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Feng found that political institutions (operationalized in terms of political repression, political instability and policy uncertainty) do matter for economic growth by constraining individuals’ decisions in their marketplace (Feng, 2003, p. 296). Political stability is also an important element among the World Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. as part of the World Bank project to assess good governance in 1996. Economic well-being is also dependent on political stability and consistency in governance policy. Loss of economic and political confidence is therefore accepted as a factor affecting economic well-being of a society. How far these hypotheses are supported or negated by evidence from Northeast region of India that has witnessed insurgency for six decades now is the object of enquiry in this chapter. Alongside pure economic indicators such as Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) and FDI, this article looks at the play of political factors like stability of governments in the representative democratic paradigm sanctioned by the Constitution of India in the Northeastern states of India during the decade 2006–2016.

Illegitimacy is widely identified as a cause of revolution and other forms of transformative political change, yet when and how it affects these processes is ambiguous. We examine when and how illegitimacy affects the stability of political regimes through a historical analysis of South Africa's National Party (NP) and its apartheid regime, which lasted from 1948 to 1994. Many scholars of South Africa identify the regime's illegitimacy as a catalyst for the end of apartheid. Yet, consistent with assertions that illegitimacy does not result in political instability, the NP maintained power for decades despite a domestic crisis of legitimacy and a global movement that decried the apartheid regime's illegitimacy. Interrogating this contradiction, we detail how the regime's illegitimacy contributed to the negotiated revolution in South Africa when it resulted in unacceptable costs for the allies that the government depended on for survival, motivating those allies to withdraw support. Building on our findings, we detail how turning attention to the ways that illegitimacy affects relationships with allies – rather than particular outcomes, such as revolution or state failure – allows us to account for variation in both when and how illegitimacy matters.

Data on economic variables are drawn from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) Yearbook (Edward, 2008; Carson, 2000, 2002, 2004; McLenaghan, 1992, 1995) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Statistics Department (1964, 1973, 1981, 1983). The economic variables that I obtained from the IFS are GDP, gross domestic investment, and government expenditures. The IMF values for the variables are in current prices. The current values are non-comparable across countries due to the different amounts of inflation across nations over time. I converted all data to constant values with the year 1985 as a base year using the GDP deflator provided by the IFS. For countries that do not have GDP deflators for the period (1960–2002), I used the consumer price index (CPI)² provided by the same source. In addition, the values for the variables are converted from their respective national currencies to U.S. dollars. Some countries in Latin America posed problems when I conducted the conversion process because they arbitrarily changed their national currencies several times from 1960 to 2002. These currency changes made it very difficult in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico to draw reliable conclusions from the empirical analysis. Several countries – Chile, Indonesia, Liberia, Mauritius, Madagascar, the Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia – have numerous missing values that made their time series fall below the required span for appropriate time series analysis. These nine countries were dropped from the NLS analysis, which reduced the number of countries involved in the NLS analysis to sixty countries. However, these nine countries were included in the CNTS analysis.

This concluding chapter summarizes the critical insights that changemakers ought to consider in their attempt to lead and manage cocreation processes and enhance their impact. The chapter also addresses three crucial challenges to the advent of a sustainable future: the need to rethink the assumptions of mainstream economics, the need to secure political stability in times of rapid societal change; and the demand for the deepening democracy. Finally, the chapter argues that local efforts to build a sustainable future will only succeed if key economic, political, and democratic challenges are effectively dealt with at the global and national levels.

This chapter assesses the extent to which historical levels of inequality affect the creation and survival of businesses over time. To this end, we use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey across 66 countries over 2005–2011. We complement this survey with data on income inequality dating back to early 1800s and current institutional environment, such as the number of procedures to start a new business, countries’ degree of financial inclusion, corruption and political stability. We find that, although inequality increases the number of firms created out of need, inequality reduces entrepreneurial activity as in net terms businesses are less likely to be created and survive over time. These findings are robust in using different measures of inequality across different points in time and regions, even if excluding Latin America, the most unequal region in the world. Our evidence then supports theories that argue early conditions, crucially inequality, influence development path.

Any endeavor to circumscribe, with a certain degree of precision, the nature of the relationship between social science and critical theory would appear to be daunting. Over the course of the past century, and especially since the end of World War II, countless efforts have been made in economics, psychology, political science, and sociology, to illuminate the myriad manifestations of modern social life, from a multiplicity of angles. It is doubtful that it would be possible to do justice to all the different variants of social science, in an assessment of their relationship to critical theory. Moreover, given the proliferation of critical theories since the 1980s, the effort to devise a “map” that would reflect the particular orientations and intricacies of each approach to critical theory also would be exacting, in its own right.¹

Any endeavor to circumscribe, with a certain degree of precision, the nature of the relationship between social science and critical theory would appear to be daunting. Over the course of the past century, and especially since the end of World War II, countless efforts have been made in economics, psychology, political science, and sociology to illuminate the myriad manifestations of modern social life from a multiplicity of angles. It is doubtful that it would be possible to do justice to all the different variants of social science in an assessment of their relationship to critical theory. Moreover, given the proliferation of critical theories since the 1980s, the effort to devise a “map” that would reflect the particular orientations and intricacies of each approach to critical theory would also be exacting in its own right.¹

The contribution starts out from the question whether the political legitimacy of the Third Wave democracies has suffered in the wake of the Great Recession. The expectation of a damaging effect of an economic or political crisis on legitimacy is based on Lipset’s assumption that established democracies with a high degree of political legitimacy are better capable of coping with such crises than young democracies. The database includes two surveys of members of parliament conducted in 2007 and 2013 in Sweden, Germany and five Third Wave democracies located in different world regions (Chile, South Korea, Poland, South Africa and Turkey). Waves 5 and 6 of the World Values Survey that were conducted at about the same time were used for comparing the legitimacy beliefs among MPs and citizens. The data show that the scores for all indicators of political legitimacy are higher among MPs than among citizens and that the differences between the two groups of respondents are considerably larger in the five young democracies. Confidence in political parties is fairly low, especially among citizens, while the evaluation of the quality of democracy in the respondents’ country is much higher. Both evaluations have been rather stable over time. In the two established democracies, support for democracy among citizens is nearly as high as among MPs. In the five young democracies, the MP-citizen differential is larger and support for democracy in the population shows a steady increase only in Chile, while it has remained low in Poland and Turkey and even decreased in Korea and South Africa. This indicates that democracy has not taken deep roots in four of the five new democracies included in the study. In Korea and South Africa, the decline in support for democracy started already before the onset of the economic crisis and therefore cannot be attributed to the recession. This is confirmed by the lack of a statistical relationship between political legitimacy on one side and economic evaluations on the other side. A multiple regression analysis shows strong country-specific effects, while individual-level variables have only minor effects.