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This paper examines why ordinary people engage in aberrant consumer behavior (ACB), and pays particular attention to the extent to which consumer perceptions of corporate ‘unfairness’ lead to a response in kind. The study examines five ethical scenarios including insurance claim exaggeration and software piracy, using data from 344 UK consumers. Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (TPB) provides an initial analytical framework. The study also adopts an additional variable, perceived unfairness, referring to the extent to which an actor is motivated to redress an imbalance perceived as unfair.

In comparison to TPB, the study reveals different components of ACB. Furthermore, analysis of variance indicates that consumer perceptions of unfairness by insurance companies provide a significant reason for claim exaggeration. This suggests that ACB is one form of market response to unfair corporate performance. Thus it is argued that an examination of ACB will not only help to understand which ethical aspects of corporate performance might be perceived as unfair, but also to evaluate the extent to which it contributes to a negative perception of particular industries and corporations. The closing discussion considers how a consumer negative response to corporate performance might relate to pricing, product attributes and customer relationships.

This chapter traces the development of the pricing research program of Kent Monroe, beginning with his doctoral dissertation and continuing to the present time. Drawing on psychophysics and adaptation-level theory the early research efforts concentrated on validating two important concepts relative to behavioral pricing research: reference price and acceptable price range. Then the behavioral pricing research program expanded to explore how the context of a purchase situation, including the structure of the prices available for judgment, influences buyers' price perceptions and willingness to buy. In the early years his research included pricing models and research on patronage behavior. Subsequently, concentrating primarily on behavioral pricing research, he began to integrate findings from the research program into examining how various sellers pricing strategies and tactics influence buyers' judgments and purchase decisions. These efforts led to the first edition of his book Pricing – Making Profitable Decisions published in 1979. The book was subsequently revised and expanded in 1990 and again in 2003.

This chapter summarizes the behavioral pricing research findings of price and how buyers respond to price. This includes the relationship between price and perceived value and the decision heuristics that help us understand how price influences perceptions of value and eventual product choice. Buyers also use price as an indicator of product quality, and customers’ perceptions of quality, benefits, and value affect how they will respond to a purchase situation. In addition, buyers’ perceptions of the sacrifice affect the purchase decision, that is the degree that consumers reflect on the amount that they would “give up” by paying the monetary price for a product may vary according to a variety of situations and conditions, such as type of product or service, or the perceived unfairness of the price, or if the buyer perceives a brand is superior to competing brands. The chapter also discusses how buyers trade off or compare the perceived gains arising from price-quality judgments versus the perceived sacrifice required to acquire the product or service, including whether buyers integrate price and other attribute information following a nonlinear (proportional) or linear (subtractive) process. It also summarizes research on price as a multidimensional attribute, considered with additional dimensions such as warranty coverage, and warrantor reputation. Finally, the chapter examines perceived product value as being decomposed into its (1) perceived acquisition value (the expected benefit to be gained from acquiring the product less the net displeasure of paying for it) and (2) perceived transaction value (the perceived merits or fairness of the offer or deal).

In customer or labor markets raising prices or cutting wages is perceived as unfair if it results from the exploitation of shifts in demands. In a series of manipulations we show that adding an alternative to the original choice set alters the perception of fairness of the final outcome. Adding a worse alternative lowers the perception of unfairness, whereas adding a better alternative raises the perception of unfairness. These findings supplemented with existing experimental evidence cast doubt on purely outcome-based theories of fairness and suggest that fairness perceptions are highly manipulable.

Price has conventionally been viewed as an indicator of either monetary sacrifice or product quality. Previous studies on price are preoccupied with reactions and perceptions of consumers upon encountering price information. Research with explicit discussion of the meanings of price to consumers is rare. The purpose of the current research is to revisit the meaning of price to consumers in general, the deeper meanings that price has for people, and the conventional meanings that it carries.

Three focus groups and nine in-depth interviews were conducted. A total of 36 individuals participated in the study.

Our findings suggest that the notion of price is multifaceted. In addition to the conventional meanings, price can be related to how consumers perceive themselves and/or their lives in the socioeconomic order they inhabit.

Managerially, exploring the meanings of price could yield further productive results. As the implications of price regarding how consumers feel about themselves are revealed, pricing strategies that yield greater satisfaction for consumers can be discovered and implemented.

To the best of our knowledge, research with an explicit focus on the meaning of price for adult consumers is rare. By providing deeper insights into what price truly means to consumers, this study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of price.

Justice rules are standards that serve as criteria for formulating fairness judgments. Though justice rules play a role in the organizational justice literature, they have seldom been the subject of analysis in their own right. To address this limitation, we first consider three meta-theoretical dualities that are highlighted by justice rules – the distinction between justice versus fairness, indirect versus direct measurement, and normative versus descriptive paradigms. Second, we review existing justice rules and organize them into four types of justice: distributive (e.g., equity, equality), procedural (e.g., voice, consistent treatment), interpersonal (e.g., politeness, respectfulness), and informational (e.g., candor, timeliness). We also emphasize emergent rules that have not received sufficient research attention. Third, we consider various computation models purporting to explain how justice rules are assessed and aggregated to form fairness judgments. Fourth and last, we conclude by reviewing research that enriches our understanding of justice rules by showing how they are cognitively processed. We observe that there are a number of influences on fairness judgments, and situations exist in which individuals do not systematically consider justice rules.

There has been a call for additional managerial accounting research that examines the effect of non-pecuniary preferences (such as those for honesty and fairness) on managerial reporting decisions.

Drawing from trait theory, agency theory, and psychological contracts theory, Kidder (2005) suggests that personality traits and perceived unfairness in the workplace both help predict detrimental workplace behaviors, with perceived fairness affecting the honesty in reporting of some individuals but not others. We test Kidder’s (2005) theory in an experimental setting where participants have opportunity and incentive to report dishonestly.

Participants’ honesty preferences and ethical values (idealism and relativism) were measured, and the fairness of the participants’ employment contracts was manipulated. As predicted, higher preferences for honesty are significantly associated with honesty in reporting, suggesting that participants make trade-offs between increasing their own wealth and acting honestly. Additionally, the perceived fairness of compensation interacted with honesty preferences and relativism to affect honesty in reporting.

The implication for practice is that while a small number of employees are likely to consistently behave in honest or self-interested ways, firms may be able to positively influence the behavior of the majority of employees by enacting policies and procedures that contribute to perceptions that compensation is fair.

These findings contribute to our understanding of non-pecuniary preferences on managerial reporting decisions.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Stakeholders often engage in actions aimed at either benefitting or punishing firms for their behaviour. Such behaviours can have very serious implications for various types of firm performance, including financial performance. Though one might expect that the investigation of possible precursors of such “stakeholder action” would be a priority of researchers in stakeholder theory, to date research within the stakeholder literature directed towards understanding stakeholder behaviour has been somewhat scarce. In this chapter, I present common themes and assumptions that prevail in the existing research on stakeholder action, identify certain important questions concerning such assumptions and suggest avenues for future research on stakeholder behaviour.