Search results

The purpose of this research study is to determine whether flood-damaged residences located in the USA are remaining unrepaired because of the lack of flood insurance coverage. Unrepaired flooded dwellings are subsequently being foreclosed with mortgage-insurance claims being paid to lenders. This paper aims to examine if weather events that cause flooding impact the losses suffered by mortgage insurers and homeowners.

Two fully modified least squares regression models are done using losses experienced by two mortgage insurance companies. The AM Best insurance rating information for a 16-year period or years 2002–2017 is used to study whether the loss ratios experienced by two companies underwriting private mortgage insurance (PMI) are statistically correlated to National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) claim levels. The assumption is that higher flood insurance claims are a proxy for more severe weather events during a particular year which results in flooding that damage residences.

The NFIP claims coefficient is positive and significant for both companies being examined. This indicates that the more serious the flooding event during a specific year, the higher the losses experienced by the private mortgage insurer. The R² results for the regression models were 0.673–0.695. The income variable has a negative coefficient which was significant. It indicates that falling income lead to rising mortgage insurer losses. The NFIP variable was significant with a positive coefficient.

The mortgage insurance industry is dominated by several companies at any point in time. During the 16-year study period, some companies have become insolvent, merged with other companies or recently started underwriting mortgage insurance. One company was diversified writing multiple lines of property insurance. There were only two insurers with complete financial information for the specified study period.

There are currently five mortgage insurers operating in the USA. A serious flood event could cause the insolvency of some of these companies. This would reduce the competition existing in the default insurance market. The financial markets for real estate loans price mortgages based on the availability and the ability to secure mortgage insurance for high loan-to-value properties. There is federal mortgage insurance available for certain types of residential loans.

There are a limited number of insurers writing flood insurance. These companies can pick or reject dwellings and/or commercial properties to underwrite for insurance. The goal of phasing out insurance through the NFIP may prove impossible to achieve. A flood event without insurance would cause serious financial consequences to property owners, loan delinquencies and could depress the local economy for years. Competition from private mortgage insurers may intensify the adverse selection already being experienced by the NFIP. Private insurers would select the lower risk flood applications leaving the more risky insurance to be covered by the NFIP.

Prior research focused on financial variables impacting PMI and weather factors affecting flood insurance claims. Financial ratios published in the AM Best rating guide for the USA and Canada were used to examine whether or not PMI losses are indirectly affected by flooding events as measured by NFIP variable. Comparing two separate lines of insurance and their impact on each other has not been studied by prior researchers.

As financial markets move toward increased globalization, it becomes worth considering whether inherent differences in financial markets across different countries will diminish. For two countries more similar than different in terms of geography, location, government and culture, Canada and the USA remain strikingly different in terms of housing finance. Public policy objectives toward housing followed quite different paths over the past 70 years and fundamental differences in banking practices have led to considerably different outcomes in terms of mortgage finance instruments in the two countries. Examines some of the differences in policy and in competitive practices between Canada and the USA in an attempt to illuminate why differences in rates and terms across the two countries still exist. While a part of the difference remains due to legal constraints concerning the finance of the domestic housing sector, focuses on the economics and public policy choices that have led to the observed differences rather than on an analysis of the legal structure.

There are striking similarities between publicly-held government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and investor-owned public utilities. Each firm enjoys large scale economies that give a significant competitive advantage over other companies, possesses a dominant market position that it may be able to exploit to earn profits above competitive levels, and has a strong incentive to enter new markets when the life cycle of its core markets constrain its ability to increase profits. The recent behavior of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac indicates that the government must impose more stringent economic regulation on those GSEs in order to be sure that they achieve their public purposes.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical perspective and going-forward assessment of the importance of private mortgage insurance (PMI) entities in the residential-lending landscape in the USA.

Financial data from the PMI entities and federal income tax data were analyzed to comment on the importance of the PMI entities in the historical and current mortgage-lending environment.

PMI entities played a critical role in expanding the population of mortgage candidates for financial institutions. Through the guarantees offered by PMI entities, financial institutions granted loans to individuals who otherwise would not have qualified for mortgages.

No prior research has assessed the overall historical role played by these primary PMI entities.

This paper aims to investigate the problem of searching for the equilibrium in the housing market, the mortgage lending market and the insurance market in the process of selling the residential property. Three classes of markets are established in three modes, which reflect the interdependence of the firms’ interests in these markets through the parameters of their integration. The paper aims to determine the prices in these markets on the basis of the compromises among the conflicting interests of the related firms, and, in addition, to assess the rationality of integration for firms, which are participants in the process of selling the residential property.

On the basis of the revenue sharing contracts and the supply chain coordination methods, the optimization models of the housing realtor, the mortgage bank and the insurance company are developed. The models consider the interdependence of the firms’ interests, the monopolistic competition in these markets and the conditions of the firms’ individual rationality in the interaction process.

The results of the study are as follows. First, as a consequence of a decrease in the demand curves in monopolistic competition, the housing market, the mortgage market and the insurance market are interconnected, therefore, the optimization models of the firms in these markets are interdependent through the revenue sharing parameters. Second, in these markets the individual firms’ sales optimums are not identical, therefore, the interests of the firms are contradictory. Third, in the realtor-bank-insurer system, the equilibrium satisfies the condition of zero revenue sharing payments between the agents; additionally, the equilibrium prices in these markets are mutually independent. Fourth, in the disequilibrium, the prices in these markets are interrelated, i.e. the price in one market increases with the price in another market, if the payment is directed from the former to the latter, and vice versa.

The results of the study are applicable in practice, if the markets demonstrate the decreasing demand curves and if the needs of buyers in related markets are interconnected.

The interaction between the realtor and the mortgage bank enables the realtor to raise its sales and the bank to increase in the number of loans, i.e. it leads to growth of their profits. The interaction between the insurer and the mortgage bank enables the insurer to increase in the number of policies and the bank to reduce the risk of lending, i.e. it leads to an increase in their profits. The identification of the individual firms’ sales optimums enables agents to determine the terms of the contracts of these interactions, which are compromises from the positions of each transaction participants. In addition, the firms’ optimums indicate the predictions of the equilibrium market prices.

In comparison with the studies in the contract theory framework, first, the mathematical description of the complicated (three-agent) system of interactions is proposed; second, the optimal choice non-linear models are developed, which take into account the non-linear demand functions in the monopolistic competition markets; third, the equilibrium of the agents with contradictory interests is investigated. In the later item, the authors establish that the revenue sharing contracts in the complimentary demands functions systems do not require the payments between the participants. Fourth, the authors prove that, in the equilibrium of these markets, the housing prices, the mortgage interest rates and the insurance rates are mutually independent and equal to the prices in the isolated markets.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the causes of the 2007‐2009 mortgage crisis, liquidity crisis, stock market volatility in the USA and their spillover effects on the global economy.

The paper critically reviews the 2007‐2009 financial crisis from both academic and practitioners' viewpoints.

The paper explores how the liquidity crisis has evolved with the advent of poorly supervised financial products, especially the credit default swaps and subprime mortgage loans. Further, it analyzes the laxity in regulations that encouraged high financial leverages, shadow banking system and excessive stock market volatility and worsened the recent financial crisis.

The implication of this paper is to understand numerous policy reforms that will help the global capital markets to be more transparent and less vulnerable to systematic risks; the suggested policy reforms may also help to prevent such financial calamities in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the stated goals of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and then demonstrate that in practice those goals have not been achieved, and at significant cost to US taxpayers.

The objectives are achieved by describing statements of the NFIP and the legislation behind it, and then providing an analysis of the NFIP in practice in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

The NFIP flood insurance primarily shelters lending institutions rather than flood victims. At subsidized rates, premiums covered little of the Katrina‐based claims, and future premiums cannot realistically be expected to repay off the resulting debt to the US Treasury.

If the findings are accepted they lead one to conclude that government attempts to complete incomplete markets are fraught with inherent and exceptional difficulties.

The NFIP should be eliminated, allowing private insurance to be offered when profitable in floodplains and allowing property‐owners to make informed choices as to residence and development.

Attention to general disaster relief and the controversies surrounding private insurers and homeowners policies following Katrina have overshadowed the NFIP's federal flood insurance failings. This paper contributes to that relative void.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receive explicit and implicit off-budget subsidies from the federal government. This paper reviews the methods to estimate the dollar amount of the subsidies. None of the three techniques to estimate the indirect subsidy yield accurate point estimates. They do suggest that Fannie and Freddie could receive billions of dollars in subsidies in some years and much smaller amounts in other years. However, assessing the size of the implied subsidies is most valuable in demonstrating that Fannie and Freddie, not the federal government, control their size. Efforts to improve federal control face significant difficulties including informational asymmetries and the political incentives that have led to the status quo. These drawbacks bolster the rationale for eliminating federal support for Fannie and Freddie.

The concept of state-corporate crime developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s in a series of papers authored by Michalowski and Kramer (Kramer, 1990; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990; Michalowski & Kramer, 1987). They specifically define state-corporate crime as:Illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution. (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006a, 2006b, p. 15)

This paper seeks to examine the role that regulation and regulatory agencies played in the creating of the subprime mortgage market, and the subsequent crash of the mortgage market. The paper has two goals. First, it seeks to document the degree to which the US housing markets, and the US housing finance market, were regulated prior to the crash. Second, it seeks to show that regulatory bodies set policies which created both incentives and explicit requirements for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as depository institutions, to enter the subprime market.

The paper examines the regulatory environment of the subprime market. It uses regulatory filings and other documents as primary sources.

The popular perception that the subprime mortgage market arose because housing finance was largely unregulated is incorrect. In point of fact, the housing finance market was very heavily regulated. Indeed, the paper shows that the creation of the subprime market was a formal goal of the federal government, and that federal regulatory agencies explicitly required participation by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).

The paper's primary implication is that incentive conflicts within the US housing finance system significantly contributed to the mortgage crisis. These incentive conflicts were not just within private firms, but also extend to the GSEs and regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies not only failed to anticipate the crisis; they actively encouraged the policies which created it. As a result, the primary focus of reform efforts should be on identifying and eliminating such conflicts.