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Carbon dioxide emissions are considered to be one of the main culprits in global warming and the Kyoto Protocol specifically targets reductions in carbon dioxide to reduce global warming. Because the fossil burning electric utility plants are the primary industrial source of carbon dioxide emissions, we examine how effective the U.S. electric utility companies have been in reducing carbon dioxide emissions. We evaluate 1998 carbon dioxide emissions in relation to the emissions of the base year of 1990 set by the Kyoto Protocol. We also examine whether adequate disclosures are being made by the utilities to reflect their pollution performance. The findings show that the total amount of carbon dioxide emissions increased by 35% in 1998 compared to 1990, but on a relative basis, they decreased from 205 to 204lbs/MMBTU. Though we detect some support for a positive association between pollution disclosures and pollution emissions, the electric utilities in general do not disclose much about global warming or carbon dioxide.

This study examines whether the 38 electric utility firms owning the 110 plants targeted by the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) made adequate pollution disclosures to inform the stakeholders whether they met the pollution emission requirements of the Act by the start of its first phase. First, it evaluates pollution emissions of the targeted plans at the start of the first phase of the Act, i.e. 1995. Then, it evaluates whether pollution disclosures of these firms improved leading up to the first phase of the Act. This evaluation is done by comparing pollution disclosures for the start of the first phase, i.e. 1995, with the year the CAA was enacted, i.e. 1990. Pollution emission data are obtained from the Department of Energy and from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and pollution disclosure data for 1989, 1990 and 1995 are obtained from the annual reports and 10Ks. A specifically designed content analysis technique is used to categorize pollution disclosures.

The pollution emissions results indicate that 1995 emissions are significantly lower than 1990 emissions. On an individual plant basis, the results, however, indicated that some plants reduced emissions while others used the permit system. The pollution disclosures results indicate that the 1995 pollution disclosure are comparatively lower than 1990 disclosures. The reason for high disclosures for 1990 could have been to protect the firms against potential legal cases if the requirements were not met. Once the fears of legal actions subsided, pollution disclosures were probably reduced. Lack of consistency and adequacy in pollution disclosures, however, make it difficult for stakeholders to properly evaluate their future risks.

Inspired by the comparison of charity donations among candidates in rural elections, the authors linked the non-profit motives of charity to corporate pollution emissions. And on this basis, the authors aim to provide theoretical and empirical explanations for the relationship between corporate philanthropy and pollution. The authors find that the desire to pursue more pollution emissions stimulates the firm's philanthropy, which is similar to the public welfare donations in rural elections.

Firstly, the authors construct a game-theoretical framework consisting of an entrepreneur and a bureaucrat to study the environmental cost of corporate philanthropy through the impact on pollution emission by the firm. Secondly, the authors used various empirical methods, including hybrid OLS, IV-2SLS, PSM, etc., to empirically test the impact of a firm's philanthropy on corporate pollution emissions. Finally, the authors use the output and abatement input as intermediary variables and apply the intermediary effect model to test the impact mechanism between corporate philanthropy and corporate pollution emissions.

Theoretical model finds that the firm invests more in philanthropy discharges more emissions when the theoretical model is in political equilibrium. Besides, empirical results show that corporate philanthropy will lead to more pollution emissions by reducing abatement input and increasing production. Finally, the heterogeneity test finds that compared with state-owned enterprises, the intention of non-state-owned enterprises' philanthropy for more pollution emission is more obvious. Moreover, the improvement of regional environmental regulation can significantly inhibit the realization of corporate philanthropy's poor motive.

The results have obvious policy implications for China's future policy-making. Firstly, regulatory agencies should pay close attention to the charitable behaviors of firms with serious negative environmental externalities, and prevent them from replacing more pollution emissions with philanthropy. Besides, due to weak environmental supervision in rural areas, rural polluting enterprises will be more inclined to make charitable donations to the village collective to obtain more emission rights. Therefore, the government should strengthen environmental supervision in rural areas to prevent enterprises from wanton pollution.

By constructing a game-theoretical framework consisting of an entrepreneur and a bureaucrat, the authors expound on corporate philanthropy's pollution motivation and decision-making mechanism for the first time in theory. Besides, this paper finds that the desire to pursue more pollution emissions also stimulates the firm's philanthropy. This paper expands the literature on corporate charitable donation motivations.

We examine the effect of firm ownership status on three environmentally relevant variables: energy efficiency, toxic emissions, and spending on pollution abatement. Prior research has demonstrated that public firms invest less than private firms and suggests this difference is due pressure from investors to strongly favor short over long-term earnings. We extend this logic to other firm behavior, examining whether publicly owned facilities invest in energy efficiency and pollution reduction differently than privately owned facilities. Using data from the US Census of Manufactures from 1980 to 2009, information on pollution from the Environmental Protection Agency Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and pollution abatement spending from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey, we find that facilities switching to public ownership are less energy efficient and spend less on pollution abatement than their privately owned counterparts. However, we also find that facilities switching to public ownership have lower toxic emissions than other facilities. We also examine how different sources of external pressures alter these results and find that increased regulatory scrutiny is correlated with increased energy efficiency, toxic emissions, and abatement spending. More concentrated institutional ownership in public firms is associated with lower energy efficiency as is a greater brand focus. These latter results are broadly consistent with the idea that publicly owned firms respond to pressures from investors with a reduced focus on environmentally relevant variables. However, since facilities switching to public ownership have lower toxic emissions, this suggests that there are two competing pressures in publicly owned facilities: cost pressures, consistent with lowered energy efficiency, and public perceptions, consistent with lower toxic emissions, particularly since TRI data became available. In this sense, the combination of ownership and transparency of information appears to influence how firms prioritize different stakeholders.

Tanneries present heavy environmental impacts due to air emissions. Specific quality objectives are fixed by European Directives concerning air and, in particular, volatile organic compounds. The purpose of this paper is to present a proposal for the management of air emissions with a view to achieve quality standards in the Italy's largest tannery district by means of a tradable emissions permits (TEPs) system.

A methodological approach is presented and analysed. The proposed system is based on the “bubble” configuration, which appears to be an effective and feasible application based on the total maximum daily load criterion, supported by the air quality standards or the environmental risk assessment (ERA) procedure.

The TEP system favours technological improvements in the reduction of emissions. The system may not provide a solution to the unpleasant odours deriving from the tanneries, but its application supported by ERA will make it possible to define the admissible levels of air pollution and improve the general state of air quality.

Although the study is not exhaustive and requires further investigation in the economic, legal, administrative and air pollution sectors, it does give the basic elements for a preliminary analysis. The evident lack of experimental data concerning weather and climatic features, intrinsic to exposure assessment, has been pointed out.

This study proposes a methodological pathway aimed at defining the system of tradable permits by verifying the existence and availability of the necessary data. The proposed TEP system can be extended to other homogeneous industrial districts with an appropriate selection of one or more critical parameters.

This chapter investigates how international trade affects pollution using annual data from 34 Asian countries for the period 1970–2019. Following the work of Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001), the authors divide the impact into three effects – scale, technique, and composition effects. The scale of economic activity drives pollution demand. The technique effect reflects increased willingness to bear the costs of abating pollution as a country gets more prosperous because of increased international trade. International trade changes the composition of output in a country and therefore the level of pollution as different goods are produced with different pollution intensities. This is called the composition effect. This chapter measures pollution using carbon dioxide emissions (metric tons per capita) obtained from the United States Energy Information Administration. This study estimates a regression model that provides estimates of the magnitudes of trade’s impact on pollution as per the aforesaid three effects. The authors find that the scale and the composition effects of pollution are positive, but the technique effect is negative, and that the net effect is negative (international trade leads to a lower level of emission) when the underlying model is linear, but it is positive (international trade leads to a higher level of emission when non-linearities are considered).

The purpose of this paper is to provide a solution for greening the supply chain of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by minimising the vehicular pollutant emission in the logistics network.

The paper proposes an optimisation model to reduce the pollution emission in the logistics of supply chain network in SMEs. The work considers vehicle routing and selection of suppliers, manufacturers and assemblers according to the availability of various Bharat Stage Emission Standards type vehicles. Introsort sorting based selection algorithm is used to solve the problem. The proposed solution is implemented using C++ on an experimental data set for analysing the model.

The outcome of the study is a pollution optimisation model for logistics of SMEs. The finding shows an approach to reduce total vehicular pollution emission in the logistics network in meeting the demand. The model is tested over an experimental study, and the result findings show which supply chain entities, type of environmental standard vehicles and vehicle routes are selected for the specific demand.

The proposed model is confined to pollution optimisation with limited parameters only and does not consider cost and other factors that can be included in future work.

The work can be used for limiting pollution in logistics system as the corporate social responsibility of enterprises.

Proposed work presents a sustainable and green solution for pollution control in logistics activities of the SMEs.

We examine the allocation of a pre-determined amount of aid from a donor to two recipient countries. The donor suffers from cross-border pollution resulting from production activities in the recipient countries. It is shown that the recipient with the higher fraction of aid allocated to public abatement and with the lower emission tax, receives a higher share of the aid when the donor allocates aid so as to maximize its own welfare. Competition for aid reduces cross-border pollution to the donor when recipients use the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement as a policy to divert aid from each other. But, it increases cross-border pollution when recipients use the emission tax to divert aid from each other.