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In light of China’s rapid development and the USA’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, both China and the USA need to view each other objectively and cooperate with each other in order to keep their relations peaceful. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

A literature review has been undertaken to prove that power transition theory is not sufficient for the adequate analysis of Sino-US relations.

Considering its empirical and theoretical defects, power transition theory, which it has been generally considered can be used to explain China’s future development and the future course of Sino-US relations, cannot be used to explain and forecast Sino-US relations scientifically.

Power transition theory cannot be used to explain and forecast Sino-US relations scientifically, considering its empirical and theoretical defects.

According to the conventional wisdom, trade is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. By allowing countries to focus on producing the goods that they can produce relatively efficiently, free trade is largely beneficial for everyone involved. Then, why are the world’s two largest economies (i.e. the USA and China) currently engaged in a trade war, which is likely to hurt their own economies? What is the driving force for the trade war between the two economic giants? The purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation of the underlying cause of the US–China trade war.

In an effort to make sense of the trade war between the USA and China, the paper draws the insights from the two international relations theories – i.e. hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory.

As China continues to threaten US hegemony in the world in general and East Asia in particular, the Sino–US competition for hegemony will intensify over time. As a result, the trade war between the two countries may persist longer than many anticipate. Further, even if the trade war between the two superpowers ends soon, a similar type of conflict is likely to occur later as long as the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry continues.

The central thesis of this paper is that “US fear” about its declining hegemony and China’s rapid rise as a challenger of US hegemony is driving a US-launched trade war with China. Since the underlying cause of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is political (i.e. the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry) rather than economic (e.g. US attempts to improve the trade balance with China by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods), the paper contends that the full understanding of the trade war requires close attention to the importance of power competition between the two superpowers.

The spread of COVID-19 is not just a health crisis. The pandemic has taken a geopolitical dimension. The health crisis amplified the competitive dynamics between the USA and China, affected the provision of global public goods and injected instability into the global order. In line with the geopolitical zero-sum thinking, both the USA and China have sought to capitalize on the crisis to boost their international profile. Instead of working together to mitigate the health and economic impacts of COVID-19, the two powers fear that the other will exploit the current situation to accrue political, economic or military gains that will give it an edge after the pandemic subsides. The spread of COVID-19 has set off a “battle of narratives,” in which China and the USA are accusing each other of failing to rise to the challenge. The world seems to be falling into a “Kindleberger Trap,” in which the established power is unable to lead while the rising power is unwilling to assume responsibility. The COVID-19 crisis is occurring amid the collapse of global cooperation. The USA, the traditional leader of international collective efforts in times of crisis, has abandoned its role entirely. The lack of leadership at the global level during an international crisis may cause the breakdown of the international order.

This paper examines the US-China competitive dynamics through the lens of the work of Charles Kindleberger, which both liberals and realists regard as foundational when examining the dynamics of global crisis management. This paper also uses the meta-geopolitics framework to determine the ability of both China and the USA to respond to the current COVID-19 crisis and its implications for their power and standing in the international system.

This paper concludes that the only way to escape the Kindleberger trap is “to embed Sino-American relations in multilateralism.”

As rivals, both the USA and China are seeking to capitalize on the crisis to boost their international profile. This paper probes how China and the USA navigated the ongoing COVID-19 crisis to determine whether or not they are currently in a “Kindleberger Trap,” using elements of the meta-geopolitics framework of analysis, namely, health issues, domestic politics, economics, science and international diplomacy. Using the meta-geopolitics framework will help us determine the ability of both China and the USA to respond to the current COVID-19 crisis and the implications of that on their power and standing in the international system.

Why have so many overlapping regional institutions been established in the Asia-Pacific? Is there any possibility of a convergence of these institutions into a single (or a few) “authoritative” regional institution(s)? What implications do the emerging overlapping regional institutions have for an evolving regional architecture in Asia? I argue first that the proliferation of regional institutions reflects complicated strategies taken by the countries to respond to the increased insecurity and uncertainty caused by the structural changes. Second, the countries of the region are taking a variety of national strategies through regional institutions, ranging from engagement to soft balancing and risk-hedging, to respond to these changes. Third, all the states of the region want to maintain a variety of institutional choices to respond to their uncertain futures. Fourth, what makes the institution-building so complicated lies in the fact that there are two major (and uncertain) powers to whom the regional countries have to respond through regional institutions: the United States and China. This makes the bargaining game for regional institution-building more complicated and competitive. Fifth, the amalgamation or convergence of the existing institutions into a single (or few) “authoritative” institution(s) through “institutional competition” will not take place in the foreseeable future. Sixth, the countries of the region may engage in “forum shopping.” Seventh, the roles of these institutions have been and will be quite modest. However, the regional institutions could to some extent contribute to moderating inter-state tensions and putting institutional constraints on the deviant behaviors of member countries.

The purpose of this paper is to study and specify to what extent Iran will succeed in being a regional hegemon. The paper is devoted to clarification of the constitutive elements for regional hegemony. These elements will be related to an actor’s perception of its role and regional perception, and how these hegemons exert power, do these work for the public good in the region (provision) and how this regional power projects power and exerts power to influence others’ preferences and values without reference to violence (projection). For the Middle East, Iran emerged as a key player in most regional conflicts and it tried to increase its sphere of influence as a regional hegemon. Therefore the question here would be: To what extend could Iran succeed in being a regional hegemon and what are the circumstances that could enhance or constrain this Iranian ambition? So the aim of the paper is to look at three dimensions in general and see whether Iran makes a plausible candidate for regional hegemony. The paper outlines the essential traits of a regional hegemon, and the main elements that constitute a regional hegemony such as perception, provision and projection, and then analyze how Iran follows those elements by analyzing internal perceptions of the Iranian elite about Iranian regional role, regional acceptance, provision of public good, projection and finally impact of the relation with external great powers. Through analyzing its regional strategy in Syria and Iraq since 2003, the year of invasion of Iraq, since ever a political vacuum was created, that enabled Iran to extend its regional influence, after the fall of its historical regional rival, Saddam Hussein baathi regime.

The study adopts an analytical framework of analyzing a regional hegemony strategy which is approached by Miriam Prys in her study “Hegemony, domination, detachment: differences in regional powerhood” to study and analyze Iran’s regional behavior as one of regional power that is seeking regional hegemony. This analytical framework is one of the most significant analytical tools that interests in the study of the behavior of regional power and identify the constitutive dimensions for regional hegemony such as self-perception, regional perception, provision and power projection.

The study concludes that there are obstacles completely in front of achieving the Iranian quest to regional hegemony over the Middle East. These are the continuing US involvement in the Middle East and the consequent tense relationship between Iran and the USA. It is most unlikely that Iran will be hegemonic state over the Middle East as long as there are refusal and resistance from other regional states for Iranian regional role; as each of regional powers has tools to contain the influence of the other. The Iranian regional behavior that is sectarianism-based, whether to protect Shiite shrines and holy places or to protect Shiites in the region, such policies deepen the ideological and sectarian conflicts. It also has not provided an attractive cultural model for the peoples of the region.

This paper enhances the deep analysis of the Middle East dynamics through the prospective of regional power. Also, the paper focuses on the analysis of the relation between great power and aspiring regional power and the impact on its strategies.

This study enhances the understanding of how Iranian decision-makers perceive their regional Iranian and the threats. Moreover, the tools that Iran uses its hard power and ideational one to create regional followers and change its allies’ normative and value systems to come in line with its national interests. Moreover, the study tries to measure the actual Iranian influence, its weakness and strength so that the Arab states and the West could behave in a fruitful way.

In the final analysis, the paper offers an insight into the regional behavior and the importance of external power in regional dynamics and to what extent the regional hegemon is applicable to Iran.

China’s swift economic rise, as symbolized by the first Chinese Olympics and by surpassing Japan to become the world’s second largest economy despite the recent global financial meltdown, has been accompanied by a transformation of Chinese foreign policy behavior. After spending the last decade emphasizing China’s “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development,” Beijing has begun to expound its policy preferences and territorial claims more forthrightly, even assertively. The purpose of this chapter will be to consider the origins, consequences, and likely future of the new Chinese foreign policy in the wake of the leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and the 12th National People’s Congress in 2013.

By refocusing its attention on its core business, this sleepy subsidiary woke up to true opportunity. Though its young CEO was well aware of the several strategic management theories powering the transition, he chose to make humanistic principles such as leadership and trust his operative mode of management.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate a significant course correction in US–China policy. It examines the increasingly broad dissatisfaction with China policy, which has resulted in an apparent end the era of intensive engagement and led to a hardening of the US approach to China across the policy spectrum, as exemplified by the critique of and incipient efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The research draws on primary and secondary source material to identify evidence of and examine the rationale behind the shift from the USA’s decades-long “engagement” approach toward an in intensifying strategic competition with China.

A course correction in US–China policy has been years in the making, and as most now argue is long overdue. The idea that China has emerged as America’s foremost strategic competitor is widely accepted, and indeed deeply ingrained in the thinking of most US foreign affairs professionals. It is also starkly evident in current US declaratory policy and increasingly in its operational policy as well.

The research offers a fresh perspective on the domestic and diplomatic dimensions of China’s rising.

The research builds on the latest scholarship on the growth of China’s geopolitical challenge to the USA to explore the development of China–US tensions and rivalries at all levels from the Bush and Obama eras to the present.

This paper aims to seek to and understand how civil conflict and international claims inform one another. Does the existence of ongoing civil and international conflicts affect how a government addresses an international claim? The paper builds on existing literature that link international and domestic conflict. However, it suggests that the logic behind civil conflicts may be different from that for international ones as states decide how to deal with any one claim.

The paper posits that states faced with domestic conflicts and additional international claims are more likely to seek to resolve an international claim than those without similar conflicts. It develops a series of hypotheses about the likelihood of claim escalation and peaceful settlement attempts and proceed to test them quantitatively using the Issue Correlates of War data combined with the uppsala conflict data program/peace research institute oslo Armed Conflict Data.

On the one hand, the paper finds support for the argument regarding the difficulty states are faced with when seeking to resolve multiple international claims. On the other hand, it finds that the presence of civil conflicts incentivizes states to resolve international claims either by force or peacefully, suggesting internal violence can both lead to diversionary behavior and attempts at conflict resolution.

The findings have important implications for work considering the complexity of domestic and international conflict linkages.

While many studies of claim militarization and peaceful attempts focus on dyadic and international characteristics, this paper creates a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of this foreign policy decision process.

Purpose – This chapter aims to position regional integration in the Kantian peace tripod and to test whether regional economic integration has a significant effect in reducing militarised interstate disputes.

Methodology – It uses logistic regression on cross-sectional–time-series data and a generalised estimating equation.

Findings – The analysis shows that regional integration had a significant impact in reducing militarised interstate disputes between 1950 and 2000.

Practical implications – This chapter may provide a new dimension to the academic discussion on the Kantian peace proposition, and encourage policy makers in less integrated regions to integrate with their neighbouring states in a bid to minimise political tensions.

Originality – The chapter is based on original data on regional integration collected by the author.