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In 1979, Galbraith wrote a manuscript titled “The Social Consequences of Inflation and Unemployment and Their Remedies.” The manuscript was found in the John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers at the John F. Kennedy Library. The reasons for Galbraith to write the article might appear at first glance to be purely contextual. At the macroeconomic level, the United States was experiencing stagflation, a situation unseen since 1945, resulting in double-digit inflation rates and high unemployment. A policy debate was going on about the Phillips curve and whether there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Milton Friedman challenged the Keynesian analyses of the Phillips curve in the mid-1960s (Friedman, 1977). Galbraith’s 16-page draft manuscript provides us an incisive summary of Galbraith’s views about the causes of stagflation and what can be done about it. He provides us with an alternative to the neoclassical synthesis of Samuelson and Solow and the neoliberal thinking of Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Extant research on non-financial service firms indicates that board size is a key determinant of firm performance. Property-liability (P&L) insurers, however, face a different set of agency costs and a more intense regulatory environment than most non-financial firms. Both of these factors were reinforced by the implementation of the Financial Services Modernization Act in 2000. We document a significant inverse relation between publicly traded P&L insurer performance and board size in the post-Financial Services Modernization Act period. Publicly traded P&L insurer performance, measured by market-to-book ratio, return on revenues, and the operating ratio, was enhanced for firms with smaller board sizes in 2000 and 2001. Ironically, we find that publicly traded P&L insurers on average increased board size in 2000 and 2001. In a post-Financial Services Modernization Act environment, board size appears to be related to publicly traded P&L insurer performance, but more research is necessary to develop a complete understanding of its role in P&L insurer corporate governance.

The recent surge forward in equity markets has seen the share prices of our leading retailers outperform the broadly based indices by generous margins. Since the stockmarket reached a low point in October last year, food retail shares have shown a rise of 136.5 per cent, according to the FT Actuaries Index, while stores have done even better with an increase of 146 per cent. Even in recent weeks, when some rather gloomy statements have been forthcoming from some retailers, shares in the sector have continued among the top performers. Yet the savings ratio remains high — indicating that consumers are still not all that confident in the future ‐sales figures still show volume falling in real terms this year, and wages are still under restraint of sorts. In these circumstances is it logical that retail shares have proved to be one of the most favoured sectors in this recent market rise? Over the past three or so years retail shares have had a rough ride. One leading firm of City stockbrokers pointed out in a circular recently that, despite the large rise in share prices since the beginning of recovery, price earnings ratios, on average, in the sector, are still only half what they were five years ago, when the market reached roughly the same peak. But that was in a period before margin restraint, price controls, and a system of wage restraint that dealt a body blow to retailers, whose employees are traditionally among the lowest paid of the country's workforce. That latter problem, at least, appears to be over. In 1975 the £6 a week cash limit (which rapidly became the increased pay norm, resulted in a wage rise of about a fifth for retailers across the board. It dented margins — even in the most efficient companies, and provoked some hefty cost (and in some cases staff) cutting measures. This year 10 per cent looks like becoming the norm — and it is still a fairly large amount. But retailers have achieved considerable economies in internal costs over the last few years. Unless the informal pay agreement is breached seriously and consistently, retailers should find that they are able to absorb this year's rise in wages fairly comfortably. But what of underlying demand? We hardly had a summer this year — and that does not bode well for textile‐based retailers' profits. Clothing — both men's and women's — has been a poor market in recent years, as have shoes and consumer durables. The exception in the case of the latter is the little pre‐budget booms aimed at avoiding higher rates of value added tax. The consumer durable trade should give the Chancellor credit for sustaining the concept of panic buying in the hearts of its consumers during such bad times for spending as a whole. In the opening 9 months of the year volume has been about 25 per cent down in real terms across the board. People's disposable income must still be shrinking. But the euphoria created by the rise in the pound, and the rush and gush of North Sea Oil will, it is forecast, lead people to dip into their bank balances and building society accounts from this winter onwards — leading up to a consumer boom in 1978 and 1979. Mail order sales are already doing well — and because the bulk is done on credit terms this is thought to be a barometer of future spending trends. Lower interest rates mean that consumers may be more willing to enter into Hire Purchase and other credit arrangements despite the fact that their actual earnings are still lagging behind the rate of inflation. The lowering of the Building Society mortgage rate puts a bit of extra cash into people's pockets. So spending should start to pick up significantly next year. Many leading retailers — Sainsbury springs to mind — have been seriously tackling the question of operational efficiency over the past few years and would appear to be in a good position to reap the profitable benefits of an upsurge in volume sales. But it seems to be foolish to expect even the ‘blue chips’ like Sainsbury, Marks & Spencer or British Home Stores to regain the very high price earnings multiples saw in 1972 and 1973. For price and wage control exposed retailers' vulnerability to governmental action. The consumer now has far more official support than she or he had five years ago, people are far more conscious of prices and more suspicious of large profits. It has proved to be simple, cheap, and effective to camouflage the full impact of rising prices on the Retail Price Index by whipping a bit off retail margins here and there. If ever we faced similar circumstances as at the beginning of the 1970's there is no doubt that retailers would be the first to find themselves under restraint once again. This should be reflected in a less giddy price earnings ratio average for the sector in the present bull market.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether the policies of China’s financial restraint have an inhibitory effect on the consumption of residents.

This study used the principal component analysis for constructing a financial restraint index and also used empirical methodology.

The authors found that financial restraint policies create rent opportunities for banking sector and production sector, which further creates the rent opportunities for the household sector. Such transfer of rent and redistribution will have an inhibitory effect on residents’ consumption. The financial restraint policies directly and indirectly inhibit the growth of residents’ income; and in theory, the purpose of financial restraint policy is to promote economic growth, thus promoting residents’ consumption. Thus, the financial restraint policies impacting the residents’ consumption are non-linear and test the threshold effect of financial restraints on the residents’ consumption of China.

This paper’s theoretical contribution includes: increasing the connotation of financial restraint in the policies of stock market and foreign exchange controls, and further developing the financial restraint theory; and exploring the inhibitory effect on the consumption of residents from the perspective of financial restraints to enrich the connotation of the consumption theory.

The findings in this study can help the financial authorities to gradually relax the financial restraint policies to encourage residents’ consumption.

The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 4 of the Prices and Incomes Act 1966 and after consultation, in accordance with subsection of that section, with organisations appearing to him to represent to a substantial extent the interests of those particularly concerned, hereby makes the following Order:—

The Secretary of State, having given notice under section 29(1) of the Prices and Incomes Act 1966(a) that he was considering the making of this Order, and having considered representations duly made, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the said section 29, and by section 25(7) and (8) of the said Act, hereby makes the following Order:‐