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This study consists of an examination of productivity growth following three major technological breakthroughs: the steam power revolution, electrification and the ICT revolution. The distinction between sectors producing and sectors using the new technology is emphasized. A major finding for all breakthroughs is that there is a long lag from the time of the original invention until a substantial increase in the rate of productivity growth can be observed. There is also strong evidence of rapid price decreases for steam engines, electricity, electric motors and ICT products. However, there is no persuasive direct evidence that the steam engine producing industry and electric machinery had particularly high productivity growth rates. For the ICT revolution the highest productivity growth rates are found in the ICT-producing industries. We suggest that one explanation could be that hedonic price indexes are not used for the steam engine and the electric motor. Still, it is likely that the rate of technological development has been much more rapid during the ICT revolution compared to any of the previous breakthroughs.

As [Alexander Graham] Bell raced to perfect his telephone, he was also writing up specifications to be filed with the United States Patent Office in Washington. On March 7, 1876, he was issued patent number 174,465. Meanwhile, Bell had discovered that a wire vibrated by the voice while partially immersed in a conducting liquid, like mercury, could be made to vary its resistance and produce an undulating current. In other words, human speech could be transmitted over a wire. On March 10, 1876, as he and Mr. Watson set out to test this finding, Bell knocked over what they were using as a transmitting liquid – battery acid. Reacting to the spilled acid, Mr. Bell is alleged to have shouted, “Mr. Watson, come here. I want you!” (PBS, 2003)

In this chapter, we review the literature that analyzes how the peculiar missions, rules, and incentive systems in the scientific community affect the process and outcomes of the commercialization of academic research. We will focus on how the peculiar institutional logics of academia determine the decision of academics to commercialize their research, and how these logics affect the outsourcing of research from firms to academic laboratories, as well as the attempts of firms to reproduce academic incentive systems within their research labs by allowing their researchers to publish and offering them financial rewards based on their standing in the scientific community. Finally, we report on research that has analyzed how the rules of the scientific community might lead to the production, transfer, and commercialization of false knowledge.

This chapter analyzes the construction of secrecy under the current U.S. export control regime for dual-use technologies and discusses its application for two technologies: research on a class of semiconductors used in military and civilian applications and biotechnology research on select agents. We argue that the assignment of technologies and countries to categories controlled under the export regime is an exercise in creating secret knowledge, in which the broad category of “the other” is subdivided between those who are forbidden to know and those who are not (and thus implicitly are qualified to become a party to the secret). We draw attention to the social cost of errors made in applying these categories, and point to some remaining issues.