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The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

This paper aims to study a retailer’s decision on the price and inventory when facing strategic consumer behavior and demand uncertainty. Price protection is a kind of rebate that the retailer provides to consumers when the price drops during the selling season. The research investigates whether price protection can bring the retailer advantages. This paper compares price protection’s impact with price commitment. In addition, the paper studies the price protection’s impacts on supplier of the supply chain.

In this model, there are three alternative strategies for retailer: no price protection policy, full price protection policy and partial price protection policy. The selling season is divided into two periods: regular period and sale period. In the regular period, the products are sold at a regular price. In the sale one, the products are sold at a lower price. By adopting rational expectations equilibrium, this paper analyzes retailer’s optimal price and order quantity under each policy and compares optimal decisions and maximum profits of three policies.

This paper finds that the price protection has a positive influence on the retailer. Strategic consumers are induced to purchase at the regular period. It can simultaneously increase retailer’s profit and reduce inventory risk. Meantime, full price protection is chosen as the optimal policy. By comparing full price protection’s impacts with price commitment, full price protection is considered as the most profitable strategy, while price commitment can bring lower inventory risk. In addition, the profit of supplier would decrease because of price protection.

This research provides a new method to address the negative effects of strategic consumer behavior. It also brings some managerial insights to some retailers, especially online ones, on whether to adopt price protection.

True protection concepts seek to measure the net or relative price effects of commercial policy interventions within a general equilibrium framework. True protection depends on substitutional relationships between sectors within an economy, which are influenced by factor endowments, and the resulting arrangement of factor intensities between the importables, non‐tradables and exportables sectors. Articles by Sjaastad and Clements (1981, 1984) have explored true protection and the incidence of protection for the case where importables are not substitutes for exportables. This case can be applied to “capital‐poor” developing countries. It establishes that the export sector is likely to bear the principal burden of import protection. This article compares and contrasts the results of the “capital‐poor” model with those for a “capital‐rich” model, in which it is the non‐tradable sector on which the principal burden of import protection is likely to fall, i.e. it tends to promote exportables, but not exports.

Returns to a model farm are simulated to assess the impact of marketing and insurance risk management tools as measured by mean net returns and returns at 5% value‐at‐risk (VaR). Results indicate that revenue insurance strategies and strategies involving a combination of price and yield protection provide substantial downside revenue protection, while mean net returns only modestly differ from the benchmark harvest sale strategy when considering all years between 1986 and 2000.

This study examines the influence of investor protection on stock price crash risk (SPCR) in Asian economies.

This study used yearly data from 432 nonfinancial companies publicly listed firms in six countries (i.e., China, India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore) from 2007 to 2020 to investigate the relationship between investor protection and the risk of stock price crashes. The hypothesis was tested using a generalized least square panel regression.

The results suggest that investor protection significantly affects SPCR in Asian economies. Furthermore, the findings show that the stocks of firms whose investors received the best protection were less prone to crash in developed Asian economies. However, in developing Asian economies, the stocks of firms whose investors received the best protection were more prone to crashes.

It provides awareness and understanding of how the level of investor protection affects SPCR, which could be useful for decision-makers and professionals across a spectrum of financial and non-financial institutions, such as portfolio managers and traders in commercial banks, investment banks and mutual funds. This knowledge enables informed decision-making and the formulation of effective policies to manage stock market volatility.

This study appears to be the first of its kind to focus on the link between investor protection and SPCR within the specific context of developed and developing Asian economies.

This chapter takes as its starting point the proposition that consumers are, by and large, far more rational in their attitudes and behaviour than suggested by most of the people who keep crying out for greater consumer protection, and also by some marketing men who seek to explain away their failures by attributing irrationality to their prospective customers.

This research seeks to identify three dimensions of price differential policies that influence judgments of the distributive, procedural, and informational justice of the policies and of the trustworthiness of the seller.

Four price differential policies were compared in a between‐subjects design. Subjects responded to scenarios in which they paid more than a friend for the same product because of a particular policy. Policies were compared on perceptions of fairness (using the social justice framework) and on perceptions of the seller's benevolence and credibility.

Consumer judgments of the informational and procedural justice of each policy depend on three key policy dimensions: whether or not all consumers are informed about how a discount could be obtained; whether consumers who received the discount were pre‐selected on the basis of their traits versus whether they received the discount because of some aspect of their transaction process behavior; and whether or not consumers could influence the amount of the price differential. Additionally, perceptions of procedural justice and informational justice have differential influence on the credibility and benevolence dimensions of trust.

The research offers the first empirically based generalizations about designing price differential policies that can minimize negative consumer judgments of the policy and of the seller. Additionally, the use of a social justice framework yields important insights on the multidimensional nature and consequences of fairness judgments.

The purpose of this paper is to use simulation analysis to assess farmer choice between crop insurance and supplemental revenue options as proposed during development of the Agricultural Act of 2014.

The certainty equivalent of wealth is used to rank farm choices and assess the effects of supplemental revenue options on the crop insurance plan and coverage level chosen by the producer under a range of farm attributes. The risk-reducing effectiveness of the select programs is also examined through their impact on the farm revenue distribution. The dependence structure of yield and prices is modeled by applying copula techniques on historical data.

Farm program supplemental revenue programs generally have no effect on crop insurance choices. Crop insurance supplemental revenue programs typically reduce crop insurance coverage at high coverage levels. An individual plan of crop insurance combined with a supplemental revenue insurance plan may substitute for incumbent area crop insurance plans.

The analysis provides insights into farmers’ possible choices by focussing on alternative crops and farm attributes and extensive scenarios, using current data, crop insurance plans and programs contained in the 2014 Farm Bill and related bills. The results should be of value to policy officials and producers in regards to the design and use of risk management tools.

Choosing the best bid is a central step in any tendering process. If the award criterion is the economically most advantageous tender (EMAT), this involves scoring bids on price and quality and ranking them. Scores are calculated using a bid evaluation formula that takes as inputs price and quality, and their respective weights. The choice of formula critically affects which bid wins. We study 38 such formulas and discuss several of their aspects, such as how much the outcome of a tender depends on which formula is being used, relative versus absolute scoring, ranking paradox, iso-utility curves, protection against a winner with an extremely high price, and how a formula reflects the weights of price and quality. Based on these analyses, we summarize the (dis)advantages and risks of certain formulas and provide associated warnings when applying certain formulas in practice.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes proposed in 2012 to commodity programs for the new Farm Bill. Both the Senate and House Agriculture Committee versions of the new Farm Bill eliminate current commodity programs including direct payments, create new revenue‐based commodity program options designed to cover “shallow” revenue losses, and also introduce supplemental crop insurance coverage for shallow revenue losses.

This paper documents the payment functions for the new revenue programs proposed in both the Senate and House Ag Committee Farm Bills, and also estimates expected payments for each using a model based on historical county yield data, farmer‐level risk rates from RMA, and commodity price levels from the March 2012 CBO baseline projections.

The authors find significant variation in expected per acre payment across programs, crops, and regions. In general, the Senate's bill would be expected to be preferred over the House's bill for corn and soybean producers, particularly those in the Midwest. Also, the RLC program in the House's Bill typically would be projected to pay much less than the Senate's SCO or ARC programs for most producers in the Midwest.

This study develops an extensive nationwide model of county and farm yield and price risks for the five major US crops and employs the model to evaluate expected payment rates and the distribution of payments under the House and Senate Farm Bill proposals. These analyses are important for program evaluation and should be of great interest to producers and policymakers.