Search results

Employees play a central role in firms’ knowledge transferal, but knowledge-sharing brings significant costs for employees. Thus, this study aims to explore the components of firms’ incentive systems and how these influence employees’ knowledge-sharing, and also to test whether employees’ knowledge-sharing intentions transform into better knowledge transfer performance at the firm level.

This study collected data in China, and 219 usable questionnaires were collected. Then, this study used a structure equation model by LISREL for hypotheses testing.

This study finds that positive economic incentives, positive relational incentives and negative relational incentives all increase employees’ knowledge-sharing intentions, contributing to firms’ improved knowledge-transfer performance. Thus, both positive and negative incentives and both economic and relational incentives exert influences on employees’ knowledge-sharing activities.

Because employees have both material and emotional needs and always want to approach good things and avoid bad things, firms should take measures to make their incentive systems more comprehensive. Then, employees can be motivated to share their knowledge effectively.

Existing studies have mainly explored the effects of positive economic incentives on knowledge transferal. Because individuals have both a promotion self-regulatory focus associated with an approach motivation and a prevention self-regulatory focus associated with an avoidance motivation, and because they have both material and emotional needs, this study classifies incentives into three types and confirms their effectiveness for motivating employees to share knowledge.

Incentives are effective at enhancing productivity, but research also suggests that performance incentives can have “unintended negative consequences” including increases in hazard/injuries, increases in errors, and reduction in cooperation, prosocial behaviors, and creativity. Relatively overlooked is whether, when, and how incentives can be designed to prevent such negative consequences. The authors review literature in several disciplines (construction, healthcare delivery, economics, psychology, and [some] management) on this issue. This chapter, in toto, sheds a generally positive light and suggests that, beyond productivity, incentives can be used to improve other outcomes such as safety, quality, prosocial behaviors, and creativity, particularly when the incentives are thoughtfully designed. The review concludes with several potential fruitful areas for future research such as investigations of incentive-effect duration.

The purpose of this paper is to address how context for malingering and the provision of incentives influence malingered symptom profiles of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

A 2 (case context)×3 (incentive) factorial design was utilized. Participants (n=298) were given an incentive (positive, negative, or no incentive), randomly assigned to a criminal or civil context, and asked to provide a fake claim of child abuse with corresponding malingered symptoms of PTSD. Under these conditions, participants completed several questionnaires pertaining to symptoms of trauma and PTSD.

Results indicated that negative incentives were primarily associated with lower symptom scores. Therefore, “having something to lose” may result in more constrained (and realistic) symptom reports relative to exaggeration evidenced with positive incentives.

These results have implications for forensic settings where malingered claims of PTSD are common and incentives for such claims (e.g. having something to gain or lose) frequently exist. Previous studies have failed to address incentives (positive and negative) in relation to a crime (i.e. abuse) that can span both criminal and civil contexts.

While the potential of human resource practices (HRPs) for promoting performance is widely recognized, even though crucial, employees’ assessment of HRPs remains under-researched, especially in emerging economies. Hence, the purpose of this research is to examine the influence of employee satisfaction with HRPs on job performance through the mediating role of job dedication (JD) and the moderating role of incentive gamification.

The current research adopts a quantitative method. Specifically, using a questionnaire survey, 418 valid responses collected (through purposive sampling) via cross-sectional method from the employees of Nigerian Information and Communication Technology (ICT) firms were used to test the research hypotheses empirically.

The results revealed that satisfaction with HRPs has a positive influence on job performance. Satisfaction with human resource practices has a positive influence on job dedication. Job dedication has a positive influence on job performance. The link between employees’ satisfaction with human resource practices and job performance is mediated by job dedication. The link between satisfaction with human resource practices and job dedication is moderated by incentive gamification, that is, the positive link is stronger when incentive gamification is high. The link between satisfaction with human resource practices and job performance is moderated by incentive gamification, that is, the positive link is stronger when incentive gamification is high.

The current study highlights the importance of employees’ assessments of human resource practices, which may be used to promote employee dedication, which in turn results in improved performance. The findings are helpful to open the black box of the impact of satisfaction with HRPs on job performance. The results also offer important new valuable guidance for practitioners and will aid the management of human resource practice design, audits, and communication.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects that the framing of contractual performance incentives have on supplier’s behavioural and relational responses and on the buyer–supplier relationship.

The authors conducted three in-depth case studies of contractual relationships, which exhibit differences in terms of how performance incentives are framed, i.e., using promotion, prevention and “hybrid” frames, respectively. The study involved 38 semi-structured interviews and content analysis of contract agreements.

First, while promotion-framed incentives lead to positive supplier responses and improved relationships, prevention-framed incentives result in negative responses and deteriorating relations. Second, hybrid-framed incentives can lead to productive supplier responses when positive ex ante expectations are met, although the creation of such positive expectations in the first place depends on the proportionality of bonus and penalty elements. Third, promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives do not by default lead to positive effects, as these are contingent on factors pertaining to contractual clarity. Fourth, the overarching purpose of the contract moderates the effects of contract framing on supplier responses.

The study contributes to contracting research by showing how the framing of performance incentives influences supplier behavioural and relational responses. It also extends the existing literature on contract framing by examining the effects of hybrid-framed incentives, and stressing that contract framing should be considered in joint with the clarity and overall purpose of the contract to elicit desired supplier behaviours.

Managers of buying firms may differentiate their approach to contract framing depending on the type of supplier relationship in focus. Furthermore, effective design of promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives requires attention to: realistic performance targets (on the short, medium and long term); salient bonuses related to these targets; incentive structures that appropriately balance rewards and risks; and: mechanisms that explicate and consider uncontrollable factors in the calculation of bonus–malus payments.

The paper extends the literature stressing the psychological impact of contracts on buyer–supplier relationships by highlighting that contractual clarity and the overarching purpose of the contract moderate the effects of contract framing on supplier behavioural and relational responses.

The purpose of this paper is to put forward a multi-stage information aggregation method based on grey inspiriting control lines to evaluate the objects dynamically and comprehensively.

According to the evaluation value of the objects, the positive and negative incentive lines were set up and the predicted values were solved based on the grey GM(1, 1) model, so the value with expected information could be evaluated. In the evaluation, the part above the positive incentive line should be “rewarded” and that below the negative incentive line should be “punished” appropriately. Thereby the double incentive effects of “the current development situation and future development trend” to objects could be implemented on the basis of control.

This method can primarily describe the decision maker's expectancy of the development of evaluation objects and make the evaluation results have better practical application value.

Many comprehensive evaluations were always based on the past information. However, the future development trend of the evaluated object is also very important. This study can be used in the evaluation for future application and development.

The paper succeeds in providing not only a method of multi-phase information aggregation with expectancy information, but also a simple and convenient method solving nonlinear inspiring lines objectively.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interaction effect between customer satisfaction and monetary incentives on online reviews and test the moderating effect of personal characteristics, filling the research gap in online review behavior from the senders.

Using a project role-playing technique that is widely applied in the marketing field, the authors conducted two experimental studies in a laboratory setting with student subjects and collected 390 and 362 acceptable samples for analysis in Studies 1 and 2, respectively.

This research confirms the positive effects of satisfaction and incentives on review scores and tests the interaction effect between satisfaction and incentives on review scores with the moderating effects of moral judgment and sensitivity of promotion. Incentives could strengthen customers’ review scores except under small incentives situation where dissatisfied customers decrease scores instead. Additionally, the moderating effects of moral judgment and sensitivity of promotion are more significant in the case of dissatisfaction.

As this study focuses exclusively on a single service context and uses student samples, limitations persist regarding the generalizability of the results.

The research provides new insights for marketers on designing effective incentive programs, as well as how to better balance costs and benefits in promotion strategies.

This is one of the first studies to explore the interaction effect between satisfaction and incentives on online reviews considering the moderating effects of moral judgment and sensitivity of promotion. As a result, a new model is forwarded.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between corporate risk and the interaction between CEO incentive compensation and CEO overconfidence.

This empirical study performs random and fixed effect (FE) regression analysis. It uses option-implied measures of CEO overconfidence.

The authors contribute to the existing literature by showing (1) that the positive association between high CEO incentive compensation and corporate risk only exists in the sphere of overconfident CEOs and (2) that the positive association between overconfident CEOs and corporate risk only exists in the sphere of high CEO incentive compensation. The authors show that the combination of high CEO incentive compensation and CEO overconfidence is associated with an increase in corporate risk of approximately 6% while the individual effects are for all practical reasons negligible. The results imply that only the combination of high CEO incentive compensation and CEO overconfidence is associated with a significantly elevated level of corporate risk.

The findings are based on S&P 1500 non-financial firms in the period 2007–2016.

The findings have important implications in terms of CEO selection and compensation.

This study provides empirical evidence on the importance of the dual presence of high CEO incentive compensation and CEO overconfidence for corporate risk. The previous literature has primarily investigated these phenomena in isolation.

Prior studies on the impact of incentives on physicians’ online participation mainly focused on different incentives while ignoring the difficulty of setting monetary incentives efficiently. Based on goal-setting theory, the current research examines the relationship between incentives with goals of varying difficulty and professional health knowledge sharing (PHKS) in online health knowledge-sharing platforms (OHKSPs).

Four field experiments with different monetary incentives were conducted by one of China’s largest OHKSPs, with whom the researchers cooperated in data collection. Monthly panel data on 10,584 physicians were collected from September 2018 to December 2019. There were 9,376 physicians in the treatment group and 1,208 in the control group. The authors used a difference-in-difference (DID) model to explore the research question based on the same control group and the Chow test with seemingly unrelated estimation (sureg) to compare regression coefficients between four groups. Several robustness checks were performed to validate the main results, including a relative time model, multiple falsification tests and a DID estimation using the propensity score matching method.

The results show that the monetary incentive significantly positively affected the volume of physicians’ PHKS directly with negative spillover to the duration of physicians’ PHKS. Moreover, the positive effect of incentives with higher difficulty on the volume of physicians’ PHKS was significantly smaller than that of incentives with low difficulty. Finally, professional title had a positive moderating effect on the volume of goal difficulty setting and did not significantly moderate the effect on the duration of physicians’ PHKS.

Some limitations of this study are: firstly, because the field experiments were enterprise benefit oriented, the treatment and control groups were not balanced. Secondly, the experiments for different incentive measures were relatively similar, making it challenging to validate a causal effect. Finally, more consideration should be given to the strategy for setting hierarchical incentives in future research.

The research indicates that monetary incentives have a bilateral effect on PHKS, i.e. a positive direct effect on the volume of physicians’ contributions and a negative spillover effect on the duration of physicians’ PHKS. The professional titles of physicians also moderate such bilateral switches of PHKS. Furthermore, when a physician’s energy is limited, the goal difficulty setting of the incentive mechanism tends to be low. The more difficult the incentives are, the more inefficient the effects on physicians’ PHKS will be.

Empirical research presents conflicting findings with regards to the effectiveness of referral reward programs (RRPs) and supports two alternative and conflicting views on the effectiveness of incentivizing recommendations. They are, first, a positive effect via perceived attractiveness of the incentive, and second, a negative effect via metaperception of the recommendation. The purpose of this paper is to examine these two opposing psychological mechanisms to reconcile the conflicting findings.

The authors conducted three experiments. Study 1 tests the base model. Studies 2 and 3 add moderators to test whether each mediating variable operates exclusively on its intended relationship.

Incentive size enhanced the attractiveness of an incentive, but reduced the metaperception favorability of the recommendation. These two opposing mechanisms operated in parallel, independently and fully mediated the effects of incentive size to likelihood of making a recommendation. Thus, the net impact of incentives on recommendation behavior depended on the relative strengths of these two opposing forces.

The study recommends managers to design RRPs with incentives that recommenders perceive as highly useful (i.e. to increase attractiveness) but have a low face value (i.e. to reduce metaperception concerns) and to target RRPs to strong rather than weak ties.

Our work offers an integrated theoretical account of consumers’ responses to incentivized recommendations and provides managerially relevant guidelines for the design of effective RRPs.