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The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between competition and corporate payout policy and more specifically to answer the question that whether competition mitigates the principal–principal agency conflicts and influences firms to distribute dividends to shareholders in Chinese corporations.

This research models measures of competition with scaled measures of dividends and analyzes a sample of 16,730 firm-year observations from Chinese-listed manufacturing firms for the period spanning 2003 to 2016. Further, this research uses the Tobit model (a censored regression) to empirically test the proposed hypotheses.

This research finds that intense competition not only mitigates agency problems and forces firms to disgorge cash but also increases a firm’s likelihood to pay dividends and weakens the negative association between agency conflicts and dividends.

The results show an important policy implication for the industry. As the principal–principal agency conflict restrains the dividends, the regulatory authorities could encourage a competitive environment and a more diverse ownership structure to induce a higher dividend rate and protect the minority shareholders. In addition, this study also has implications for other emerging markets characterized by concentrated ownership and principal–principal agency problems.

This study adds to the literature related to the disciplinary role of competition and identifies competition as a significant determinant of corporate payout policy. Furthermore, this research extends earlier research on corporate payout decisions that besides firm-level corporate governance and country-level legal system, industry-level competition also influences corporate payout decisions, significantly.

This study aims to examine the role of principal–principal (P–P) agency conflict in shaping the information environment of firms in China. Moreover, it investigates whether audit quality and analyst following play any role in moderating the effects of P–P agency conflict.

The authors used principal component analysis to synthesize a measure of P–P agency conflict and used accruals quality as measure of information quality. They used two-step Arellano Bond system GMM estimators to cope with potential endogeniety in the model. Moreover, they also performed subsample analyses based on state ownership to ensure the robustness of findings.

The results of this paper provide evidence that high P–P agency conflict is associated with poor information quality in China. But this is not true for subsample of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, better audit quality and high analyst following mitigate the negative effects of high P–P agency conflict on information quality but only in subsample of non-state-owned enterprises.

The findings of this paper are important, as they contribute in literature on forces shaping the information environment of firms. Moreover, it presents audit quality and analyst following as external governance mechanisms to alleviate the negative consequences of the P–P agency conflict vastly embedded in the ownership structure of firms in China.

Drawing on the principal-principal conflict and identity literatures, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the Agency Problem Type II-bis in the context of family business. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that the size of the family owner group is related to firm growth and that this relationship is moderated by the extent to which the family identifies with the firm.

The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 265 medium and large German family firms (FFs) via moderated hierarchical regression analysis.

The main findings suggest that business family identity moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of the family owner group and firm growth in such a way that FFs with medium-sized family owner groups and high levels of business family identity reach higher firm growth.

In the context of FFs fully owned by one family, family owners might have different strategic preferences, goals, and identities, thus potentially making them subject to the conflict that could arise among the different family owners in relation to growth expectations. Recognizing this problem could help family owners find potential solutions to ensure the well-being of both the family and the business.

The combination of family ownership structure and family ownership dynamics affects firm growth. Challenging the homogeneity of the family owner group, the authors highlight the role of Agency Problem Type II-bis in hindering growth of FFs. A finer-grained view of principal-principal conflicts in FFs is thus discussed.

This paper explores the contextual factors involved in the development and application of paradigmatic theories in general, and the application and development of Agency Theory in the Chinese context in particular.

Referring to four templates for the design of conceptual papers as outlined by Jaakkola (2020), i.e. theory synthesis, theory adaptation, typology and model – we adopt an approach combining theory/literature synthesis and model establishment. Based on a thorough analysis and discussion of the literature on the topics of “context effect “, “interface between theory and context”, “special characteristics of Chinese context” and “invalid application of Agency Theory in a Chinese context”, we use Agency Theory as the lens to discuss the importance of context in applying and developing paradigmatic theory specifically. We start from the contextualization of Agency Theory and then explore approaches to theorizing the Chinese context by developing a conflict coefficient model.

First, the application validity of paradigmatic theories is not sustainable; contextual factors are critical in applying and developing not only propositional but also paradigmatic theories, such as Agency Theory. Second, the Chinese context requires special attention when applying paradigmatic theories originating from Western countries. Third, the traditional application logic of Agency Theory is invalid in the Chinese context due to the coexistence of principal-agent conflicts (PAC) and principal–principal conflicts (PPC), and changeable dominance status of two conflicts according to the contexts. Based on these observations, a model of contextualization theory of PAC and PPC (i.e. conflict coefficient model) is developed from a dynamic perspective, which connects the separated situation states and allows the identification and measurement of the relative severity of the two types of agency conflicts.

Practitioners can also use this model to identify and measure the relative strength of the two conflicts and determine the direction of control and improvement. Moreover, analysis of Chinese context and agency problems of Chinese firms also has great practical significance considering the increased importance of the Chinese market and the increasingly important role played by Chinese firms in the international economy in general, and in specific host countries in particular.

First, in general, this study expands Whetten's (2009) study of the interface between theory and context. It specifically discusses approaches to considering contextual factors in the development and application of the relatively overlooked paradigmatic theories, using traditional and widely used Agency Theory as a lens. Our study suggests that typical Agency Theory, developed based on Western-centric assumptions, does not completely hold in the context of Chinese business practices because of different cultural, legal and governance realities. Second, it improves and extends the application of Agency Theory by proposing the new perspective that PAC and PPC coexist in specific contexts and positing that the relative severity of two types of agency conflicts depends on the context variables. Third, it puts forward a conflict coefficient model offering a more comprehensive, intuitive and quantifiable method for comparing the extent of the two conflicts in different scenarios, providing a reference for empirical studies of corporate governance.

The purpose of this study was to explore the motives (especially the agency motives) for corporate diversification from the perspective of corporate executives who make such strategic decisions and manage the diversified firms daily.

A qualitative research approach was adopted, and 12 chief executive officers (CEOs) of diversified firms in Nigeria were interviewed for their perspectives on the motives for corporate diversification.

Stewardship motives – diversification to use excess capacities in assets and resources to exploit opportunities in the market and defend against adverse environmental developments – were the most cited reasons for diversification. The relevant agency problem related to corporate diversification motive in Nigeria is the principal–principal (majority shareholder-minority shareholder) one. CEOs with substantial holdings in their firms indicated that they use diversification to reduce their investment risk and retain control of their portfolio.

The findings suggest that in corporate environments such as Nigeria that feature blockholding prominently, the corporate strategy-related agency problem that policymakers should pay greater attention to is the principal–principal conflict rather than the traditional agent–principal problem that has influenced corporate governance over the years. There is also a need to revise the dominant view that diversification is a value-destroying strategy motivated by the self-seeking behavior of managers who have little or no shares in the companies they manage.

The few studies on motives for corporate diversification that incorporated the perspectives of corporate executives did not address the agency motives of diversification. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has done so.

This study examined the attainment and the benefits of financial flexibility in the presence of concentrated ownership in the Caribbean.

This study used qualitative methodology via the use of case studies.

Results revealed that liquidity may be considered the most important form of financial flexibility for firms in transitioning economies, due to constrained capital markets. Blockholder firms also focus on liquidity out of a concern for recovering their substantial investment. This study suggested that in addition to an emphasis on liquidity, blockholder owners emphasise professionalism in managing the firm. This professionalism, accompanied by a genuine separation of ownership and control, may be critical in minimising the possibility of misappropriation of surplus liquidity. The study showed that blockholder owned firms may not recognise maximum capital investment benefits because of the use of sub-optimal capital budgeting techniques reflecting their liquidity preference, or pay maximum dividends, opting instead to use dividends as a governance tool. However, the ability to separate ownership from the management of the operations may counteract this, leading to an increased focus on net present value (NPV) maximising projects, and a dividend policy aimed at preserving future financial flexibility.

This study highlights the value of qualitative studies in finance research, by providing a deeper insight into the management of firm financial flexibility, under blockholder ownership. It emphasises the importance of considering liquidity as a critical form of financial flexibility. Furthermore, the study shows that two significant factors in controlling principal–principal (PP) conflict may be the ability to separate ownership from control and the appointment of a professional management team.

This research introduces the variable of PP agency in the study of financial flexibility.

High ownership concentration makes controlling blockholders powerful enough to use private benefits of control and able to shape the corporate governance system to favor their own interests. This paper aims to examine the effect of the nature of the ultimate firm owner on the quality of corporate governance in Brazil.

Econometric models are estimated to assess whether the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder affects the quality of the corporate governance system. Models are estimated using panel data methodology with coefficients estimated by the generalized method of moments system estimator.

The results show that the absence of a controlling shareholder has a positive effect on corporate governance, whereas the presence of a controlling blockholder, or a shareholder agreement among a few large shareholders, has a negative effect. This adverse effect holds when the controlling blockholder is a family or another firm. The findings are in line with the expropriation effect given that weaker corporate governance system facilitates controlling shareholders’ ability to extract private benefits of control. The findings also give support to the substitution effect as powerful blockholders take on the management monitoring function by weakening the board.

Following important previous literature, the study investigates the effect of the nature of large controlling shareholders on the adoption of good corporate governance practices. The work provides additional evidence on the effect of the nature of large controlling shareholders on the quality of the corporate governance system in Brazil, taking into account the main kinds of controlling blockholders present in that market. The findings give support to both the expropriation and substitution hypotheses highlighting the presence of the principal-principal agency model in an important emerging market, Brazil.

Adopting an integrated agency and stewardship perspective, the purpose of this paper is to understand the relationship between family businesses (FBs) and private equity (PE) investors at three stages: entry, cooperation, and exit.

This qualitative study combines the perspectives of 11 FB owners and/or managers, seven PE investors, and four intermediaries. The in-depth interviews of this purposive sample are analysed at the intra- and inter-case level using a template analysis approach up to reaching theoretical saturation.

Building and maintaining an effective relationship between the FB and the PE investor requires both a stewardship perspective (i.e. reciprocal principal-steward behaviour) and a necessary but insufficient agency perspective (i.e. principal-principal behaviour).

More large-scale studies with an integrated agency-stewardship perspective on FBs using PE can increase the external validity of the insights from this research to build and maintain an effective relationship between both parties.

Providing insights into the relationship building process and best practices, this study helps reduce the knowledge and empathy gap that exists between FBs and PE.

The results clarify the need to reconcile an agency and stewardship perspective to thoroughly understand the relationship and behaviour of FBs and PE investors, and to help the parties understand and benefit from each other’s added value.

This review paper aims to compare the various dimensions in the finance literature pertaining to the Anglo-Saxon Model (Stockholder Model) prevalent in the USA and the UK with the German Model (Stakeholder Model) of corporate governance prevalent in Germany and continental Europe. The present study identifies different strands of research on the various dimensions of these models, along with aspects of governance in emerging economies and the phenomenon of the convergence of these governance mechanisms.

The literature review on corporate governance models has been carried out on the themes of internal and external governance mechanisms. The review considers agency theory along with principal–principal (PP) conflicts as the fundamental blocks explaining the need for governance structures.

The traditional models of governance, along with the incorporation of PP conflicts, will result in a hybrid model inculcating the best of both the traditional models. However, convergence in the true sense may not be possible owing to fundamental differences pertaining to cultural, economic, legal and socio-economic aspects of the firm.

This paper proposes a framework incorporating the interplay of managerial talent and controlling shareholders to understand the governance system that may be applicable for firms in emerging economies.