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This paper aims to focus on the role of reporting entities, e.g. banks, other financial institutions, legal professionals, in the prevention of criminal offenses connected with money laundering in Croatia and Slovenia.

The methodology of the economic analysis of law is used to analyze the effectiveness of laws in Croatia and Slovenia regarding the definition and the role of reporting entities in money laundering prevention in these two countries. A comparative approach is also used as the authors compare the effectiveness of Slovenian and Croatian legal systems and their compatibility with EC Directive (2015/849).

The authors find that banks have long clinged to the guaranteed confidentiality of deposits, which means that money laundering has undoubtedly brought them some benefits in the short term. The prevention of money laundering for banks is not free. The measures imposed on the bank by legislation (encouraging these banks to a higher level of demand for preventive behavior) entail costs that go beyond the direct, visible benefits of the implemented measures. However, a functioning and stable financial system has a number of externalities, of course, which are also enjoyed by banks.

The paper focuses on economic analysis of Croatian and Slovenian legal systems with regards of the regulation of role of reporting entities in the prevention of money laundering which produce certain costs and benefits for the financial system and reporting entities as whole. The paper also uses the comparative approach to address the problem of compatibility of Croatian and Slovenian legal system with the EC Directive (2015/849).

This paper aims to critically examine the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Bill, 2016. It also aims to determine the level of effectiveness of the preventive measures in the Bill.

The appraisal took the form of a desk study, which analyzed various documents and reports such as the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012, Mutual Evaluation Reports conducted by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) on Nigeria, the judgment delivered by Justice Gabriel Kolawole of the Federal High Court Abuja and the United Kingdom’s national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing.

This paper determined that the Bill could achieve its core objectives if the following recommendations are implemented: section 15 of the Bill should be modified to include the definition of “Arrangement”; lawyers should be allowed to send their Suspicious Transaction Report to the Nigerian Bar Association, provided that there are appropriate forms of cooperation between the NBA and the Financial Intelligence Unit, and this approach is in line with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations; the Bill should expressly prohibit retaliation by employers against whistleblowers and provide them with a private cause of action in the event that they are discharged or discriminated against by their employers, and this approach is being adopted by the US Dodd–Frank Act; a request for customer information, by the Director-General of the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Centre, should be made pursuant to an order of the Federal High Court obtained upon an ex-parte application supported by a sworn declaration by an authorized officer of the Centre, justifying the request for customer information.

This paper offers a critical appraisal of the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Bill, 2016. The paper will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Bill. This is the only paper to adopt this kind of approach.

A review of literature revealed that many publications on efforts at combatting money laundering focus on two frameworks, namely, legal/legislative and institutional, while overlooking the third and equally important framework – the “regulatory/ supervisory framework.” This paper aims to eradicate the dearth in literature with regards to this third and seldom acknowledged framework and it aims at filling that gap.

The analysis took the form of a desk study, which distinguished the three frameworks for combatting money laundering and provided a comprehensive list of the main actors in each regime within the Nigerian legal context. The Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2016 was examined in detail.

Three categories of regulators were identified and discussed in this paper: the supervisory bodies that regulate the activities of financial institutions, namely, Central Bank of Nigeria, Securities and Exchange Commission and Nigerian Insurance Commission; The Bureau for Money Laundering Control which supervises – designated non-financial institutions and businesses; the Attorney General of the Federation; and (Self-Regulatory Organizations. The Attorney General of the Federation was identified as the prime regulator within the context of the 2016 Act. Suggestions on how the regulators could make the most of their roles were made in the concluding part.

This paper only considered the Nigerian legal context and only the extant law – the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2016 was critically examined.

The findings in this paper and the writing approach are original.

This study aims to investigate the Federal Government’s failure to combat money laundering and terrorism financing and the various hurdles to enforce the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2012 (as amended), effectively, which prohibits illegal earnings criminally induced investments in and out of Nigeria. This has had an impact on the country’s economic potential and its image in the international community. Despite many anti-corruption laws criminalising money laundering and terrorism financing, it is rated among the nations with the highest poverty index despite its immense natural resources.

This study uses a conceptual legal method to help a doctrinal library-based investigation by using existing material. This study also makes use of main and secondary legislation, such as the Constitution, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amended) Act 2012 and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2013 (as amended), as well as case law, international conventions, textbooks and peer-reviewed publications. A comparison of anti-money laundering legislation in Canada, the UK, Hong Kong, China and Nigeria was conducted, with lessons learned for Nigeria’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing laws. According to the findings, the Act is silent on the criminal use of legitimate earnings to fund terrorism and cultism.

There is no well-defined legal framework for asset recovery and confiscation. In Nigeria’s legal system, this evident void must be addressed immediately. To supplement existing efforts to prevent money laundering, the research develops a hybrid model that incorporates the inputs of government representatives and civil society organisations. This study suggests a complete revision of the Act to eliminate ambiguity and focus on the goals of global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding restrictions.

One of the limitations of this study is the paucity of literature and data on money laundering and terrorist financing in Nigeria due to the secrecy around the crimes, which do not give room for the collection of statistical data and due to the transactional nature of the crimes. This is not to submit that no attempts have been made in the past or recent times to quantify the global value of money laundering and its effects on Nigeria’s economy. Such attempts have been inconclusive and inaccurate.

The dearth of records on the magnitude of money laundering in Nigeria has limited generalising the research findings due to the limited access to some required information. However, this study is suitable for adoption in other sectors of the economy in dealing with clandestineness in money laundering and terrorism financing. Future researchers are commended to use the quantitative assessment method to appraise the effects of money laundering and terrorist financing laws and policies in Africa to supplement the current literature in the field.

The research develops a hybrid model that incorporates the inputs of government representatives and civil society organisations. This study suggests a complete revision of the Act to eliminate ambiguity and focus on the goals of global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding restrictions.

This paper aims to discuss the findings of a UK-based research study that sought to explore the applicability of situational crime prevention towards money laundering undertaken through the purchasing of high-value portable commodities.

This paper presents exploratory findings from research conducted between 2011 and 2013 in the UK. The research sought to identify the process, steps and vulnerabilities behind money laundering through the purchasing of high-value portable commodities and whether the introduction of situational crime prevention techniques could reduce vulnerabilities in the existing environment.

Despite significant research into money laundering typologies, the use of high-value portable commodities has remained largely untouched, regardless of the increased implementation of anti-money laundering policies and procedures. This paper demonstrates how the purchasing of high-value portable commodities is extremely vulnerable to money laundering – while identifying how the successful application of situational crime prevention is possible – but inherently it depends on various characteristics directly and indirectly facilitating each stage of the money laundering process.

This paper is of value to government policymakers, regulators and financial institutions considering future preventative measures. It is also of value to financial investigators and law enforcement agencies intent on investigating money laundering. While the paper relies on data from the UK, the overall findings are such that wherever cash-intensive businesses exist, so too does the opportunity for money laundering through the financial arrangement retained by such businesses.

This paper presents new research on the direct link existing between high-value portable commodities and money laundering in the UK and the viability of techniques for situational crime prevention despite significant research having previously taken place to identify and develop money laundering typologies.

Those carrying on ‘relevant financial business’ are already aware of the responsibilities imposed on them by the legislation relating to money laundering. At present this is made up of a variety of statutes, namely the Criminal Justice Act 1988, as amended (in Scotland the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987), the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 and the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. Pursuant to the anti‐laundering policy adopted by successive governments, the Money Laundering Regulations came into effect on 1st April, 1994, providing details of the requirements that were imposed on those carrying on ‘relevant financial business’. Since then there have been guidance notes issued by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, the Law Society and the Institute of Chartered Accountants which set out the steps that those regulated by particular bodies should take to satisfy the law. The latest step is that the FSA has now issued a draft set of rules that will, when enacted, operate in addition to the above. This has arisen as a result of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 which, inter alia, gives the FSA the power to make rules in relation to the prevention and detection of money laundering in connection with the carrying on of regulated activities by authorised persons, with the objective of reducing financial crime. In this context ‘financial crime’ is interpreted to mean

The purpose of this paper is to examine the regulatory mechanisms adopted by two African countries, Nigeria and Zambia, in dealing with money laundering in their countries and to suggest ways of enhancing the effectiveness of these mechanisms to serve as veritable models for other African states.

The relevant laws enacted by these states in their efforts to tackle this crime were examined to assess their adequacy or otherwise in this direction. The key provisions of these enactments, namely, the Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act, 2004 and the Zambian Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2001, were discussed and the similarities and dissimilarities in both enactments highlighted.

It was found that these enactments have provided the requisite regulatory framework for dealing with this crime in these countries. In particular, both enactments contain novel provisions such as prohibition on cash transactions involving large sums of money, forfeiture of assets obtained from money‐laundering transactions, etc. It was also found that, although enacted three years earlier, in 2001, the Zambian enactment is more comprehensive and forward‐looking than the Nigerian Act, which was enacted in 2004, as the former provides for the establishment of an investigation unit within the Anti‐Money Laundering Authority, provisions that are absent in the Nigerian enactment.

The implication of this finding is that African states must adopt strict and stringent measures to enhance the enforcement of Money Laundering Laws, with the regulatory mechanisms, which were put in place by these countries in tackling the menace, serving as veritable guideposts.

The paper demonstrates, in a special way, the steps taken by two African states, Nigeria and Zambia, in dealing with money laundering and suggests that, if other states utilize these measures, it will go a long way in improving their capability in the fight against money laundering. It finally suggests proper co‐operation and collaboration between African states to make the fight more meaningful.

The Swiss legislative policy designed to combat the use of the financial system for money laundering has been progressively tightened over the last few years. It appears that since the 1980s all measures taken were designed in order to have established a consistent framework at the end of the process. The legislative frame has been completed with a key element through the adoption on 10th October, 1997, by Parliament of a new Federal Act on the prevention of money laundering in the financial sector (Money Laundering Act (MLA)). This new piece of legislation entered into force on 1st April, 1998.

Due to their particular nature, virtual assets (VA) are vulnerable to financial crimes such as money laundering and if the appropriate legal mechanisms are not established, this may result in the financial collapse of various economies. To this effect, best practices and standards have been published by some international organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force and IMF which are now domesticated in the national laws of several countries. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse the anti-money laundering (AML) legislative framework in the context of VA in three countries, namely, Mauritius, Japan and South Africa.

To achieve the research objective, the Mauritian AML laws in the context of VA were compared with the corresponding laws of some other countries, namely, Japan and South Africa. As such, a qualitative research method was adopted. In particular, the black letter approach was used to examine the relevant laws of these countries. A comparative analysis was conducted concerning the relevance of AML laws for each country when dealing with VA with the view of suggesting recommendations for Mauritian stakeholders to adopt to enhance the existing AML legal and regulatory framework.

The comparative study conducted has revealed that there are both similarities and divergences among the AML framework of the three countries further to which this research recommends that the Mauritian laws must be amended concerning the duration of information storage on VA, the definition of VA, advertisement by VA service providers and the electronic submission of annual reports. The Mauritian regulatory bodies also need to play a more active role in their joint collaboration to monitor suspicious VA transactions to combat money laundering.

At present, this study will be among the first academic writings on the efficiency of AML laws in the context of VA in Mauritius and also, because existing literature is quite scarce on assessing the adequacy of AML legislation in developing countries, this research aims at filling in the gap in literature. This study is carried out with the aim of combining a large amount of empirical, theoretical and factual information that can be of use to various stakeholders and not only to academics.

The paper aims to examine the jeopardy of the bank in performing its varied functions to customers, the public and regulatory authorities. The bank’s overriding mandate is accepting deposits from its customer and to make payments as and when requested. However, banks also perform investment undertakings and other related functions. Banks have been applauded for facilitating the fight against crimes such as money laundering and financing of terrorism but they are times when they have also been vilified for not doing enough to prevent the foregoing crimes. There is evidence that banks have sometimes been exploited to facilitate commission of crimes either wilfully or recklessly. In this regard, banks which do not do enough to prevent commission of crimes have been perceived as either delinquents or villains for allowing themselves to be exploited for those inclined at committing money laundering and its predicate offences. The paper explores the varied situations in which banks have been caught up in both of these foregoing situations. They have done a plausible job in safeguarding the public and prevention of money laundering and terrorism offences. They have also been perceived as villains by allowing themselves to be exploited by criminals in perpetuating the foregoing offences. In both of the foregoing extremes, public opinion has been divided – there are those who support that banks do a good job and those who brand banks as villains. Those empathising with banks argue that by requiring banks to report suspected money laundering activities creates unfriendly business environment and hostilities in a particular bank. Apparently, this school of thought posits that over-regulation of banks potentially generates a hostile business environment and scares off potential business clients not to mention generating an anti-business climate in a particular bank. To them, banks should do just banking without being encumbered to provide overarching oversight responsibilities such as fighting money laundering and terrorism. The work of preventing crimes should be responsibility of oversight institutions and authorities, and banks should not be involved in executing of the foregoing responsibilities. As such, banks have been reduced to act as policemen. However, one wonders whether the foregoing thesis suggests that banks should just sit back and be exploited for criminal purposes or accept to acquiesce wrong doing or lawlessness simply for business expediency? This paper explores the jeopardy of the bank in delivering its mandate and to evaluate where the balance between its competing obligations needs to be drawn. Banks perform duties to the customer (emanating from their contractual relationship) and its responsibility to the regulatory authorities to safeguard the public. The paper provides an exposition of the modern business regulatory landscape within which banks operate in performing their competing duties towards the customer and the public. In the modern elusive global market environment, banks are in a jeopardy because people they would least expect to be involved in money laundering could be chief instigators of money laundering (ML) and predicate crimes. This includes presidents (e.g. Sana Abacha of Nigeria), minsters, judges and other elevated government figures could be the ones instigating the commission of money laundering offences in their countries. The jeopardy of the bank is that some of the foregoing political officials could be untouchable political figures on whose its survival depends. Banks need to remain fully alert bearing in mind that with globalised business environment in which they operate, circumstances can change very rapidly. It would also be overly unnecessary to blame banks for failures in the regulatory system beyond their control such as the global crisis – which they could not have foreseen or prevented. Finally, this paper articulates the fluid environment in which the modern bank operates and its attendant challenges.

The paper was written by the analysis of both primary and secondary data sources focusing on vulnerability of banks in executing their mandate as financial institutions. The paper has also utilised case law on misfeasance of banks where courts have found banks for misfeasance and literally not doing enough in execution of their obligations to prevent financial crimes. This paper has also utilised some of the data utilised by the author in writing his PhD dissertation but done so in a distinctive manner to foster the objective of this paper. The author has harnessed and evaluated the foregoing data sources and adapted them in different contexts to address pertinent issues this paper was written on.

The findings are not clear cut of whether banks qualify to be branded villains or heroes. The findings have demonstrated that the majority of banks are doing a plausible job to prevent money laundering and prevention of terrorism. There are also discerning situations where banks have been less valiant in prevention of crimes and in doing so they have put themselves in a negative spotlight. The paper has utilised different data sources generated on the role of banks in providing frontline services to the public and their failure to execute the foregoing mandate diligently.

The limitation of the paper is that it would have been better to evaluate the secondary data sources used in writing it by carrying out interviews on some issues it hinges. Due to some practicalities, it was not possible to carry out interviews or to send out questionnaires to banks and other financial institutions. As such, some of the data sources used could have been biased.

This paper is of significant importance for banks, regulatory authorities, governments and those with a stake in the way banks are regulated and governed. I presume the foregoing stakeholder constituencies will find it a worth read and interesting. The paper also demonstrates that some the information written on banks in newspapers is not always true and urges caution in utilising newspapers as a source of generating data. It also underscores the need for banks to be more vigilant in execution of their mandate towards different stakeholder constituencies, so that they are not inadvertently exploited for criminal purposes.

The paper has far reaching implications for banks to be utilised in prevention of crimes in executing their mandate cautiously. It is important that much as financial institutions should be utilised in the foregoing respect, they should not be constrained by over-regulation, as this also means that they would pay dearly in compliance costs.

The originality of the paper is manifested that while it has relied heavily on secondary and primary data sources, it was written in a distinctive way to foster the objectives of writing it. The paper was also evaluated in the context of empirical evidence where banks have used the influence to prevent crimes or where they have been less vigilant in doing so and they have been exposed to criminal exploitation. The foregoing experiences were evaluated carefully using reliable data sources such as case law and recent legislation.