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The effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is not clear. By integrating resource dependence and agency theories, this paper aims to focus on how prestigious CEOs affect firm performance and how informal relations between the CEO and outside directors affect agency costs and resource benefits associated with prestigious CEOs.

The authors use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze their data set, which is conducted by a sample of 4,226 Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2013. The authors also use OLS regression to assess the sensitivity and robustness of their findings.

The findings indicate that prestigious CEOs are significantly and positively associated with firm performance. Moreover, the authors find the effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is more pronounced when prestigious outside directors interact with prestigious CEOs. Guanxi – a Chinese concept similar to camaraderie – attenuates this association, particularly when the CEO and outside directors share the same surname.

Future research should consider whether there is a mediating link between prestigious affiliates (i.e. CEOs) and firm performance.

This paper provides two practical implications. First, China Securities Regulatory Commission policymakers should pay more attention to outside directors’ quality and ability and their informal guanxi with the CEO. Second, prestigious CEOs may also have potential costs.

This study contributes to corporate governance literature and CEO-board relations literature by shedding light on how resource dependence and agency theories apply to corporate governance.

This paper aims to examine the effects of the social distinction of company directors on firm performance.

The social distinction of company directors adds to the firm’s reputation, allowing the firm to access resources and privileges. The indicators of social distinction this study uses are the prenominal titles of directors in Malaysian companies. As Malaysian companies are known to have directors with political connections and the prenominal titles can be intertwined with these connections, to ascertain the effects of social distinction on firm performance, this study examines whether social distinctions proxy and complement political connections in improving firm performance. This study uses Tobin’s Q (TQ) for longer-term performance and gross sales for current-year performance.

This study finds evidence to suggest that the impact of higher-order titles on Tobin’s Q and sales is greater in politically unconnected firms than in connected firms. This study also finds evidence to suggest that higher-order titles amplify the effect on Tobin’s Q in politically connected firms, whereas lower-order titles amplify sales, both moderated by firm-age. The findings shed light on the mediating variables that contribute to the above, and are robust for alternative performance measures, and account for endogeneity concerns.

The results are generalisable only to countries where social distinctions are of significance.

Future research on political connections should consider social connections that affect firms. Also, such research should prompt the awarders of titles to prohibit the use of titles for pecuniary motives to minimise market imperfections.

Adding to the prior literature on the characteristics of directors and firm performance, this study shows that the social distinctions of directors do matter.

The impact of founder CEOs on firm value continues to be debated in the finance literature. While earlier studies suggest that founding family ownership and founding CEO structure create less value than public ownership, later studies provide contradicting evidence. This study examines how founder CEOs affect firm value in the business group context while controlling for firm-specific variables and various CEO characteristics.

The authors use a sample of publicly listed Indian firms from 2010 to 2015 with 997 firm-year data observations. While 306 of these are in business groups, the remaining 691 are in a nonbusiness group. The authors also divide the sample into various sector subgroups, including materials (170), industrials (198), consumer (422) and others (198). They use two different models, including the fixed effect model (FEM) and pooled generalized method of moments (GMM) model to run regressions.

The authors find that firms with founder CEOs have lower firm value than those with nonfounder CEOs. These results show the importance of the role of founder CEOs in the Indian business groups. The authors further find a positive relationship between founder CEO and business group interaction variable, showing that an increase in founder CEO (or business group) increases the significance effect of business group (founder CEO) on firm performance. After separating the sample business and nonbusiness groups, the relationship between founder CEOs and firm value in both groups remains negative. Using various firm-specific control variables, the authors find that highly leveraged and smaller firms experience lower Tobin's Q. In contrast, firms with more investment in research and development perform better. Among CEO characteristics, the authors find that firms with highly educated CEOs do not perform well, while firms with older CEOs do better. Finally, they find that CEO tenure and duality are associated with lower firm performance.

This study adds value by providing evidence on the founder CEOs and firm performance in business groups from a fast-developing emerging market.

Holding the number of outside directorships constant, this paper aims to test whether executive directors from superior performing firms are subsequently rewarded with better quality outside directorships.

The quality of new outside directorship appointments is modelled using a two‐step Heckman selection procedure to control for the probability of acquiring a new outside board seat. Outside directorship quality is estimated using an index formed from series of observable firm‐specific characteristics proxying for the following three latent aspects of quality: prestige, reputational risk and monetary rewards. The index aggregates across these three dimensions to produce an overall quality score, with higher scores signifying higher quality directorships.

Tests based on a sample of UK executive directors who subsequently acquire at least one new outside board seat show that the quality of newly acquired outside directorships is positively related to past and contemporaneous performance at the executive's own firm. Recent past performance appears to be a more important determinant of the quality of outside directorships than long‐run performance reputations. However, effects are largely confined to executives that either switch between boards or enter the outside directorship market for the first time.

Findings support the view that the market for outside directorships operates (at least in part) as a meritocracy by rewarding executives from superior performing firms with better quality outside board appointments.

Prior work on the market for outside directorships focuses on explaining cross‐sectional variation in the number of outside board seats held. The paper is the first to measure and model directorship quality.

The purpose of this paper is to question the profiles of female directors on top French company boards. It explores the legitimacy attributes of current female directors to identify the profiles sought recently, as firms approach the need to make many new appointments to fulfill gender quotas for supervisory boards, given that the proportion of women on a corporate board must reach 40 percent by 2017, with an intermediate level of 20 percent by 2014.

The authors gathered numerical and qualitative biographical data on all SBF 120 (French stock exchange index) firms’ female directors from annual reports and web sites over seven years (from 2003 to 2009). The authors constructed an SPSS database to categorize the individuals into various orders of legitimacy.

Drawing on director bio-data, the authors extend previous work on four legitimacy assets (family ownership; academic excellence; strong ties to the State; and top career), by adding a fifth asset (representative director), and contribute a gender dimension to the literature on personal legitimacy. Owning-family ties and academic excellence are still particularly salient in explaining legitimacy of women directors. A new source of female directors since 2005 is the pool of foreign women, outside the elite Grandes Ecoles system.

The authors had data for directors of 115 companies out of the SBF 120 firms. The authors also lacked data for seven women out of 144 appointed during the period, despite efforts to track down data from public sources.

These legitimacy profiles present different challenges for management development as those responsible for appointing several women to their boards in a short space of time will find out.

The authors highlight that with the diminishing role of family members on large corporate boards, more women directors need to be found, developed and mentored. If this approach is followed, new female directors with solid achievements can be appointed, without having their legitimacy as directors challenged by resistant males. Women will thus be able to take their legitimate place in French boardrooms and contribute their diverse experiences and knowledge.

This paper questions the legitimacy assets of female directors, which can be clustered into three groups: combined elite education and top corporate career; owning-family membership; and representative directors. These legitimacy profiles present different challenges for management development as those responsible for appointing several women to their boards in a short space of time will find out.

Influential reports combined with media attention on directors’ remuneration has sparked academic and practitioner interest in the whole area of corporate governance. Cadbury’s suggestion to strengthen the independent governance role has led to particular interest in non‐executive directors (NEDs). More recently, the role of NEDs in the governance of small and medium‐size enterprises (SMEs) has started to generate attention, and a number of registers of NEDs are established. Indeed, the role of NEDs in SMEs received special attention in the recent Hampel report (1998). Until recently, only two papers directly addressed the role of NEDs in SMEs; both papers were by Mileham and used data obtained from a survey concerned with the role of NEDs carried out with Institute of Management members. This research made a useful contribution, but had a number of limitations. More recently, the increased interest in the role of NEDs in SMEs has sparked further research, but there is still a need for an overall picture of NED and mentor involvement in UK SMEs. The research in this paper addresses this need by presenting the results from a survey sent to 5,279 UK SMEs selected from the Yellow Pages Business Database. The questionnaire was designed to provide a general overview of NED and mentor involvement in SMEs and to allow the following questions to be answered: How many SMEs have NEDs, and are there any firm size patterns? Are there firm age patterns? Are there firm sector patterns? Does firm size influence the formality of NED procedures? What does the managing director believe NEDs add? Are firms with NEDs more successful than those without a NED? Does the profile of the managing director matter? Does a firm’s size influence NED involvement? How do firms acquire NEDs? Why do some SMEs not have NEDs? The paper presents these findings and explores the implications for SMEs and policy advisors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of prior firm performance on board composition and governance structure.

A total of 90 companies listed on National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations were used for this study. Hypotheses were tested using both general linear regression and logit regression analyses.

The results showed that prior negative change in firm performance was significantly related to a decrease in the overall number of directors and a decrease in the number of outside directors.

The sample size used in this study was relatively small and the focus was on small to medium‐sized firms, so the results found here may not apply to firms larger than those used in our sample.

Directors may want to consider the implications for governance practices found in this study, specifically, whether smaller boards with fewer outsiders are appropriate following periods of performance decline.

This study is one of the first to examine the effects of trends in prior firm performance on board composition and chief executive officer duality.

This paper aims to examine the prevalence of directors of US Fortune 500 firms who come from an academic background, and possible unique reasons for their appointment.

Based on extant theory of the resource‐dependence roles of non‐management directors, this study proposes and tests three hypotheses concerning distinctive reasons firms may appoint an academic to their boards. Academic directors may serve unique roles in increasing board demographic diversity, increasing firm intellectual capital, and providing links to local geographic constituents. Using year 2002 data from the US Fortune 500 firms, this study presents descriptive statistics and uses t‐tests and χ² tests to examine hypotheses.

Firms having academics on their boards have greater board demographic diversity than firms without an academic director. Firms with academic directors have the same average emphasis on knowledge‐based earnings as other firms. Academics associated with US top‐ranked universities tend to be more likely to hold board seats. Firms tend to select academic directors from the geographic regions where the firm is headquartered and have a slight tendency to use them on public affairs committees.

This study's findings highlight a unique non‐monitoring advantage of academic directors for firms seeking increased board diversity, and potential community/stakeholder liaisons.

Firms wishing to increase board diversity or improve relationships with other stakeholder groups may find academic directors useful to such efforts. Academic directors appear to be just as capable as other outside directors in developing firm intellectual capital.

This paper extends the present literature in resource dependence by examining academic directors, a new director subset. The paper is also unique in that it uses data collected from proxy statements, rather than survey data.

The purpose of this paper is to examine firms’ early adoption decision regarding new practices, and what social factors – that is social status and political legitimacy – may influence decision processes under ambiguity.

The study examines outside director presence among publicly listed firms in China between 1991 and 2000, using discrete time – event history analysis based on observation of 770 firms.

Social status negatively influences early adoption decisions through the expectation of status enhancement, while political legitimacy is also influential because early adoptions are more attractive to firms in need of political access. Moreover, a firm’ political legitimacy moderates the effect of social status, due to their resource dependence on different stakeholders.

This study’s findings provide important insights for research on diffusion models of new practices by identifying the social processes during early diffusion, and articulating different effects of status and legitimacy. It further emphasizes the sociopolitical perspectives and social motives of governance structure changes in emerging economies.

The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to quantitatively synthesize and evaluate the impact of 11 CEO power constructs (CEO duality; compensation; ownership; founder CEO; acquisition experience; functional area experience; outside directorship; elite education; CEO celebrity; age; and tenure) on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. Results of 85 independent studies show that CEO ownership, functional area experience, and tenure are significantly positive predictors for better acquisition performance. At the same time, CEO duality and CEO elite education are significantly negative predictors of different measures of acquisition performance. These findings indicate the importance of integrating different theories to enhance our understanding of the nature of strategic leadership in acquisition performance.