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The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of banking scandals in relation to corporate governance (CG) failures in an emerging economy, arguing that Anglo-American ideas of CG are misplaced in traditional settings.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders. Observations of annual general meetings (AGMs) and the personal working experience of one of the researchers, along with documentation, provided triangulating data on CG practices.

The authors have found that both of the banks studied had adopted CG practices contrary to the expectations of the Sri Lankan CG codes. Key features of CG practices that emerged from their investigations of these two scandals are ineffectual central bank regulations, familial boards of directors, ceremonial board meetings, biased auditing practices and manipulative AGMs, relying on traditional structures of accountability centred around families, kin and social networks.

The authors argue, drawing on Weber (1958, 1961, 1968, 1978), that the traditionalist culture mediates the process of rationality in bank governance codes and regulatory frameworks Therefore, practices fall far short of expectations.

The paper builds on the extended critique of shareholder-centric CG models and their transferability to alien contexts. It contributes to the CG studies calling for more appreciation of the need to move beyond the conventional view of CG problems as simply down to conflicts of interests. The authors complement and advance the decoupling debate in CG studies drawing on the Weberian notion of traditionalism.

Austrian Business Cycle theory (ABCT) has lately drawn increased attention as a result of its ability to explain the US financial crisis of 2007–2009. However, its explanatory power is questioned by the Canadian experience of the crisis, where a similarly loose monetary policy to the United States did not give rise to a similarly calamitous outcome. Accounting for this difference points to the necessity of elaborating the political element already contained in ABCT. This task of political science is most fruitfully done by focusing on the regime, that is, the distribution of the state’s offices and powers. These shape the incentives and ideals that move political action toward the financial sector. Though both Canada and the United States have democratic regimes, their origins and historical development have caused these to vary in significant ways. These variances largely clarify why the negative consequences of easy money predicted by ABCT were less pronounced in Canada than the United States.

The supervisory authority of the Bank of England derives from tradition and statute. The interplay of these two factors can be analysed by applying a formalist/anti‐formalist model. In this paper this has been developed to explain the regulatory cycle and the reasons why anti‐formalism has been adopted. Evidence of recent events in the banking industry has been used to support the argument and explain the actions of the Bank of England.

The paper aims to offer an exploration of the Banking Act 1987 which was passed following the failure of Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) in 1984. This Act extended the role of auditors in banking supervision by removing traditional confidentiality constraints and created a new role of “reporting accountant”. The paper seeks to examine the origin and development of these new reporting roles. In addition, the paper considers the extent to which the findings of this historical investigation might contribute to current debates on the role of auditors in banking supervision.

The paper draws on official documents, personal accounts of individuals responsible for dealing with the JMB crisis, and semi‐structured interviews conducted with audit partners and banking supervisors who had direct experience of implementing the supervisory reforms instituted under the Banking Act 1987. Power's explanatory schema of controversy, closure and credibility is adopted as a framework for the analysis of documentary sources and interview data.

The failure of JMB generated sufficient controversy so as to require reform of the system of banking supervision. The paper shows that JMB was a controversy since it disturbed what went before and carried with it sufficient allies for change. To achieve closure of the controversy, agreement by key actors about changes to the nature of the role of auditors was required to ensure legitimacy for the reforms. Backstage work undertaken by the auditing profession and the Bank of England provided the necessary credibility to renormalise practice around the new supervisory arrangements.

The paper develops Power's schema which is then employed to analyse the emergence of the new role of reporting accountant and extended role for auditors in UK banking supervision. The paper provides empirical evidence on the processes of controversy, closure and credibility that help to ensure the legitimacy of accounting and auditing change.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate conceptualizations of Europeanization, the difficulties this creates when assessing the impacts of the European Union (EU) on member states and the influence member states have on the EU policy‐making processes. There are also problems when considering questions regarding the basis of Europeanization in terms of its relationships with globalization, governance, institutionalization, polity, politics and policy.

Different conceptualizations of Europeanization concentrate on distinct methodological positions and whether Europeanization may best be understood as “situation” or “process”. Indeed, difficulties are further exacerbated when identifying the extent that drivers for change at the EU and domestic level involved Europeanization, domestication, globalization and/or European integration. Meso theory identifies “process” and substantive theory “situation” in terms of downloading (En1), up‐loading (En2) and cross‐loading (En3). Each of these conceptualizations allow “situations” where empirical reliability could be made explicit from a particular perspective.

This paper investigates and assesses the Europeanization of UK financial services and provides a conceptualization of Europeanization as both meso (middle range) and substantive theory. By breaking down meso theory into substantive theories (up‐loading, downloading and cross‐loading) the analysis attempts to clarify the interaction between Europeanization, globalization and domestication in relation to impacts on UK financial services regulation. Following an assessment of UK financial services in general, this paper concentrates on the concept of “competent authority” and how the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) displays attributes outlined in the directives. Through an analysis of the Third Life Assurance Directive, Second Banking Directive and FSA this paper identifies a number of issues relating to how the EU responded to sector demands and how Europeanization is actualized through domestic response.

Europeanization indicates a continual interaction or dialectic between the uniformity of the EU and the diversity of the individual member states. The process involves interaction between global, domestic and European variables with the European dimension in relation to domestic interpretation providing a mechanism whereby dominant economic global factors can be diminished or enabled.

In the early 1980s Tesco had provisionally agreed plans with the property developer, Provincial Properties Wales, to build a new store in Barry. Michael Hepker, the owner of Ravensbury Investments, was keen to buy into the project and persuaded Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) to lend him the capital to purchase Provincial Properties. JMB were to have the store as security for the loan. Unfortunately, planning permission for the building was refused, but, if accusations subsequently made in the House of Commons are to be believed, this fact was never disclosed to JMB. The bank never thought to check on the progress of the building work, so it remained blissfully unaware that its loan was unsecured. At the same time, JMB was lending ever increasing amounts to another client, who was later convicted of fraud in New York in October 1994. Together these two concentrated exposures exhausted JMB's capital base, so that when repayments started to dry up the bank faced collapse. The Bank of England (the Bank), as lender of last resort and UK supervisor of the banking industry, became concerned because JMB was regarded as playing a key role in maintaining the UK's central position in the international gold bullion market. The Bank feared a run on gold deposits which might have spread to the ordinary and unconnected deposit‐taking industry and perhaps led to a currency crisis. The markets were already edgy after the collapse of Continental Illinois National Bank in the USA, which had prompted a run on the dollar, and so the Bank believed it might have been difficult to persuade the markets that JMB's problems were confined to its lending business only. As a result of the JMB debacle, Barry never got its Tesco's and the Bank of England found itself obliged to rescue JMB using money from the government and City institutions.

The deregulation of international banking and financial markets has raised a number of concerns about their fragility and risk of collapse through systemic contagion. A large amount of research has been conducted to explore policy solutions to this problem. However, there is little work in the literature which attempts to understand the various components and dimensions of systemic risk. This paper develops a comprehensive understanding of systemic risk, by using the theoretical framework provided by Perrow in his seminal book, ‘Normal Accidents’. It elaborates and exposes three of the central components — risk, complexity and coupling, which together make the modern global financial system significantly fragile. It is hoped that this understanding will create a common basis for future discussions of systemic risk and also help towards developing policy reforms.

The Central Bank of Argentina began its activities in May 1935 surrounded by controversy. The Bank was created as a result of a mission led by the expert from the Bank of England, Sir Otto Niemeyer. The foreign involvement in the origins of the bank was not welcome to a good part of the Argentine society. Finally, the project for a central bank approved by the Argentine Congress was not the one proposed by Sir Otto Niemeyer, but a version of it that contained crucial modifications introduced by Raúl Prebisch. The aim of this work is to highlight Prebisch’s ideas on monetary and banking matters by analyzing the differences with the ideas of Sir Otto Niemeyer around monetary policy and the characteristics of the future Central Bank of Argentina. Even if there were almost no direct debates between them, there were different visions and indirect contentions that can be traced in the writings of both, which on the side of Prebisch were published in the Revista Económica del Banco de la Nación Argentina and some government documents, and on Niemeyer’s side can be traced in some writings and correspondence regarding his visit to Argentina, held in the archives of the Bank of England.

This special issue contains selected extracts from Marketing and Selling Bank Services, a learning resource from MCB University Press designed to help practising bank managers to refine and apply bank marketing skills. Competition in financial services is growing and an organisation's ability to market and sell its services is essential for success. Marketing, marketing channels, service levels, pricing, communication with customers, persuading the customer, creating an effective salesforce, interviewing the customer, and international banking are all aspects that are discussed. Suggestions for action are made to enable a manager to put into effect some of the ideas presented.