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It is well known that a player in a non-cooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game’s outcome. We explore what happens when external parties – who we call “game miners” – discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various structured bargaining games among such miner(s) and players that determine such an outcome-contingent contract before the start of the original game. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another as in the original game, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclusivity and first-mover advantage. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit and bounds on the game miner’s profit. We also find that game miners can lead to both efficient and inefficient equilibria.

Grounded theory (GT) is a very crucial qualitative tool in research inquiry. It embraces systematic, inductive, and comparative inquiry method to construct a theory. GT is mostly appropriate to investigate organizational phenomena, which involves a change process. In this chapter, the authors focus on the emergence of GT as a research inquiry tool with the focus how GT evolves from classis grounded theory to constructivist ground theory. In the detailed method of GT, a focus is given on coding method along with theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation points. Despite being a powerful technique, GT has drawn a number of criticisms. Majority GT researchers consider the technique as an inductive method with a few exceptions, where it has been deliberated as a deductive method. However, in the line of Corley (2015), it can be argued that GT should be considered as a methodological approach to study inductive phenomena having less understanding of theoretical perspective. Chapter concludes with identifying future scope of study in the field of GT.

This chapter opens the second part of the Volume, focusing on the small farms' role and dynamics within the evolving food system. Assessing small farmers' actual and potential contribution to the change towards a sustainable food and nutrition security requires a deep understanding of their strategic decision-making processes. These processes take place in a context highly conditioned by internal and external conditions, including the complex relations between farm and household, which are mapped and described. Building on an adaptation of Porter's model (Porter, 1990), the chapter investigates how farmers, given those conditions, define their strategies (in particular their innovation strategies) aimed at economic and financial sustainability through a multidisciplinary analysis of scientific literature. Internal conditions are identified in the light of the Agricultural Household Model (Singh & Subramanian, 1986) which emphasizes how family farming strategies aim at combining business-related objectives, and family welfare. Then, a comprehensive set of external conditions is identified and then grouped within eight categories: ‘Factors’, ‘Demand’, ‘Finance and Risk’, ‘Regulation and Policy’, ‘Technological’, ‘Ecological’, ‘Socio-institutional’ and ‘Socio-demographic’. Similarly, six types of strategies are identified: ‘Agro-industrial competitiveness’, ‘Blurring farm borders’, ‘Rural development’, ‘Risk management’, ‘Political support’ and ‘Coping with farming decline’.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) creates rights for covered employees, defines conduct that violates those rights, and deems that conduct an unfair labor practice. But while given broad remedial powers under the Act, the Board's options were curtailed by the Supreme Court's limit on the use of deterrence as an express remedial justification. The Board was left with a strongly make-whole, i.e., ex-post, focus to undo the consequences of a violation.

Put differently, the current NLRA remedies reflect a pay-or-play philosophy. The goal is restoration after the fact, using ex-post remedies to give parties the benefit or status quo that they expected. An actor willing to pay may use a cost–benefit analysis and strategically choose to violate the Act, accepting the make-whole remedies later. But the Act created ex-ante statutory rights, not agreed-upon contractual terms. By statutory enactment, employees are given something of value deemed worthy of protection. Assigning value to compliance with the law in the first instance not only prevents sometimes irreparable harm but also reaffirms the inherent value of the right itself.

The impact of the Board's limited remedies is therefore a broad value-driven one. Without ex-ante deterrence, the available ex-post make-whole remedial options make a normative statement about individuals' rights under the Act: those rights may not be inherently worth enough to incentivize legal compliance. The make-whole focus can imply that financial compensation for the portion of harm that can be calculated and “undoing” some nonfinancial effects is sufficient. There is little drive to deter infringement before the fact. By examining the remedial philosophy behind contrasting approaches in the common law of torts and contract, this Article asserts that the current remedial strictures and framework undermine both the Act and the worth of its rights in the eyes of the public and the employees who hold them.

Purpose: Construction in Malta is generally characterised by small projects operated through fragmented contractual ties and limited technological advances. Through this study, the authors aim to examine the impact of changing client requirements on local construction, analyse the impact of these shifts on project expectations and explore how client requirements can be integrated into the ongoing design phases during the life cycle of the structure. Using a multi-million-euro, multi-phase residential, commercial, and redevelopment construction project as a case study, this paper presents an in-depth analysis of the short-term disruptions and long-term impacts while considering the implications for trade-offs.

Methodology: A mixed-methods approach was used to conduct the analysis. Qualitative data collected from semi-structured interviews showed that projects have different impacts on relationships even when the same organisations work on different trades within the same project. The quantitative data collected was used to analyse the variations caused by trade-offs from the original contracted work packages. The case study setting represents an example of a phenomenological methodology. It adapts existing theories to interpret what happens by examining an example of a phenomenon of interest. Although the conclusions cannot be generalised to the whole construction industry, its merit is that it addresses relationships and processes and is therefore ‘holistic’ rather than limited to isolated factors.

Findings: The findings, illustrate the effects or factors supported by the empirical data towards the main framework that supports the research study model for mapping trade-offs. The model is presented as a three-dimensional framework illustrating the dynamics of objectives, considerations, and time across project life cycles, and goes beyond the control parameters of the project management, cost, quality, and time triangle.

Conclusion: A set of recommendations are presented in relation to the drawing up of project briefs, procurement strategies, and the limitations and implications of embedding client changes.

This chapter examines three kinds of relational bonds (trust-based commitments, forbearance-based commitments, and apprehension-based commitments) on which parties rely in the processes employed in negotiating, committing, and executing their cooperative inter-organizational relationships (CIORs). It also considers three different societal contexts with strong, moderately strong, and weak exogenous governance safeguards in which these relational bonds are employed. The authors propose a process theory of relational bonds that fit different contexts. Specifically, our central proposition is that parties to CIORs are more likely to achieve their goals when they rely on relational bonds that fit their societal contexts in which they engage in economic exchanges.

In this chapter an argument is made for a clear articulation for the exclusive domain of entrepreneurship research. To date, the entrepreneurship academic community has neglected to define clear boundaries as to what distinguishes entrepreneurship scholarship from other closely related fields. It is argued here that the well-worn constructs of firm performance or success and failure of the individual entrepreneur do not provide the field the clarity of purpose and unique domain it desires. Similarly, the context of small business is not what will bring singular clarity for the field. Instead, this chapter argues that entrepreneurship research should be focused upon understanding how opportunities to bring future goods and services into existence occur.

A key argument in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that transactions are aligned with governance structures so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction cost economizing – match (Williamson, 1991). The archetypical problem in TCE is the vertical integration or “make-versus-buy” decision, and the focus of transaction cost economizing in this context is on mitigation of “holdup” problems associated with investments in specific assets (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). However, this asset specificity condition in only one example (albeit a significant one) of a more general class of contractual hazards. Indeed, in his most recent discussion of the TCE agenda, Williamson (1996, p. 3) suggests that “identification, explication, and mitigation of contractual hazards – which take many forms, many of which long went unremarked – are central to the exercise.”