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Patient safety is gaining prominence in health professional curricula. Patient safety must be complemented by teaching and skill development in practice settings. The purpose of this paper is to explore how experienced pharmacists identify, prioritize and communicate adverse drug effects to patients.

A focus group discussion was conducted with cardiology pharmacy specialists working in a Doha hospital, Qatar. The topic guide sought to explore participants’ views, experiences and approaches to educating patients regarding specific cardiovascular therapy safety and tolerability. Discussions were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data were coded and organized around identified themes and sub-themes. Working theories were developed by the three authors based on relevant topic characteristics associated with the means in which pharmacists prioritize and choose adverse effect information to communicate to patients.

Nine pharmacists participated in the discussion. The specific adverse effects prioritized were consistent with the reported highest prevalence. Concepts and connections to three main themes described how pharmacists further tailored patient counseling: potential adverse effects and their perceived importance; patient encounter; and cultural factors. Pharmacists relied on initial patient dialogue to judge an individual’s needs and capabilities to digest safety information, and drew heavily upon experience with other counseling encounters to further prioritize this information, processes dependent upon development and accessing exemplar cases.

The findings underscore practical experience as a critical instructional element of undergraduate health professional patient safety curricula and for developing associated clinical reasoning.

The issue of cybersecurity has been cast as the focal point of a fight between two conflicting governance models: the nation-state model of national security and the global governance model of multi-stakeholder collaboration, as seen in forums like IGF, IETF, ICANN, etc. There is a strange disconnect, however, between this supposed fight and the actual control over cybersecurity “on the ground”. This paper aims to reconnect discourse and control via a property rights approach, where control is located first and foremost in ownership.

This paper first conceptualizes current governance mechanisms through ownership and property rights. These concepts locate control over internet resources. They also help us understand ongoing shifts in control. Such shifts in governance are actually happening, security governance is being patched left and right, but these arrangements bear little resemblance to either the national security model of states or the global model of multi-stakeholder collaboration. With the conceptualization in hand, the paper then presents case studies of governance that have emerged around specific security externalities.

While not all mechanisms are equally effective, in each of the studied areas, the author found evidence of private actors partially internalizing the externalities, mostly on a voluntary basis and through network governance mechanisms. No one thinks that this is enough, but it is a starting point. Future research is needed to identify how these mechanisms can be extended or supplemented to further improve the governance of cybersecurity.

This paper bridges together the disconnected research communities on governance and (technical) cybersecurity.