Search results

Emotions, understood as evolving mental states, are pivotal in shaping individuals“' decision-making, especially in ambiguous information evaluation, probability estimation of events, and causality analysis. Public–private partnership (PPP) projects represent a confluence of “economic–environmental–social” dimensions, wherein stakeholder behavior follows the sequential progression of “cognition–emotion–action.” Consequently, comprehending the effects of emotional shifts on stakeholder's decision-making processes is vital to fostering the sustainability of PPP projects.

The paper utilizes rank-dependent expected utility and evolutionary game theory to systematically examine the influence of emotional factors on stakeholders' behavior and decision-making processes within PPP projects. The paper integrates three emotional state functions—optimism, pessimism and rationality—into the PPP framework, highlighting the intricate interactions among the government, private sector, surrounding public and the media. Furthermore, the paper amalgamates the evolutionary pathways of environmental rights incidents with the media's role. Through equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, the paper delves into the diverse interplay of emotions across different phases of the environmental rights incident, assessing the impact of these emotions on the evolutionary game's equilibrium results.

Emotions significantly influence the microlevel decisions of PPP stakeholders, adapting continually based on event dynamics and media influences. When the private sector demonstrates optimism and the surrounding public leans toward rationality or pessimism, the likelihood of the private sector engaging in speculative behavior escalates, while the surrounding public refrains from adopting a supervisory strategy. Conversely, when the private sector is pessimistic and the public is optimistic, the system fails to evolve a stable strategy. However, when government regulation intensifies, the private sector opts for a nonspeculative strategy, and the surrounding public adopts a supervisory strategy. Under these conditions, the system attains a relatively optimal state of equilibrium.

The paper develops a game model to examine the evolutionary dynamics between the surrounding public and private sectors concerning environmental rights protection in waste incineration PPP projects. It illuminates the nature of the conflicting interests among project participants, delves into the impact of emotional factors on their decision-making processes and offers crucial perspectives for the governance of such partnerships. Furthermore, this paper provides substantive recommendations for emotional oversight to enhance governance efficacy.

This study seeks to estimate union wage effect in the public and private sectors of Ghana, respectively. It also seeks to ascertain whether the union wage effect in the two sectors varies.

The authors use data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 6 (GLSS 6, 2012/2013) and Ghana Labour Force Survey (GLFS, 2015). In terms of estimation technique, the authors employ the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition technique to estimate union wage effect in public and private sectors, respectively.

The findings indicate that union wage effect in the public sector is positive and higher relative to that of the private sector.

The findings imply that strict enforcement of Section 82 of Labour Act 2003 (Act 651) will curb the political influence of public sector unions over their employer (Government).

This research paper has not been presented to any journal for publication and it is the authors' original work.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-01-2023-0045

Public-private partnership (PPP) power projects are associated with varying risk factors. This paper aims to develop a fuzzy quantitative risk allocation model (QRAM) to guide decision-making on risk allocation in PPP power projects in Ghana.

A total of 67 risk factors and 9 risk allocation criteria were established from literature and ranked in a two-round Delphi survey using questionnaires. The fuzzy synthetic evaluation method was used in developing the risk allocation model.

The model’s output variable is the risk allocation proportions between the public body and private body based on their capability to manage the risk factors. Out of the 37 critical risk factors, the public sector was allocated 12 risk factors with proportions = 50%, while the private sector was allocated 25 risk factors with proportions = 50%.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research presents the first attempt in Ghana at endeavouring to develop a QRAM for PPP power projects. There is confidence in the model to efficiently allocate risks emanating from PPP power projects.

In comparison to other countries, power generation in Sub-Saharan Africa is poor. The demand for power has surged in recent times and continues to increase at a fast rate. The public–private partnership (PPP) model has been identified as an option to address the challenges in the power sector. The purpose of this research paper is to critically explore the reasons for entering into PPP power projects in Ghana by the public and private parties.

Questionnaires were used to elicit responses from respondents using a two-round Delphi survey. From 60 respondents contacted in round one, 48 responses were obtained, and these 48 respondents further took part in round two. Mean score ranking was used to rank the reasons for entering into PPP power projects, while analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run to test significant difference in perceptions among the respondents.

From round 2 of the Delphi survey, the significant reasons for public sector entering into PPP power projects were as follows: achieving improved value for money, access to additional capital, increased certainty of projects and greater efficiency of project delivery services. For private sector, most significant reasons were as follows: obtaining of investment support, improvement in private sector’s international image and synergy with public sector. From ANOVA analysis, there were significant different perceptions among some of factors on the respondent profile variables and the reasons for entering into PPP power projects, while other factors did not have significant different perception.

Significant reasons for both public and private sectors identified would be incorporated by the government when PPP policy guidelines and laws are reviewed. This will aid in the effective implementation of PPP for power projects.

Promoting technological innovation is important to address the complexity of major engineering challenges. Technological innovations include short-term innovations at the project level and long-term innovations that can enhance competitive advantages. The purpose of this study is to develop an incentive mechanism for the public sector that considers short-term and long-term efforts from the private sector, aiming to promote technological innovation in major engineering projects.

This study constructs an incentive model considering the differences in short-term and long-term innovation efforts from the private sector. This model emphasizes the spillover effect of long-term efforts on current projects and the cost synergy effect between short-term and long-term efforts. It also explores the factors influencing the optimal incentive strategies for the public sector and innovation strategies for the private sector.

The results indicate that increasing the output coefficient of short-term and long-term efforts and reducing the cost coefficient not only enhance the innovation efforts of the private sector but also prompt the public sector to increase the incentive coefficient. The spillover effect of long-term innovation efforts and the synergy effect of the two efforts are positively related to the incentive coefficient for the public sector.

This research addresses the existing gap in understanding how the public sector should devise incentive mechanisms for technological innovation when contractors acting as the private sector are responsible for construction within a public-private partnership (PPP) model. In constructing the incentive mechanism model, this study incorporates the private sector's short-term efforts at the project level and their long-term efforts for sustained corporate development, thus adding considerable practical significance.

The optimal payment in the whole operation and maintenance period of water environment treatment PPP projects has become the main approach to realize sustainable development of projects. This study is aimed at constructing an effective payment model for the whole life period of projects to achieve win-win among all stakeholders, so as to provide a theoretical reference and managerial implications for the public sector in the whole operation and maintenance period.

In the whole operation and maintenance period of water environment treatment PPP projects, this article investigates how the public sector optimizes the payment in the whole operation and maintenance period of projects. Firstly, the projects' whole operation and maintenance period is divided into several stages according to the performance appraisal period. And then, the multi-stage dynamic programming model is constructed to design the payment construct model for the public sector in each performance appraisal stage. The payment from the public sector is the decision variable, and the deduction from the private sector is a random variable.

The optimal payment model showed that the relatively less objective weight of public sector leaded to its relatively more total payment and vice versa. Therefore, the sustainable development of the projects can only be ensured when the objective weights both of them should be balanced. Additionally, the deduction from the performance appraisal of private sector plays an important role in the model construction. The larger deduction the private sector undertakes, the smaller profits private sector has. Since the deduction at each stage is a random variable, the deduction varies with the different probability distributions obeyed by the practical deduction in each stage.

The findings from this study have provided theoretical and application references, and some managerial implications are also given. First, the improvement of the pricing system of public sector should be accelerated. Second, the reasonable profit of the private sector must be guaranteed. While pursuing the maximization of social benefits, the public sector should make full use of the price sharing mechanism in the market and supervise the real income situation of the private sector. Third is increasing the public to participate in pricing. Additionally, it is a limitation that the deduction is assumed to conform to a uniform distribution in this study. Other probability distributions on deduction can be essentially further sought, so as to be more line with the actual situation of the projects.

The optimal payment in whole operation and maintenance period of the projects has become an important issue, which is a key to project success. This study constructs a multi-stage dynamic programming model to optimize payment in the whole period of projects. Additionally, this study adds its value through deeply developing the new theories of optimal payment to more suitable for the practical problems, so that to optimize the design of payment mechanism. Meanwhile, a valuable reference for public and private sectors is provided to ensure the sustainable development of the projects.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the correlation between credit supply to government and credit supply to the private sector to determine whether there is a crowding-out or crowding-in effect of credit supply to government on credit supply to the private sector.

The study used data from 43 countries during the 1980–2019 period. The study employed the Pearson correlation methodology to analyze the data.

There is a significant positive correlation between credit supply to government and credit supply to the private sector. There is also a significant positive relationship between credit supply to government and credit supply to the private sector, implying a crowding-in effect of government borrowing on private sector borrowing. The positive correlation between credit supply to government and credit supply to the private sector by banks is stronger and highly significant in the period before the Great Recession, while the positive correlation is weaker and less significant during the Great Recession, and the correlation further weakens after the Great Recession. The regional analyses show that the positive correlation between credit supply to government and credit supply to the private sector by banks is stronger and highly significant in the African region than in the Asian region and the region of the Americas.

There is no evidence on the correlation between credit supply to government and credit supply to the private sector during the Great Recession.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, it explores the influencing factors of the government’s trust decision-making in the private sector; second, it explores how these influencing factors affect the government’s trust decisions.

A theoretical model was established, and a questionnaire survey was conducted among 152 professionals. The collected datas were analyzed by the structural equation modeling (SEM) method.

The study identified four critical factors that influence the government’s decision to trust the private sector in public-private-partnership (PPP) projects. All the four factors have a positively correlated impact on the government’s trust decision-making. The structural equation path analysis shows that the most important factor affecting the government’s trust decision-making is the trustee’s (private sector) trustworthy characteristics, and the path coefficient is 0.92. The path coefficients of risk perception and the trustor’s trust tendency are 0.83 and 0.74, respectively. The influence of the legal system environment on government trust decision-making is moderate, with a path coefficient of 0.68.

This paper contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, the factors influencing decision-making to government trust in the private sector in PPP projects have been identified. Second, a comprehensive view of the mechanism of government trust in the private sector in PPP projects has been theorized by the SEM method.

Trust is the glue that holds cooperative relationships together and often exists in an asymmetric manner. The purpose of this study is to explore how to mitigate the issue of losses or increased transaction costs caused by opportunistic behavior in a soft environment where trust asymmetry is quite common and difficult to avoid.

This study focuses on examining asymmetric trust between the government and the private sector in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Drawing upon both project realities and relevant literature, the primary conditional variables influencing asymmetric trust are identified. These variables encompass power perception asymmetry, information asymmetry, interaction behavior, risk perception differences and government-side control. Subsequently, through the use of a survey questionnaire, binary-matched data from both the government and the private sector are collected. The study employs fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to conduct a configurational analysis, aiming to investigate the causal pathways that trigger asymmetric trust.

No single conditional variable is a necessary condition for the emergence of trust asymmetry. The pathways leading to a high degree of trust asymmetry can be categorized into two types: those dominated by power perception and those involving a combination of multiple factors. Differences in power perception play a crucial role in the occurrence of high trust asymmetry, yet the influence of other conditional variables in triggering trust asymmetry should not be overlooked.

The findings can contribute to advancing the study of trust relationships in the field of Chinese PPP projects. Furthermore, they hold practical value in facilitating the enhancement of trust relationships between the government and the private sector.

The paper aims to elucidate effective strategies for promoting the adoption of green technology innovation within the private sector, thereby enhancing the value of public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operational phase.

Utilizing prospect theory, the paper considers the government and the public as external driving forces. It establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government regulators, the private sector and the public. The paper uses numerical simulations to explore the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and the determinants influencing each stakeholder.

The paper demonstrates that government intervention and public participation substantially promote green technology innovation within the private sector. Major influencing factors encompass the intensity of pollution taxation, governmental information disclosure and public attention. However, an optimal threshold exists for environmental publicity and innovation subsidies, as excessive levels might inhibit technological innovation. Furthermore, within government intervention strategies, compensating the public for their participation costs is essential to circumvent the public's “free-rider” tendencies and encourage active public collaboration in PPP project innovation.

By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the paper comprehensively examines the roles of government intervention and public participation in promoting green technology innovation within the private sector, offering fresh perspectives and strategies for the operational phase of PPP projects.