Search results

This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of research in the field. The paper discusses the origins of the field and the roles of nonmarket strategy. The political economy framework is used and contrasted with the current form of the resource-based theory. The paper argues that research should focus on the firm level and argues that the strategy of self-regulation can be useful in reducing the likelihood of challenges from private and public politics. The political economy perspective is illustrated using three examples: (1) public politics: Uber, (2) private politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup, and (3) integrated strategy and private and public politics: The Fast Food Campaign. The paper concludes with a discussion of research issues in theory, empirics, and normative assessment.

We model the interaction between a profit-maximizing firm and an activist using an infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic game. The firm enhances its reputation through “self-regulation”: voluntary provision of an abatement activity that reduces a negative externality. We show that in equilibrium the externality-reducing activity is subject to decreasing marginal returns, which can cause the firm to “coast on its reputation,” that is, decrease the level of externality-reducing activity as its reputation grows. The activist, which benefits from increases in the externality-reducing activity, can take two types of action that can harm the firm’s reputation: criticism, which can impair the firm’s reputation on the margin, and confrontation, which can trigger a crisis that may severely damage the firm’s reputation. The activist changes the reputational dynamics of the game by tending to keep the firm in reputational states in which it is highly motivated to invest in externality-reducing activity. Criticism and confrontational activity are shown to be imperfect substitutes. The more patient the activist or the more passionate it is about externality reduction, the more likely it is to rely on confrontation. The more patient the firm and the more important corporate citizenship is to firm’s brand equity, the more likely that it will be targeted by an activist that relies on confrontation.

Multinational corporations (MNCs) utilize corporate social responsibility (CSR) to govern their global economic activities. Yet CSR adoption is influenced by institutional diversity of both home and host countries. This article uses neoinstitutional and comparative capitalism theories to understand how CSR is shaped by different forms of stakeholder salience in diverse institutional contexts. Using data on labor rights CSR adoption by 629 European MNCs, our empirical results indicate that CSR complements institutionalized stakeholder power in home countries, but substitutes for its absence in host countries. Hence, CSR may paradoxically legitimate MNC behavior given both the presence and absence of stakeholder rights.

The success enjoyed by some of the alternative agrifood movements has led to a dual process: on the one hand, their mainstreaming and cooptation; while on the other hand, their institutionalization into public regulation and law. This dual process is the result of the influence these movements have had on consumers and politicians and serves to demonstrate the constant exchange between the spheres of public and private regulation, a feature that characterizes the neoliberal model of governance. In turn, this has led to the appearance of new alternative initiatives which may converge with or diverge from founding initiatives when these are the result of divisions within a movement. The question that arises here is obvious: despite these evident achievements, by working within the market and using the tools of neoliberal regulation, have these movements managed to generate the social change they intended from the outset? This chapter will attempt to answer the question by offering a reflection on two of the most widely discussed aspects of this strategy: first, the private and/or public space where these movements develop and the citizen-consumer duality of the actors to whom they appeal; and second, their ability to generate standards, norms, and certification systems, that is, their ability to establish the rules of the game.

Today, the global education market is one of the faster growing sectors, and it has attracted several new actors or what we call educational brokers who are now responsible for shaping national agendas. The newer actors in education are vastly different for the former players in that whereas previous actors engrossed national educational systems through the provision of technical assistance to meet international standards, best practices, and benchmarks, these newer players are for-profit entities that emphasize austerity, leanness, human resource maximization, performance targets, and competition. Therefore, in this new educational landscape, national governments are seen as “clients” who receive “expert” advice from “external consultants” that have an assortment of experiences across different sectors. Education governance is no longer a statist endowed but one that incubates in laborites of best practices resonates with existing case studies and results driven based on Big Date collected. We argue that educational brokers are responsible for the emergence of a hybrid form of education governance that use business and market techniques to reform strategies within the education sector. We conclude by suggesting that collectively educational brokers are using what we call “educational sub-prime mechanisms” – higher interest rates, reduced quality collateral, and less advantageous terms to counterweight higher credit risk – to manage educational portfolios and newer forms of educational risk.

Purpose – The chapter answers the question if urban regime theory (URT) can provide a useful framework to understand and solve problems of cooperation in regional processes in rural–urban areas.

Methodology/approach – The chapter is a theoretical discussion on problems found in contemporary rural spatial governance.

Findings – URT can provide a framework for understanding the obstacles encountered in regional development and is a promising perspective for the analysis of regional processes. A solution for problems in regional cooperation can be found in so-called ‘vital coalitions’, forms of vital interaction between regional actors, based on energy and productivity, that can create a ‘capacity to act’ in regions that have become ‘gridlocked’ by current procedures and regulations.

Research limitations/implications – A modern URT, applied in a regional context:(1)Can point out ‘how power is organised to act’;(2)Analyses informal networks between actors as bases for cooperation and vitality, and as a possible starting point for new (cultural) counter-regimes and(3)Offers insight into regional complexity and cooperation and into emergent regimes.

Practical implications – Vital coalitions are forms of self-governance, that introduce new agendas and function as forms of niche-innovation in regions. This can lead to the forming of new ‘cultural regimes’ in which the motives and values of civilians are a key element.

Originality/value of the chapter – The value of the chapter lies in the use of concepts in regions from a fresh new perspective, by translating the URT from a local, urban context to a regional rural–urban perspective.

This paper suggests that a corporate-environmental food regime is emerging as part of a larger restructuring of capitalism. Like past food regimes, it reflects specific social and political compromises, which I interpret through the social movement concept of interpretive frames. The diasporic-colonial food regime of 1870–1914 grew up in response to working class movements in Europe, and created a historically unprecedent class of commercial family farmers. When world markets collapsed, those farmers entered into new alliances, including one that led to the mercantile-industrial food regime of 1947–1973. Lineaments of a new food regime based on quality audited supply chains seems to be emerging in the space opened by impasse in international negotiations over food standards. Led by food retailers, agrofood corporations are selectively appropriating demands of environmental, food safety, animal welfare, fair trade, and other social movements that arose in the interstices of the second food regime. If it consolidates, the new food regime promises to shift the historical balance between public and private regulation, and to widen the gap between privileged and poor consumers as it deepens commodification and marginalizes existing peasants. Social movements are already regrouping and consolidation of the regime remains uncertain.

This chapter assesses the impact of socially responsible investing (SRI) in terms of its role in governance. Governance refers to the rules, incentives, institutions and philosophies for coordinating, controlling and supervising behaviour. The SRI sector purports to be a mechanism of market governance, such as through its codes of conduct and targeting of individual companies by engagement or divestment.

This subject-matter of the chapter is evaluated primarily through a conceptual and theoretical argument rather than empirical research.

Social investors’ capacity to ‘govern’ the market is constrained by gaps and deficiencies in the legal frameworks for the financial economy. Fiduciary law controlling institutional investors is the most important element of this governance framework. The SRI movement is starting to broaden its agenda and strategies to include advocacy for regulatory reform. But the SRI industry has devoted attention to its own voluntary codes of conduct, such as the UNPRI, which do not yet provide a sufficiently comprehensive or robust substitute for official regulation.

Paradoxically, whereas SRI once stood for taking action through the financial economy when governments had failed to act, the sector is also somewhat dependent on the state to provide an empowering governance framework. But state regulation itself may be strengthened by partnership with the SRI industry, such as by utilising its codes of conduct to supplement official legal standards.

The chapter deepens insights into the relationship between the SRI sector as a largely voluntary movement and its legal governance through the state or the market.

This chapter synthesizes the economics, law, and technology of security tokens and security token offerings (STOs). Security tokens are an increasingly important instrument in decentralized finance (DeFi) markets. They are blockchain-based investment contracts that are subject to securities law. Interoperability, fractional ownership, market liquidity, and rapid settlement are the main reasons security tokens are a primary catalyst for digitizing finance. The chapter empirically compares STOs with initial exchange offerings (IEOs) and initial coin offerings (ICOs). STOs take longer and raise more funding. However, controlling for other factors, the amount raised in STOs and IEOs is lower than in utility-token ICOs. These findings suggest an avenue for future research. Moreover, both the law and the technology of security tokens need to address critical challenges related to the competent jurisdiction in multinational activities and blockchain interoperability, scalability, and natural resource degradation.