Search results

This paper aims to study the preferences of the supply chain (SC) members on various power structures under demand information asymmetry considering competing retailers.

A two-level SC with one manufacturer and two retailers is designed. The retailers are in Bertrand competition. The manufacturer who holds the confidential demand information chooses the appropriate information sharing (IS) format. Three IS formats are provided, i.e. no IS (the manufacturer never shares with the retailers), partial IS (the manufacturer shares with one retailer), full IS (the manufacturer shares with all retailers). In addition, the authors model two power structures based on the decision sequences in the SC, i.e. retailers or manufacturer-dominant SC. The authors characterize the equilibrium solutions and payoffs and then investigate the members’ preferences for IS formats.

It is shown that in retailers (manufacturer)-dominant SC, the retailers prefer full (no) IS, but the manufacturer prefers no (full) IS. Moreover, the authors analyze the members’ preferences on power structures under demand information asymmetry, which has a relationship with the degrees of demand uncertainty and competition intensity.

The analysis regarding the preferences of the SC members on power structure under demand information asymmetry provides valuable managerial insights to enhance cooperation and achieve a win-win result.

This research aims to examine which cooperative contract (wholesale-price contract or cost-sharing contract) can more effectively upgrade the green degree of product and promote demand when considering consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

This research investigates a dyadic green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Four Stackelberg game models with a cost-sharing contract or a wholesale-price contract are built in retailer-led and manufacturer-led scenarios, respectively. Using backward induction, the optimal green decision under each model is obtained. In addition, the optimal cooperative contract is proposed by comparing these four models.

It is found that under consumer reference price effect, a cost-sharing contract outperforms a wholesale-price contract in upgrading product greenness and promoting demand. Under any single contract, the retailer-led situation is more conducive to improving product greenness than the manufacturer-led situation. Moreover, consumer reference price effect would reduce the sharing ratio of a cost-sharing contract when the manufacturer dominates, but it could mitigate the problem of double marginalization by reducing wholesale and retail prices under both types of contracts, which would enhance consumer surplus.

It is a new attempt to incorporate consumer reference price effect and power structure into a green supply chain framework and proposes a novel demand function that simultaneously emphasizes consumer reference price effect, consumer environmental awareness and product green attribute. In addition, it provides managerial insights for business managers to choose green cooperative contracts with consumer reference price effect under different power structures.

This paper considers carbon abatement in a competitive supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and two retailers under vertical shareholding. The authors emphasize the equilibrium decision problem of stakeholders under vertical shareholding and different power structures.

A game-theoretic approach was used to probe the influence of power structure and retailer competition on manufacturers' carbon abatement under vertical shareholding. The carbon abatement decisions, environmental imp4cacts (EIs) and social welfare (SW) of different scenarios under vertical shareholding are obtained.

The findings show that manufacturers are preferable to carbon abatement and capture optimal profits when shareholding is above a threshold under the retailer power equilibrium, but they may exert a worse negative impact on the environment. The dominant position of the held retailer is not always favorable to capturing the optimal SW and mitigating EIs. In addition, under the combined effect of competition level and shareholding, retailer power equilibrium scenarios are more favorable to improving SW and reducing EIs.

This paper inspects the combined influence of retailer competition and power structure on manufacturers' carbon abatement. Distinguishing from previous literature, the authors also consider the impact of vertical shareholding and consumer preferences. In addition, the authors analyze the SW and EIs in different scenarios.

This research aimed to analyze the interactions of “pre-adolescent” students in the classroom through relationships sustained by structure, agency, and power exercises based on Anthony Giddens’ Theory of Structuring.¹ A qualitative research approach was used with the characteristic of a case study in a municipal public school in the city of Itabira (MG), Brazil. As procedures for recording the evidence, we used the application of a questionnaire, observation of the classroom and listening to students and teachers in a class of the sixth year of elementary school II during the 2017 school year. The results indicated that the vision of “pre-adolescence” marked by biological and psychological changes remains institutionalized for school professionals. The students demonstrated the need for the teacher to use his teaching authority to set limits in the classroom, however, this exercise of agency-power by the teacher must be negotiated and mediated by the participation of “pre-adolescents.” In view of this procedural context, “pre-adolescent” students cannot be held responsible for the instability of the interactive process in the classroom if the historical and social context through which these students pass is not considered in comparison to the institutionalized characteristics solidified through the process, time, and space by the school and/or some of its representatives (teachers).

The purpose of this paper is to expose the playout of power dynamics when a new business intelligence (BI) system is implemented in a central pharmacy department in a National Health Service (NHS) hospital. The authors aim to explore the assumptions, experiences and actions of organisational stakeholders and ascertain how different professional groups obtain influence, power and control during this process.

In this research the authors employ structuration theory (ST), to establish how and where domination is achieved. To achieve this, the authors investigate the production and reproduction of structure as part of a longitudinal assessment using interviews and questionnaires.

Constant renewal and evolution are crucial in the implementation of a BI system. During the process of implementation and change many stakeholders resent the change. Disempowering these users leads to new power structures led by BI analysts.

The findings from this paper can help strengthen implications of BI systems implementation and better understand the impact these systems have on wider stakeholders. With coherent communication and an engaged attitude new BI systems can be implemented without alienating the key user stakeholders.

This paper differs from other papers by advocating that new systems and processes alter individual power structures in organisations, disrupting internal dynamics and introducing new aspects of control and dominance.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.

Based on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.

The optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.

The authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the affective and cognitive dimensions of satisfaction that impact the buyer-supplier relationship (BSR) from the supplier's perspective and to consider satisfaction within the context of power-dependency theory.

Qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 Chinese apparel supply professionals who regularly interact with apparel buyers. Audio or video interviews were conducted via WeChat (the most popular social media platform in China).

A thematic analysis of the interview data revealed that both affective and cognitive dimensions of satisfaction impact the BSR. A model of supplier affective and cognitive satisfaction in a collaborative BSR was developed to illustrate the connections between the two dimensions.

Due to intense competition in the market, supplier satisfaction is essential for building relationships in the apparel industry. Existing studies have focused on satisfaction from the perspective of the buyer rather than the supplier because in a BSR, the buyer tends to hold more power. Moreover, research has primarily considered cognitive evaluations of satisfaction with the BSR. This study offers new insight on both cognitive and affective satisfaction from the perspective of suppliers within the context of power-dependency theory.

The purpose of the study is to examine the relation between board structure and firm performance variability in an international setting. The authors further explore the effect of national culture in shaping such relations.

The authors’ international sample contains 4,911 firms across 49 countries over the 2002–2017 period. The authors use national culture values on individualism and power distance developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2011). The authors focus on within-firm, over-time variability of firm performance and estimate multivariate linear regressions with fixed effects. The authors address the endogeneity concern using the instrumental variable approach, and the authors’ results are robust to alternative measures of variables and different subsamples.

The authors find that firms with larger board size, greater board independence and less powerful CEOs have less variable performance. Individualism has a magnifying effect while power distance has a mitigating effect in shaping such relations.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to answer the call of Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) for research on corporate boards in an international setting. It is also one of the few studies which examine the variability of firm performance, while the majority of existing literature focuses on the level of firm performance. Most importantly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the role of national culture in shaping boardroom interactions that affect the decision-making process of corporate boards, which, in turn, affects firm performance variability.

This study offers a Bourdieu-oriented analysis of the tax compliance practice for indigenous entrepreneurs in New Zealand. It examines the intersection of accounting and tax for Māori entrepreneurs and their relational interactions with the Inland Revenue Department (IRD)/state/Crown and accountants by considering the contextual factors of history, culture and society of Māori.

Qualitative research was adopted using face-to-face in-depth interviews with 34 participants and reviewing government documents. The authors analyse the tax compliance practice by drawing on Bourdieu's concepts of field, capital and habitus to conceptualise the tax field as a site of struggle for power and control by the IRD, accountants and indigenous entrepreneurs.

This study demonstrates how the tax field is structured as a game between tax reporting, taxpaying and monitoring functions. The position within the field is determined by the actor's access to the relevant capitals and habitus. It identifies how accounting, given its centrality to tax compliance, facilitates the power relations between the IRD, accountants and Māori entrepreneurs. The Eurocentric accounting-based tax reporting and the contextual factors illuminate how indigenous entrepreneurs are being dominated in the tax field. They experienced cultural dissonance with conflicting responsibilities when traversing the collectivistic indigenous and tax fields. Their collectivism involves sharing resources as they cherish whanaungatanga (relationship, kinship) and manaakitanga (kindness, generosity), which are at odds and are not valued in the tax field.

It is an empirical illustration of the connection between accounting, tax and power for indigenous taxpayers and their relationship with the IRD/Crown and accountants. It has practical implications for developing and enhancing tax compliance in jurisdictions with indigenous taxpayers. Such an understanding is helpful for policymakers, government, business agencies and the accounting professions when assisting, empowering and educating indigenous groups regarding tax compliance.

This paper responds to the call for accounting research with modern-day indigenous peoples rather than historical ones. The paper fills a gap in the accounting and tax literature by examining the tax compliance practice of indigenous small and medium enterprise (SME) entrepreneurs using Bourdieu's framework. It identifies how the role of accounting creates, maintains and reinforces power structures in the tax field. Tax/accounting reporting based on Eurocentric rules disempowers and alienates indigenous entrepreneurs. They misrecognise their actions in reproducing the existing power structures in the tax field due to deeply held historical and cultural factors about the fear of the Crown/state and their practice of rangitaratanga (esteeming authorities).