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Since Baumol (1990), the economic literature has distinguished between two broad categories of entrepreneurship: productive and unproductive. The purpose of this paper is to introduce another subcategory: indirectly productive entrepreneurship. Sometimes, profit-seeking entrepreneurs allocate their talents to indirectly productive activities to mitigate the new costs market participants endure as a result of a government regulation. The resources used to mitigate these costs must be diverted from other uses.

This paper uses the example of cell phone storage outside New York City’s high schools to illustrate an indirectly productive entrepreneurial activity that mitigates the inefficiencies or costs created by a regulation. These costs and the resulting entrepreneurship would not have arisen absent the regulation.

These profit opportunities do not result from market entrepreneurial errors or successes but emerge from inefficiencies or unintended consequences produced by government regulations. When evaluating such entrepreneurship, the question is whether such regulation is desirable from an efficiency viewpoint because such entrepreneurship, while making such regulation less inefficient or less costly, diverts resources from other lines of production.

This paper identifies a new category of entrepreneurship: indirectly productive entrepreneurship. This paper also shows that government regulation often deters productive entrepreneurship. However, under some circumstances, regulation can indirectly encourage productive entrepreneurship by creating artificial profit opportunities that would not have existed otherwise.

The underlying assumptions of Baumol’s theory of entrepreneurial allocation limits its potential to answer some key questions related to the entrepreneurship allocation. Hence, this paper aims to highlight the inherent limits of Baumol’s theory and suggest a new approach for understanding the entrepreneur-institution relationship and their functions.

This is a conceptual paper with a narrow focus on the literature.

The paper argues that Baumol’s adherence to neoclassic economics assumptions about entrepreneur and institution, such as entrepreneurs as rational choice taker with predetermined goals or institutions as exogenous, limits the potential of his theoretical framework to explain productive entrepreneurship in weak institutional settings. As such, underlying on Austrian economics assumptions about entrepreneur and his/her agency, this paper proposes a reconceptualization of productive entrepreneurship as an outcome of the interaction between entrepreneur and context.

Going beyond Baumol’s main proposition of one-sided influence of institutions on entrepreneurship allocation, this research highlights the influence of individual factors and entrepreneurial action on choosing entrepreneurial paths by entrepreneurs. So, future policies to stimulate productive entrepreneurship should consider these factors and go beyond Baumol’s mere focus on institutional improvement.

Going beyond one-sided influence of institutions on entrepreneurship allocation, this paper suggests an interaction centric approach which considers the role of actors and institutions as the co-creator of each other in the social process and argues that any effort for explaining the entrepreneurship should consider the co-creative nature of the actors and institutions as well as the endogenous nature of institutions. The proposed approach will help expanding entrepreneurship literature through finding answers to some key under-examined questions in the promising research stream of entrepreneurship allocation.

Using state-level data on productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, shadow economy size, and public official corruption, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether formal sector productive (unproductive) entrepreneurial activity is associated with lower (higher) levels of informal economic activity.

Additionally, the author aims to connect US state-level entrepreneurship, shadow economy size, and corruption by asking whether corruption affects entrepreneurial outcomes primarily through its effects on the shadow economy. The author contends that if this is the case, then estimates of corruption should serve as a good instrument for shadow economy size in regressions on formal sector entrepreneurial outcomes.

Results from OLS regressions suggest that shadow economy size shares a strong, negative (positive), and statistically significant relationship with productive (unproductive) entrepreneurship. These results are fairly robust to GMM estimation. Additionally, the author finds that corruption is a strong instrument for shadow economy size; one for which validity cannot be rejected in regressions on productive, and net entrepreneurship scores.

However, the author cannot safely assert that the author finds evidence of the shadow economy serving as a primary channel through which corruption affects observed entrepreneurial outcomes. Failure to reject validity of the corruption instrument is, at best, suggestive of the primacy of the entrepreneurial choice between formal and informal sector participation.

This study, to the author’s knowledge, is the first to attempt “connecting the dots” between entrepreneurship, corruption, and shadow economy size.

The purpose of this paper is to outline barriers to public-sector entrepreneurship and explore the impact of those barriers on population shifts within the USA.

This paper lays out five specific barriers to public-sector entrepreneurship: barriers to entry and exit for consumers and producers, increased centralization and concentration in government, the lack of residual claim amongst public-sector actors, the rise of public-sector union membership and increasingly uncompetitive elections. The paper then assesses the impact of each of these barriers on population and production changes within the USA from 2010 to 2017.

Those state governments with limited barriers for productive public-sector entrepreneurship are rewarded with faster growing populations. Specifically, states with higher incomes, less centralized spending, lower public-sector unionization rates and higher state credit ratings tend to experience the greatest levels of population growth. States with less centralized spending also experience the largest increases in gross state product per capita.

This paper offers practical applications for policy makers wishing to increase their tax bases, increase the standard of living for their constituents or increase the efficiency in production and distribution of government goods and services. In particular, this paper offers evidence that an improved credit rating carries the most economic significance for population gains.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to examine Tiebout effects from barriers to public-sector entrepreneurship in the USA. Researchers in fields including political science, economics, management and public policy have all contributed to our understanding of public entrepreneurship. And yet, there are still numerous barriers preventing productive public-sector entrepreneurship from occurring at an optimal level.

Entrepreneurship can be understood as a systemic phenomenon, thus relying on sets of influential factors associated with socioeconomic contexts. Institutional conditions play a pivotal role in this regard, affecting the allocation of entrepreneurial efforts. The goal of this research is to verify to what extent do the pillars of Countries' Institutional Profiles – regulatory, cognitive and normative – affect both the prevalence and quality of entrepreneurship, assessing the differences between developing and developed countries both in total entrepreneurial activity and in the following qualitative frames: innovation rate, high job creation expectations and motivational index.

The authors’ assessment uses data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) with a longitudinal approach for 112 countries over the period 2003–2019. Dynamic panel data regressions are applied.

By comparing developing and developed countries, findings highlight that institutional effects are heterogeneous among developing and developed countries, with informal institutions being more relevant for developing countries than formal ones. Also, using a broad range of institutional indicators, the authors’ assessment indicated that the association between institutional conditions and productive entrepreneurship seems to be far more intricate than argued by theoretical literature.

The authors’ findings indicate the need for developing countries to address formal institutional voids in order to generate more effective conditions for productive entrepreneurship to emerge. Following prior literature, this can have systemic impacts on trajectories for economic growth and development.

The originality of this research consists in using a longitudinal and integrative approach to compare institutional effects on different types of entrepreneurship, as well as comparing these effects in countries at different stages of development.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the mediating role of corruption in the relationship between entrepreneurship and institutional quality in a sample of 90 countries from all around the world.

The data were collected from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, which developed a model where Corruption Perception Index as a proxy for corruption mediates the relationship between the variable rule of law as a proxy for institutional quality and opportunity entrepreneurship as a proxy for productive entrepreneurship. Correlation, Baron and Kenny approach (causal steps approach) and PROCESS Macro (normal test theory) developed by Hayes were used to find out the direct and indirect effects of institutional quality between corruption and entrepreneurship.

The bootstrap mediation results indicated that institutional quality was a significant predictor of corruption and corruption was a significant predictor of entrepreneurship. These findings support the mediation hypothesis. In addition, findings showed that there is a negative relation between corruption and productive entrepreneurship and a positive relation between institutional quality and productive entrepreneurship.

The current study only considered the single proxy for institutional quality, i.e. rule of law; therefore, some other proxies for institutional quality such as government effectiveness and doing business can be used for future studies. Moreover, the proposed model does not control for the country differences like GDP or development stages of countries.

The findings of this study indicate that the total association between institutional quality and entrepreneurship is not only direct but also that rule of law contributes to levels of entrepreneurship through reduced levels of corruption. As a result, countries with higher levels of rule of law tended to experience corruption at lower levels, which in turn contributed to the emergence of increased levels of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, these results may be beneficial for organizations fighting against corruption, because entrepreneurial activity can be add to the group of economical drivers constrained by corruption. It is also beneficial for policy makers who focus on promoting entrepreneurship, since one way to increase entrepreneurial activity is to lower the existing corruption level.

The results indicated that the direct effect of institutional quality on the entrepreneurship remained significant when controlling for corruption, thus suggesting partial mediation. In other words, corruption only mediates part of the effect of institutional quality on entrepreneurship, that is, the intervention (institutional quality) has some residual direct effect even after the mediator (corruption) was introduced into the model.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the distinctions and complementary of William Baumol and Israel Kirzner’s classifications of and insights into entrepreneurship, and thus providing a more complete taxonomy of the substance of entrepreneurial activity. This paper also attempts to clarify distinctions between unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship.

This paper illustrates a more complete taxonomy of the substance of entrepreneurial activity by examining entrepreneurial innovation in drug markets both legal and illegal, identifying cases of productive, unproductive, superfluous, erroneous, destructive, and protective entrepreneurship.

This paper finds that the classifications of entrepreneurship (productive, superfluous, unproductive, erroneous, protective and destructive) put forth by Baumol, Kirzner, and the institutional entrepreneurship literature are complementary. While Baumol seeks to explain the disequilibrating tendencies of entrepreneurship, Kirzner seeks to explain the equilibrating tendencies of entrepreneurship within the institutional context.

This paper utilizes case studies from legal and illegal drug markets to uniquely and better explain the six cases of entrepreneurship. This paper also contributes to the literature by clearly articulating the complementarity of Baumolian and Kirznerian entrepreneurship.

The purpose of the paper is to establish the need to study the shame-proneness trait of entrepreneurs – what is it and why is it important to study.

In this conceptual paper, the authors argue that shame-proneness is an important understudied trait of entrepreneurs and put up a case for further research. The authors argue that shame-proneness moderates the effect of social acceptability on opportunity exploitation decisions. The authors also argue that productive entrepreneurship can be promoted and unproductive entrepreneurship can be prevented through policy intervention, and the level of intervention can be determined by knowing the shame-proneness level of entrepreneurs.

The key argument is the following: an entrepreneur is homo economicus and homo sociologicus, i.e. she is driven both by rational economic value consideration and by the prevalent social norms, which influence opportunity exploitation decisions. Since shame enforces compliance with social norms, it is vital to study entrepreneurs' shame-proneness to understand entrepreneurial founding across different regions. Knowing the level of shame-proneness of entrepreneurs in a given region would help the government devise effective interventions to promote productive entrepreneurship and deter unproductive or destructive entrepreneurship.

This paper is an original creation of the authors.

Inspired by the debates among economists about the role of beliefs and informal institutions in economic development, the purpose of this paper is to derive and test different hypotheses about the ways beliefs about the market economy, institutions and policies, and productive entrepreneurship are intertwined.

The paper derives from the literature three hypotheses unified around the idea of (political, cultural, and market) entrepreneurship. The paper then tests these hypotheses by running various country-level regressions intended to check the relationships between formal institutions and policies (measured by World Governance Indicators and by the Economic Freedom of the World index), productive entrepreneurship (measured by total factor productivity form the Penn World Table), and different kinds of market beliefs from the World Values Survey (WVS).

The sociological hypothesis says that more pro-market beliefs provide incentives for innovation by recognizing entrepreneurship as a dignifying activity. The political hypothesis says that people with more pro-market beliefs will demand, and therefore live with, more pro-market institutions and policies. The “Schumpeterian” hypothesis says that it is market institutions that make it possible for entrepreneurs to run against anti-market beliefs, and innovate. The results support the Schumpeterian hypothesis, mainly because market beliefs predict institutions and policies as well as productivity very poorly, while formal institutions and policies make a much better job of this.

The paper contrasts three different hypotheses concerned with the broader consequences of political, cultural, and market entrepreneurship and tests them by making use of the time structure of the observations found in the WVS.

The purpose of this editorial is to introduce the Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy (JEPP).

The paper outlines the primary objectives of JEPP.

JEPP was created to encourage and disseminate quality research about the vital relationships among institutions, entrepreneurship and economic outcomes. JEPP 's aim is to improve the quality of scholarly and public discourse about entrepreneurship and development policies. In general, JEPP seeks high‐quality articles that say something interesting about public policy, entrepreneurship and economic development.

The editorial describes the thinking behind JEPP, and the journal's objectives. JEPP welcomes all scholars and individuals with professional or personal interests in acquiring and sharing knowledge about institutions, entrepreneurship, and economic outcomes.