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The purpose of this paper is to introduce and analyze the short-term and long-term causes of the candlelight demonstrations and the ensuing presidential impeachment in South Korea, as well as the characteristics of the organization that planned the candlelight demonstrations and the participants of them.

The research is based on the previous literature, news articles, as well as various surveys on the randomly selected participants of the demonstrations and on a representative sample of Korean electorate, including non-participants as well.

The candlelight demonstrations, although “triggered” by a news report, would not have occurred, without angers and discontents accumulated over the president’s whole term by the irregularities and wrongdoings of the administration. The system of checks and balances in democratic system did not work properly. In that regard, the candlelight demonstrations and the ensuing presidential impeachment were just an unanticipated expression of the problems and defects built in the Korean democratic system of 1987, which would have found a way out in any form eventually.

Based on the analysis of the candlelight demonstrations and the ensuing presidential impeachment, the paper suggests instructive implications on a new democracy as well as on modern representative democracies that are in jeopardy now.

This study analyzes earnings management among Brazilian public firms during the 2016 Presidential Impeachment.

The sample comprises, as a treatment group, 721 firm-quarter observations relating to Brazilian listed firms. It also considers a control group of listed firms from Mexico, which were not affected by the exogenous shock analyzed (i.e. the 2016 Presidential Impeachment in Brazil). The firms' quarterly financial data cover the period between 2013 and 2018.

Considering several proxies related to earnings management by accruals, the main findings suggest a negative relationship between the 2016 impeachment event and the level of discretionary accruals, suggesting that Brazilian firms tended to reduce their earnings management levels during the impeachment process. The results are robust whether the control group is considered or not.

This study brings new empirical evidence to the literature on accounting information quality about the role of the economic and political environment in earnings management, especially in weak institution countries characterized by institutional voids and higher levels of corruption.

This study attempts to figure out the factors that contributed to deposing certain elected presidents before the end of their constitutional terms, alongside tracing the new political context that prevailed in Latin America since 1978 and its impact on direct political participation and military behavior during presidential crises.

The paper uses the comparative method to investigate the causes of presidential instability in three case studies.

The likelihood of presidential instability increases when a president enacts austerity economic policies that marginalize large sectors of the citizenry, becomes implicated in acts of corruption and develops a hostile relationship with members of the ruling coalition.

This study integrates the social movement theory with analytical perspectives from parliamentary behavior to explain presidential instability. It attempts to investigate the dynamics of interaction between the acts of furious citizens and disloyal legislators through the in-depth analysis of three case studies.

This chapter analyzes events leading to the collapse of President Dilma Rousseff’s parliamentary base that are essential for understanding the impeachment process in 2016. First, it assesses structural factors shaping the Brazilian political system and the adaptation strategy of Lula da Silva’s government in its relationship with the National Congress. Next, it analyzes the changing relationship between Dilma Rousseff’s government and Congress, especially the House of Representatives, as the main locus for presidential impeachment actions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the paradoxical pattern in which South Korean presidents enjoy imperial power early in their term, but became fragile and impotent as their term comes to an end.

Based on the previous literature on Korean presidentialism, this paper introduces and critically compares several competing theories on the Korean presidency and its defects.

This paper finds that for Korean presidents, imperial governance and fragility represent two sides of the same coin, like a Janus face. These two seemingly competing descriptions of the Korean presidency are not actually contradictory.

This paper investigates how Korean presidents are imperial with regard to constitutional design as well as political behavior, and presents a logic of transformation from an imperial president to a fragile one, focusing on party politics and election cycles.