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Using a general model of corruption that explains and accounts for corruption across professions and institutions, this chapter will examine how certain practices in the media, especially in areas where journalism, advertising and public relations regularly intersect and converge, can be construed as instances of corruption. It will be argued that such corruption, as in the case of cash-for-comment scandals, advertorials, infomercials, and infotainment, as well as public relations media releases disseminated misleadingly as journalistic opinion, is regular, ubiquitous, and systematic.

How can organizations use strategic frames to develop support for illegal and stigmatized markets? Drawing on interviews, direct observation, and the analysis of 2,497 press releases, I show how pro-cannabis activists used distinct framing strategies at different stages of institutional development to negotiate the moral boundaries surrounding medical cannabis, diluting the market’s stigma in the process. Social movement organizations first established a moral (and legal) foothold for the market by framing cannabis as a palliative for the dying, respecting moral boundaries blocking widespread exchange. As market institutions emerged, activists extended this frame to include less serious conditions, making these boundaries permeable.

Despite increasing interest in business model innovation (BMI), there is only limited scholarship that examines how business model (BM) innovators present and explain their innovations to various stakeholders. As BMI often involves the creation of a new ecosystem, understanding how innovators can gain support of future ecosystem members is important. Based on a longitudinal case study of Salesforce, a pioneer in cloud computing, the authors show how the innovator’s skillful framing to different audiences fosters the emergence of an ecosystem around the new BM. The authors suggest that effective framing constitutes an important strategic process that enables BM innovators to shape new ecosystems due to the performative power of words.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

This paper aims to help auditors manage the risk of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations of the companies that they audit, particularly those with operations in Latin America.

First, the paper describes the relevant provisions of the FCPA. Second, it identifies the common schemes and transactions associated with heightened risk of FCPA liability in Latin America and provides recommendations to minimize this risk. Third, it discusses the responsibilities of auditors under U.S. securities laws and regulations with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. Finally, it describes the sanctions that auditors could face if they fail to fulfill their responsibilities regarding these FCPA violations. The paper is based on data collected from various documents including laws, cases, accounting and auditing standards, litigation releases, press releases, deferred prosecution agreements, and enforcement actions.

Auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(a) of the Exchange Act to design procedures that provide reasonable assurances of detecting the FCPA violations of their clients, which are illegal acts with direct and material effects on the financial statements. In addition, auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act to report the violations of the FCPA that they detect during the audit to the appropriate level of management. If management does not take the necessary remedial steps, auditors must report FCPA violations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In order to reduce their FCPA-related liability and fulfill their responsibilities under U.S. securities laws and accounting standards, auditors should closely scrutinize transactions with a high risk of FCPA liability. An analysis of FCPA cases occurring in Latin America reveals six categories of transactions with heightened FCPA risk.

While there is much literature regarding a company’s compliance with the FCPA, there has not been much literature about the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. This paper attempts to start bridging this gap by providing guidance to auditors regarding their responsibilities to detect and report FCPA violations.

Casino gambling in the United States has increased significantly in the last 30 years, going from just 2 states (Nevada and New Jersey) in 1988 to 41 states with over 980 casinos. This rapid growth of casino gambling has resulted in additional social costs, including workplace embezzlements committed by problem gamblers. Embezzlements contribute to greater fraud risk for organizations in casino regions and are expected to rise as casinos multiply and increasingly cater to convenience gamblers. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the proximity of casinos as a fraud risk factor for embezzlement. The authors recommend that internal and external auditors for companies located in casino areas assess this fraud risk and where appropriate, perform audit procedures to address this risk. There is also an opportunity for external auditors to assist those companies located in casino regions (that may lack internal auditors) in establishing fraud prevention programs.