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The purpose of this paper is to expand the investor sentiment’s effect on investment efficiency to the layer of “credit financing,” studying whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

The authors obtain firm-level data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets and using panel estimation techniques examine whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

This paper finds that credit financing plays the role of partial media in the process of investor sentiment affecting investment efficiency. Based on the funds increasing effect, with the high-investor sentiment and increasing credit financing, corporations alleviate the financing constraints, but also provide a convenient for the abuse of corporate funds. So, investor sentiment positively associates with enterprises’ overinvestment, while investor sentiment negatively associates with enterprises’ underinvestment. Relying on the particular system background and property right environment in China, this paper finds that investor sentiment has an effect on the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises and the underinvestment of private enterprises through credit financing channel, while it does not function in the overinvestment of private enterprises. The reason of the difference is that under the soft budget constraint in the country, the credit preference of state-owned enterprises and the creditor’s rights management of banks are partially absent.

By fusing the special financial environment and institutional background, this thesis further includes in the analysis frame the difference in governance effect by credit financing between state-owned and privately owned listed companies, and further analyzes the difference in impact on investment efficiency in enterprises of different natures after investor sentiment has affected enterprise credit financing.

This paper has verified the constraint assumption and deepened the research work on bank credit supply and answered practical questions such as whether the banks in the country exercise supervision function over the listed companies and on which kind of listed companies the supervision function plays a more effective role.

As an unofficial substitution mechanism, bank-enterprise relationship can elevate the investment efficiency by private owned enterprises. Based on the timely research results on credit financing, reference is provided for private listed companies to utilize investor sentiment to improve its investment efficiency.

This paper has proved the specific path which creates the dual effects on resources allocation by investor sentiment, that is, the intermediary transmission in credit financing, clarifying the mechanism of action by which investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment and making incremental contribution to the research of how investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment.

As China is transforming from a planned economy a market‐oriented economy, private enterprise plays a prominent role in China's economy today. This paper introduces the status of private enterprise and focuses on its records management. By explaining the changes in China's policy towards the private sector, it deals mainly with practice in both archive administration and the records management of private companies. Government archives administration changed along with national policy from serving only the public sector to serving both public and private sectors evenly. For the private sector, archival consciousness is the key element in its fledging stage of records management. The paper also analyzes the characteristics of private companies that are different from state‐owned ones and the advantages and disadvantages of records management, and predicts some aspects of its development.

Based on the theory of “optimal contracting approach” and “the managerial power approach”, this paper aims to investigate whether senior executives of listed companies in China make use of their power to gain their own private benefits. The paper also compares compensation contracts between state- and private-owned enterprises to test whether there is a significant difference between senior executives from different ownership types of enterprises in terms of compensation contracts.

The paper raises four hypotheses based on the theories of “company agency”, “optimal contracting approach” and “managerial power approach”. After that, 5,680 A-share-listed companies of stock market in Shanghai and in Shenzhen Stock Market from 2008 to 2012 were taken as research samples to conduct a series of research analysis, including t-test, reliability analysis and regression analysis, with the help of SPSS 18.0.

The senior executives of listed companies in China could make use of their power to increase their own salary to gain power pay and, at the same time, company performance, company size and other factors that are important to influence the executive compensation. This paper further argues that senior executives of private-owned listed companies are more likely to use their power to obtain power pay and increase their own compensation. Additionally, the agency costs of Chinese listed companies are negatively related to the performance pay of senior executives, whereas there is no obvious negative correlation with the power pay of senior executives.

This paper takes multiple, in-depth approaches to study the relationship among managerial power, agency cost and executive compensation and to find out the differences in compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. It also provides necessary suggestions to ensure the interests of stockholders, such as: optimizing the management structure of listed companies; improving the transparence of information disclosure of listed companies; establishing effective mechanism of incentive and constraint; and improving and standardizing the market of professional managers.

The compensation contract of senior executives in China is critical to enhance enterprises’ performance, and it will become an important factor that will facilitate the interests of stockholders and management. However, this paper argues that some phenomena of over-payment of senior executives in listed companies cannot be explained by the theory of “optimal contracting approach”, but it is necessary and important to compare the differences of compensation contract of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. A series of findings are proposed in this paper.

This paper made use of a principal analysis to extract the main factors that could represent the managerial power from different angles. In addition, this paper also compared the differences between compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. Additionally, in this paper, the compensation of senior executives was divided into “power compensation” and “performance compensation”, which were used to test the relationship with the management cost of companies.

Using a unique three‐digit firm‐level data set of all medium‐ and large‐sized manufacturing enterprises in Bulgaria covering the years 1997/1998, and investigation is conducted into how wage determination is related to ownership status. Building on a slightly modified version of the right‐to‐manage model, the pooled OLS, panel and first‐difference TSLS estimates show statistically significant differences in the share of rents taken by workers employed in state, private domestic and foreign firms. Taking account of firm heterogeneity, it is found that rent sharing is nearly non‐existent in foreign‐owned firms, while the level of pay is higher compared with state‐owned companies. Further, rent sharing seems to be highly pronounced in state‐owned enterprises, while on average domestically private‐owned companies are characterised by less rent sharing. Overall, the robustness checks confirm these findings.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and foreign ownership on the demand for an external audit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in six Latin American countries. In particular, the authors test whether foreign-owned firms (compared with domestic private-owned firms) and domestic firms with minority foreign shareholders are more likely engaged in audit assurance.

The authors applied the logit model to estimate the impact of ownership concentration and owner/shareholder type on audit demand, using a sample of 4,609 SMEs. The probabilities of being audited for firms in these countries are then calculated from the estimation results.

The empirical results suggest an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and audit demand only for Uruguay and Peru. However, foreign-owned firms and domestic private-owned firms with minority foreign ownership have a high probability of being audited for all sample countries.

Policymakers in developing countries may promote foreign investments in domestic private-owned firms to improve their corporate transparency and governance.

This study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of ownership on audit demand by particularly focusing on foreign owners and foreign minority shareholders. The findings indicate that foreign ownership (either majority or minority) contributes to corporate transparency and business environments in emerging countries.

Two factors explain why the Serbian privatization experience deserves close attention from outside world. First, Serbia's starting conditions for privatization, with a historical tradition of workers’ management, strong trade unions, and an ambivalent initial attitude toward privatization, have as much in common with circumstances surrounding privatization in the developing countries as with those in the so-called economies in transition. Second, Serbia embarked on a resolute privatization path only in 2001, following more than 10 years of diverse privatization efforts in other post-socialist economies of the region. This makes Serbia a perfect case study of how a country can learn from the experience (both positive and negative) of other reformers.

This paper aims to investigate the Chinese employment relationship under the framework of psychological contracts. The authors explored the effects of firm ownership (in terms of state-owned and private enterprises) and employment type (in terms of permanent and temporary employees) on employee perceptions of psychological contract. In addition, the associations between fulfilled psychological contract and various dimensions of employee attitudes were examined.

The authors adopted a questionnaire as the primary instrument to investigate the impact of firm ownership and employment type on psychological contract perceptions and outcomes. The analysis was based on a Chinese sample of a size of 363 employees.

The results indicate that state-owned employees overall reported fewer promises (employer under-obligation promised psychological contract), while private employees tended to have more promises (mutual high obligation, employer over-obligation and quasi-spot obligation promise-based psychological contract). Permanent employees reported high fulfillment (employer over-obligation, mutual high obligation and employer under-obligation fulfilled psychological contract). In contrast, temporary employees presented many promises (mutual high obligation promised psychological contract) and low fulfillment (quasi-spot fulfilled psychological contract). In general, firm ownership had weak effects on permanent and temporary employees’ perceptions of promise-based psychological contract, but no significant influence on fulfillment-based psychological contract. Moreover, psychological contract fulfillment was positively related to employees’ fairness perception and job satisfaction, while negatively related to the intention to quit. The authors failed to find comprehensive statistical support for the moderating effects of firm ownership or employment type.

The study contributes to the literature through a number of ways. First, instead of psychological contract breach, the authors use psychological contract fulfillment as a direct measure to examine the relationship between psychological contract and employees’ attitudes. Second, they investigate the effects of firm ownership on employment relationship under the psychological contract framework, enriching the institutional lens of the issue. Third, while majority of psychological contract studies concerning employment type concentrate on either permanent or temporary employees, the authors take both types into account. Fourth, they integrate perspectives of firm ownership and employment type. Finally, the authors perform the study in the Chinese context, which offers extra evidence to the body of psychological contract literature.

This study aims to examine the earnings management behaviour of financially distressed listed companies in China for the period 2002‐2006.

The present study uses discretionary accruals to serve as a proxy variable for earnings management, with the type of ultimate ownership and the type of industry to which the company belongs functioning as independent variables.

The empirical results show that the desire to avoid continued special treatment (ST) status and the risk of being de‐listed leads firms to adopt different earnings management behaviour before and after being designated as an ST firm.

The desire to avoid being de‐listed is as strong among managers of state‐owned companies as it is among private companies.

Implementing the effective regulation of corporate earnings management is therefore an issue of great importance. It is recommended that the government needs to take the degree of industry regulation into account when assessing regulations aimed at controlling earnings management.

In a transition economy like China, the state versus private ownership and the degree of government regulation in industry is likely to affect the earnings management of financially distressed companies. The study demonstrates that companies in less‐regulated industries tend to undertake more earnings management in the years both before and after they are designated as ST companies.

The purpose of this study was to find whether there was any significant difference in performance between government-linked companies (GLCs) and private-owned companies (POCs) and there was any significant improvement in performance of GLCs after Malaysian Government ' s initiatives to transform the GLCs to high-performance companies.

Panel data estimation techniques were used to run the regression in this study.

It was found that there was no significant difference in performance level between GLCs and POCs. It was also found that the performance level of GLCs had improved significantly after the initiation of GLCs ' transformation programme by the Malaysian Government.

The implication of the results of this study is that state-owned enterprises in developing countries like Malaysia can be relevant and important to take care of social responsibilities and needs, as also they can perform at par with private companies. There is no need for privatization of government-owned enterprises; rather, it needs corporatization. Government-owned enterprises can play an important role to drive national development.