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The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

An examination of imperfect price discrimination, modelled as a linear combination of perfect price discrimination and uniform pricing, is used to analyze the impact of imperfect discrimination on firm size and product diversity. Additionally, claims that perfect price discrimination leads to the welfare optimum are shown to be generally false.

Presents various aspects of price discrimination in the context of services marketing. Provides a mathematical model which takes demand‐related variables, competitive factors and basic costs into consideration. Factors affecting price discrimination are studied under service intrinsic factors and extrinsic/environmental factors. Also presents mathematical models to demonstrate the viability of price discrimination under different capacity utilization and demand constraint scenarios. Finally, provides the managerial implications of the models along with directions for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to show that information goods allow new forms of second degree price discrimination because of their economic special features. In addition, it shall be explained why it makes economical sense for information providers to make offers free of charge, and how price discrimination can assist them thereby.

This paper is a literature‐based and practical/analytical depiction, showing in which context the three price discrimination forms have developed and how they are effectively applied.

Windowing, versioning, and bundling are very effective strategies of price discrimination for information goods. This can be illustrated through various application examples. With the division of information content and media carriers a clear distinction between windowing, versioning, and bundling is achieved.

Information providers receive support for the design of their pricing policy. It is obvious, that with the aid of the depicted price discrimination variants, both market penetration with cost free offers and the generation of revenues from product sales can be aimed for.

What is new about the paper is the first time comparative portrayal of three recent second degree price discrimination forms and their application to information goods.

Price becomes a main instrument for rationing pharmaceutical drugs in Central America as a consequence of pro‐market reforms implemented in the 1980s. Under market‐rationing conditions, people's access to branded drugs does depend on their purchasing power and on the vector of prices they face. The purpose of this paper is to study the regional pricing strategy followed by pharmaceutical firms across Central American countries. These countries differ in such economic factors as per capita income, income distribution, market size, and nature and extent of their social‐security system; thus, there are conditions that foster the implementation of price‐discrimination practices across the region.

The investigation takes advantage of a large database with information about prices of identical drugs sold across Central American countries and produced by 17 large pharmaceutical companies. Regression analyses are used to study whether price discrimination exists in Central American drug markets and what pricing strategies are followed by different pharmaceutical companies.

Results show that there are significant differences in the prices of identical drugs across the Central American countries, as well as that pharmaceutical companies follow different pricing strategies.

Cross‐country price comparisons are usually based on constructed price indices, which imply losing detailed information about the products being compared. This investigation uses prices of identical drugs, rather than constructed price indices, to study cross‐country price differences by pharmaceutical companies across the Central American region. The study of price discrimination is crucial to understanding how markets end up rationing such an essential product as pharmaceutical drugs.

The existence of parallel imports (PI) raises a number of interesting policy and strategic questions, which are the subject of this survey article. For example, parallel trade is essentially arbitrage within policy-integrated markets of IPR-protected goods, which may have different prices across countries. Thus, we analyze fully two types of price differences that give rise to such arbitrage. First is simple retail-level trade in horizontal markets because consumer prices may differ. Second is the deeper, and more strategic, issue of vertical pricing within the common distribution organization of an original manufacturer selling its goods through wholesale distributors in different markets. This vertical price control problem presents the IPR-holding firm a menu of strategic choices regarding how to compete with PI. Another strategic question is how the existence of PI might affect incentives of IPR holders to invest in research and development (R&D). The global research-based pharmaceutical firms, for example, strongly oppose any relaxation of restrictions against PI of drugs into the United States, arguing that the potential reduction in profits would diminish their ability to innovate. There is a close linkage here with price controls for medicines, which are a key component of national health policies but can give rise to arbitrage through PI. We also discuss the complex economic relationships between PI and other forms of competition policy, or attempts to limit the abuse of market power offered by patents and copyrights. Finally, we review the emerging literature on how policies governing PI may affect international trade agreements.

The purpose of this paper is to whether competition between platforms can be effective, thus leading to efficient allocations.

Based on the classic linear Hoteling model, this paper builds a two-period competition model for two competing platforms using two variants, namely, a discrimination pricing model and a unified pricing model.

In the case of the discrimination pricing model, the competition is moderate, and the two platforms split the market evenly in the first stage, while both platforms tended to offer preferential treatment to new users and set higher prices for regular customers in the second stage. Compared to the unified pricing model, in the first stage, the platform can provide a higher price that depends on the cross-network effect when it implements discrimination, and thus, obtains higher profits. However, in the second stage, fierce competition leads to the release of benefits, new and regular customers obtain lower prices and the platforms lose higher profits. In the long-run, discriminatory pricing is not the best option due to lower total profits. The two platforms will implement cooperative pricing or one platform becomes dominant.

Instead of focusing on the cross-network effects, this paper emphasizes the role of the same-side network effect on price discrimination regarding the platforms’ competition. The same-side network effects are investigated in relation to a discrimination pricing strategy and compared to a unified pricing strategy. Another innovative aspect is the study of these network effects in a dynamic setting based on a two-period competition model for two platforms.

Two‐part pricing and block pricing are two extensively used techniques for price discrimination which seem to have received little attention in the marketing literature. Also, it does not seem to be generally appreciated that quantity discounts can be employed as a vehicle for price discrimination. This paper describes these techniques and discusses from a managerial perspective why they can be profitable and how they might be implemented. A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of these techniques versus conventional methods of price discrimination based on a priori segmentation of the market is also presented.

The learning outcomes of this study are as follows:

1. the benefits of differential pricing over uniform pricing;

2. the differences between second- and third-degree price discrimination;

3. the rationale for charging different prices for segments having different willingness to pay; and

4. how different prices for the same product can lead to perceptions of unfairness and how companies might manage such an issue.

This case outlines the decisions that Adar Poonawalla, the CEO of Serum Institute of India (Serum), had to make in late April 2021 concerning its pricing for the COVID-19 (Covid) vaccine. Serum was the world’s largest manufacturer of vaccines, and its Covishield vaccine had received regulatory approval, but faced an unusual challenge and opportunity. In most countries, governments had procured Covid vaccines from manufacturers and then delivered the vaccines to consumers free of cost. But in India, there was a three-tier pricing system. While the Government of India had committed to free vaccines in government-run public hospitals, it also allowed vaccine makers to directly sell vaccines to state governments, as well as private hospitals, who were at liberty to charge consumers for the vaccines. This created an interesting pricing dilemma for Serum: as different customers had different willingness to pay, should Serum use differential pricing? Would such a tiered pricing system be considered fair? How many different price points should Serum maintain? By exploring these and related decisions that Poonawalla had to make, the case is intended to teach price discrimination.

The case is intended for graduate-level courses in marketing, pricing and economics. This case illustrates the principles of differential pricing/price discrimination. More specifically, it highlights pricing strategies motivated by second- and third-degree price discrimination in an emerging market’s health-care context. From the information in the case, the student can learn to apply the concepts of second- and third-degree price discrimination in marketing. After working through the case and assignment questions, instructors will be able to help students understand the following concepts:

Teaching objective 1: the benefits of differential pricing over uniform pricing.

Teaching objective 2: the differences between second- and third-degree price discrimination.

Teaching objective 3: the rationale for charging different prices for segments having different willingness to pay.

Teaching objective 4: how different prices for the same product can lead to perceptions of unfairness and how companies might manage such an issue.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 8: Marketing

The purpose of this study is to understand the profit implications of analytics-driven centralized discriminatory pricing at the headquarter level compared with sales force price delegation in the purchase of an aftermarket good through an indirect retail channel with symmetric information.

Using individual-level loan application and approval data from a North American financial institution and segment-level customer risk as the price discrimination criterion for the firm, the authors develop a three-stage model that accounts for the salesperson’s price decision within the limits of the latitude provided by the firm; the firm’s decision to approve or not approve a sales application; and the customer’s decision to accept or reject a sales offer conditional on the firm’s approval. Next, the authors compare the profitability of this sales force price delegation model to that of a segment-level centralized pricing model where agent incentives and consumer prices are simultaneously optimized using a quasi-Newton nonlinear optimization algorithm (i.e. Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm).

The results suggest that implementation of analytics-driven centralized discriminatory pricing and optimal sales force incentives leads to double-digit lifts in firm profits. Moreover, the authors find that the high-risk customer segment is less price-sensitive and firms, upon leveraging this segment’s willingness to pay, not only improve their bottom-line but also allow these marginalized customers with traditionally low approval rates access to loans. This points out the important customer welfare implications of the findings.

Substantively, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically investigate the profitability of analytics-driven segment-level (i.e. discriminatory) centralized pricing compared with sales force price delegation in indirect retail channels (i.e. where agents are external to the firm and have access to competitor products), taking into account the decisions of the three key stakeholders of the process, namely, the consumer, the salesperson and the firm and simultaneously optimizing sales commission and centralized consumer price.