze the use of websites by a sample of 78 corporations and non‐profits five years apart. In particular, it studies organizational use of interactive and social media features and use of web sites for building relationships with six stakeholder publics.

The authors studied the websites of 78 for‐profit and not‐for‐profit organization seeking to learn how they used this new medium as a communication tool to build and maintain relationships with six key stakeholders: the mass media, consumers, investor/donors, employees, the government, and the community in 2004 and in 2009. They also explored for differences in the way for‐profit corporations and non‐profits used their web sites for relationship building given their different missions and cultures.

First, there was a marked difference in how corporations and non‐profit organizations used their websites. Second, a significant number of organizations used social media applications such as blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube through their websites in 2009. Third, aside from increased use of social media, in 2009 more organizations used feedback mechanisms such as e‐surveys and e‐polls embedded in their websites, enhancing interactions with a variety of stakeholders. Both corporations and non‐profit organizations generally utilized their websites as information‐dissemination tools, where the information flow is one‐way, although the percentage of both corporations and non profits that used interactive features offered by new media has increased slightly between 2004 and 2009.

This study is among the few that compare web page use by corporations vs non‐profits. A second unique feature of this study is that it is longitudinal in nature, studying web site use five years apart by the same organizations.