Search results

Purpose – Audit quality is traditionally defined as the joint probability that an existing problem is discovered and reported by the auditor. This study examines whether and how audit quality is associated with related-party transactions and CEO duality. The first part (i.e., the ability to discover) is related to professional judgment, and the second part (i.e., report truthfully) is related to independence.

Methodology/Approach – Regression methods was used on archival data.

Findings – Our results reveal that for publicly held companies in environments with stronger capital market discipline, which causes greater reputation concerns and litigation risks, a CEO who is also the board chair does not hinder auditor independence. For privately held companies, however, such a CEO hinders auditor independence due to a lack of capital market discipline. The findings on related-party financing, on the other hand, are reversed. That is, in terms of information for an auditor, since the conflicts of interests are more severe in publicly held companies than in privately held companies, the relevance of related-party financing to a decision whether to issue a going-concern opinion is greater in publicly held companies.

Social implications – The empirical results of publicly held companies are useful for countries with better corporate governance, while those of privately held companies are helpful for countries with relatively weak corporate governance.

Originality/Value of paper – Because auditors performing audit services face different litigation risks and reputation concerns, the differences in our results between the two types of clients can have implications about the suitability of these types of companies in emerging markets.

This study examines compensation changes among top executives of formerly privately held stock insurers and mutual insurers at the time around an initial public offering. This study explains how CEO compensation changes following an IPO differ between these two types of insurers owing to their differing agency characteristics. The results also show that CEOs’ benefits increase materially following an IPO. The authors find evidence that reduced ownership retention by managers increases agency costs and CEOs of mutual insurers exploit their positions and increase their reward at the expense of policyholders.

This paper aims to investigate the motivations behind the publication of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, and particularly the effect of information asymmetry between firms and their owners.

A natural experiment contrasting the CSR reporting of private vs public firms is used to test whether the degree of information asymmetry is a significant factor in the decision to publish CSR reports. Using a hand-collected sample of the 239 largest US private companies matched with publicly-traded firms, the effect of these inherently different information environments on CSR reporting is tested through logistic regression. Factors suggested by stakeholder and legitimacy theories are tested for their differential impact on private vs public firms’ decisions to publish a CSR report.

Results indicate that private firms are less likely to publish a CSR report than similar public firms. Public firms also follow Global Reporting Initiative guidelines more frequently, consistent with signaling report quality to dispersed investors. A subsample of private companies facing greater information asymmetry is found to be similar to public firms in their reporting behavior, reinforcing the link between information asymmetry and CSR disclosure. Further analysis suggests that non-owner stakeholders play an important role in private companies’ CSR reporting decisions.

In addition to accounting and governance scholars, the findings should interest private firm managers preparing for an initial public offering (IPO), as the evidence suggests that CSR reporting is used to communicate information to dispersed investors. The insight into reporting motivations should be useful to accountants engaged in CSR consultation and assurance.

With the growing attention paid to the CSR performance of firms, demonstrated by the growth in socially responsible investing, the study provides evidence that effective communication of CSR information to investors may play a key role in CSR-engaged firms’ disclosure strategies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the CSR reporting decisions of a large sample of publicly-traded and privately-held firms. The results add to our understanding of what motivates firms to publish CSR reports, highlighting the importance of information asymmetry between the firm and its owners.

We examine how auditors' use of limited liability agreements (LLAs) impact perceptions of private company creditworthiness in a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment. Ninety-three United States-based bank loan officers evaluate whether LLA clauses and the size of the company's external auditor impact lending decisions. We use signaling theory to predict, and we find that LLAs decrease perceived creditworthiness, mainly when the company engages a Non-Big4 auditor. We find no difference in perceived creditworthiness when the company employs a Big4 firm, irrespective of including an LLA clause. Supplemental analyses show that lenders perceive that LLA clauses signal higher credit risk and, in turn, decrease perceived creditworthiness. We offer insights into how lenders integrate information about privately held companies into their decisions, which could impact the cost of capital for private companies. Our study should be of interest to preparers and the varied users of financial statements and regulators.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the organizational form of an investment management firm affects the performance of the mutual funds under its operation. More explicitly, this study aims to test whether funds managed by publicly listed firms achieve different risk-adjusted performance when compared with funds operated by privately held investment firms.

This study uses Jensen's alpha to measure funds’ performance based on the Carhart’s (1997) benchmarks and market timing factors. The researchers test the relation between fund performance and organizational form using regressions. It alleviates the reverse causality and endogeneity using propensity score matching (PSM) methodology. The study investigates the difference in performance of funds managed by public firms on the post- vs pre- initial public offering (IPO) basis. Alternatively, this study tests the performance change post-public listing of the parent firm. It computes the difference for a matched sample of funds managed by private firms that were likely to go public but did not. The researchers match funds using PSM methodology.

This paper provides robust evidence that publicly traded management companies administer relatively under-performing mutual funds in comparison to those managed by privately held firms. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that confirms that organizational decision is endogenous to performance. The study finds that after a privately held company goes public, the performance of their mutual funds and the performance of the matched group funds, whose companies remained private at the same time, tends to decline, compared with companies prior to the public offering. However, the decline in mutual fund performance is larger for the companies who chose to pursue their IPO.

The contribution of this study to the literature is twofold. First, while there is a wealth of literature on the impact of ownership structures on corporate performance, there are very few studies focused on mutual fund markets, despite the evidence that supports a generally mixed effect. This study confirms that the performance of mutual funds managed by publicly traded investments firms is lower than that of funds managed by privately held firms. Second, the organizational decision (private vs public) is not exogenous but depends on the actual funds’ performance.

Using a population study, we provide evidence on the important but understudied issue of company survival under employee ownership, as well as on the performance effects of employee ownership and the issue of whether employee ownership substitutes for other pension benefits.

Company survival and pension benefits are assessed using a unique dataset from Dun & Bradstreet of privately held Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) companies over the 1988–1999 period, matched to non-ESOP companies in the same industry. Performance is assessed using pre/post-comparisons of ESOP adopters in the 1988–1994 period.

Privately held ESOP companies in 1988 were only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to go bankrupt or close over the 1988–1999 period, and only three-fifths as likely to disappear for any reason. The ESOP companies had significantly higher post-adoption annual employment and sales growth, along with higher sales per employee. ESOP companies are four times more likely than their non-ESOP pairs to have defined benefit pension plan and other forms of defined contribution plans.

The greater survival was not explained by higher productivity, or by greater compensation flexibility. The higher survival may instead be tied to complementary policies adopted along with ESOPs to create a more committed and engaged workforce that contributes ideas to enhance survival and is more flexible when economic difficulties arise. The pension results are consistent with other studies on compensation under employee ownership, suggesting that employee ownership is generally used as a form of efficiency wage to provide above-market compensation.

Higher survival among ESOP companies could result in lower job loss and unemployment, potentially providing a public policy rationale for support of employee ownership.

The chapter provides the first examination of company survival in privately held ESOP companies, and one of the few examinations of how ESOPs relate to other pension benefits.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how share buybacks can be, in Portuguese small privately held firms, a source of tax‐based conflicts between shareholders and tax administrations. Two issues are of particular relevance: the favored tax treatment of capital gains relative to dividends, and the use of valuation formulae to compute prices used in such transactions. The paper intends to present some advice to firms and consultants regarding equity valuation in privately held firms, to avoid tax based litigation. An extended analysis of the issue and its relevance to other jurisdictions is also presented.

The paper is based on a conceptual discussion of the usual approach taken by the Portuguese tax authorities to challenge share buybacks in small, privately held, firms. The arm's length principle in transfer pricing rules is the cornerstone of the topic analysed. The paper compares the merits of alternative pricing basis, and shows the economic and legal problems that each alternative presents.

The paper finds that the lack of tax neutrality between dividends and capital gains in Portugal can induce tax motivated transactions in small firms. The tax administration try to challenge these transactions on transfer pricing grounds. The alternative valuation strategy used by tax authorities is flawed, and puts the taxpayers in a good litigation position. However, a sensible valuation put forward by the firm can avoid such legal battles, which consume time and other resources of small owners.

The owners of privately held firms and the tax authorities should use valuation methods in very sensible terms. Cash flow valuation rests on several assumptions. These assumptions should not be used to produce prices that are easily questioned and increase litigation between firms and taxpayers.

The paper can be a source of practical advice for small business owners and advisors, as far as share transactions and share valuation are concerned. It is useful not only for the Portuguese managers and tax authorities, but also for any country where taxation of dividends and capital gains induces tax motivated buybacks.

This paper aims to explore the differing attitudes of salaried chief financial officers (CFOs) that can be associated with agency theory and stewardship theory. CFO attitudes are investigated because CFOs typically face additional agency conflict in their roles as overseers of the financial and accounting functions that are responsible for the production of numerical information used as a basis for incentive compensation.

A qualitative field study of 14 large privately held Austrian manufacturing companies was conducted. The findings rely on information retrieved from 18 semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals from these companies.

The findings reveal a number of contextual factors that influence stewardship and agency attitudes of salaried CFOs. CFOs, who mainly report formally to owners, perceive more control in the hands of the owners. Short-term management appointments appear to facilitate agency-like behavior, whereas the existence of owner–managers and the typical CFO's maturity in terms of age and wealth seem to nurture stewardship behavior.

Further (quantitative) research is needed to corroborate the findings in this study, which are derived from a qualitative research approach. Further research on agency and stewardship behavior should also include the view of principal with respect to agent actions, as this paper shows that principal opinion strongly affects the way agents perceive control.

The findings suggest that the behavior of company owners can influence and change a manager's agency or stewardship attitude. Owners who desire a culture of stewardship should set long-term goals and facilitate long-term management appointments. Moreover, owners can lower a manager's perceived level of owner control by adopting an active role in management.

This paper is the first to analyze stewardship and agency attitude of salaried CFOs in privately held companies. It, therefore, adds to the current literature on the role of the CFO, as well as to the literature on governance issues in privately held firms.

The volume of acquisitions involving privately held targets has far surpassed that of publicly traded firms in recent years; yet, surprisingly little research has examined private target acquisitions. By analyzing the unique features of the market for private targets, we compare the potential for value creation and value capture in private and public target acquisitions. We argue that the corporate context of private targets does not provide the same opportunities for curbing agency costs and sharing intangible resources than the context of public targets, which reduces the value creation potential for the buyer. On the other hand, private targets have lower bargaining power vis-à-vis acquirers because of higher failures in the market for corporate control of private firms and liquidity discount, which increases the value creation potential for the buyer. The net value creation potential of acquiring private targets, therefore, depends on the relative importance of their agency costs, resource sharing opportunities, and bargaining power.

The purpose of this paper is to determine if self-serving bias affects audit client satisfaction level with their audit firm.

A 2×2 between-subjects design is used, where the authors experimentally manipulate the level of client involvement in the audit and the extent of value-added services the client received.

Using a sample of 115 financial managers (audit clients), the authors find no evidence that self-serving bias exists among clients in the experimental setting. Rather, they find that clients appear to be more satisfied with their auditor when they (clients) participate more in the service exchange.

The research is limited to a specific context within the privately held company audit setting.

Audit firms may consider encouraging their privately held clients to participate more in the audit process by clearly communicating expectations and providing clients with audit preparedness materials, including templates and training where necessary.

Although the self-serving bias has been shown to exist in the marketing literature, the authors present a setting where the relationship between service provider (auditor) and customer (client) is such that the self-serving bias may not hold.