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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of institutional investors on the cost of bank loans using US bank loan data from 1995 to 2012.

The cost of bank loans is analyzed with regard to loan spreads, collateral requirements, and the number of prepayment covenants.

This paper finds that, first, holding institutional ownership constant, institutional control is positively related to the cost of bank loans, implying that strong institutional control intensifies conflicts between large shareholders and lenders. Second, institutional holdings are negatively related to the cost of bank loans. These results indicate that institutional monitoring reduces the agency problem between shareholders and managers.

This paper suggests that the trade-off between institutional monitoring and institutional control jointly determines the effect of institutional investors on the cost of bank loans. Moreover, lenders should consider large shareholders and their influence when making lending decisions.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

As financial markets move toward increased globalization, it becomes worth considering whether inherent differences in financial markets across different countries will diminish. For two countries more similar than different in terms of geography, location, government and culture, Canada and the USA remain strikingly different in terms of housing finance. Public policy objectives toward housing followed quite different paths over the past 70 years and fundamental differences in banking practices have led to considerably different outcomes in terms of mortgage finance instruments in the two countries. Examines some of the differences in policy and in competitive practices between Canada and the USA in an attempt to illuminate why differences in rates and terms across the two countries still exist. While a part of the difference remains due to legal constraints concerning the finance of the domestic housing sector, focuses on the economics and public policy choices that have led to the observed differences rather than on an analysis of the legal structure.

This case examines issues surrounding the choice of financing arrangements for the acquisition of Radiologix in July 2006. The case follows Mark Stolper, the CFO of RadNet, as he considers how to raise the $363 million in funds necessary to finance the acquisition. When completed, the combined firms will be the largest private diagnostic-imaging provider in the United States. When Stolper joined RadNet in 2003, he confronted a company with “too much debt, and the wrong kind of debt.” His goal is to finance the acquisition in a way that further enhances the financial strength and operating flexibility of the company. Given the large size of funding required, the firm is unlikely to be able to fund the entire transaction with first-lien or bank debt. His financial advisors differ in their recommendations for how to raise the remaining funds—one suggests using second-lien debt, and the other, high-yield debt.

The purpose of the case is to familiarize students with frequently encountered types of debt financing that are used to finance mergers and acquisitions and other corporate transactions. The case provides information on the distinctions among first-lien, second-lien, and high-yield debt in relation to their price, availability, flexibility of covenants, repayment ease, and composition of likely investors. The case is designed for use in courses that cover corporate financing, M&As, and debt financing.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting.

Using a sample of US firms during the period 1992-2011, the authors examine the association between overinvestment (underinvestment) and three characteristics of bank loan contracts: loan spread, collateral requirement, and loan maturity.

The authors find that overinvesting firms obtain loans with higher loan spreads. Additional tests show that the effect of overinvestment on loan spreads is generally more pronounced in firms with lower reputation, weaker shareholder rights, and lower institutional ownership. The effect of overinvestment on collateral requirement is mixed, and investment efficiency has no significant relation to loan maturity.

The results are subject to the following caveats. First, while the study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency affects bank loan contracting terms, especially the cost of bank loans, the underlying theory is not well-developed. The authors leave it up to future research to provide a theoretical framework to clearly distinguish the cash flow and credit risk effects of past investment behavior from those of existing agency conflicts. Second, due to data limitation, the sample size is small, especially when the authors control for corporate governance measured by G-index and institutional ownership.

The finding that overinvestment is costly to corporations suggests that managers should consider the potential trade-offs from such investment decisions carefully. The evidence also alerts shareholders and board members to the importance of monitoring management investment decisions. In addition, the authors find that corporate governance moderates the relationship between investment decisions and cost of bank loans, suggesting that it would be beneficial to design effective governance mechanisms to prevent management from empire building and motivate managers to pursue efficient investment strategies.

First, the findings enhance understanding of the potential economic consequences of overinvestment decisions in the context of a firm’s private debt contracting. The evidence suggests that lenders perceive higher credit risk from overinvestment than from underinvestment, likely because firms squander cash in the current period by investing in (negative net present value) projects that are likely to result in future cash flow problems. Second, the study contributes to the literature on the determinants of bank loans by identifying an observable empirical proxy for uncertainty in future cash flows that increases credit risk.

Considering the importance of environmental lawsuits in the capital market specifically and society more generally, the authors examine whether environmental lawsuits are related to the cost of bank loans for the first time.

This study uses a US sample of 7,684 loans from 1,409 individual borrowing firms over the 1995–2015 period. The hypothesis is tested using lagged data from the year before the start of a bank loan, and firm fixed effects panel regression analysis is applied to control for correlated omitted variable bias. To further address endogeneity concerns, the authors use a difference in differences analysis that exploits the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on April 20, 2010, to establish causality. Finally, the authors use the entropy balancing method as an additional endogeneity check.

The authors find a positive relationship between environmental lawsuits and firms' bank loan costs. The results are economically significant. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in environmental lawsuits is related to a 2.07 basis point increase in bank loan costs. The results are robust to various endogeneity checks. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that a poor information environment, weak corporate governance, and low corporate social responsibility (CSR) levels strengthen the positive relationship between environmental lawsuits and bank loan costs. Finally, additional analyses show that environmental lawsuits are significantly negatively related to the loan amount and maturity contract provisions.

The authors provide new empirical evidence that increasing understanding of the economic consequences of environmental lawsuits on bank loan costs.