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The purpose of this paper was to assess the similarities and differences between the Political Parties and the Access to Information Acts in Malawi. While political parties are largely funded by donations that are frequently kept as a secret, the Access to Information Act does not include political party funding among the categories of non-disclosed information.

This paper is based on the qualitative content analysis of the legislation in Malawi. Content analysis of the two pieces of legislation was adopted. This paper is a review of the literature and an examination of Malawi's Political Parties and Access to Information Acts. The document study was supplemented by a review of related literature on the two legislations.

The Political Parties Act prohibits the government, ministries and departments from directly or indirectly funding political parties. The Access to Information Act to ensure information generated by Malawi government ministries, departments and agencies is readily made available by the citizens when needed or requested. The Access to Information Act does not exempt political parties from disclosing their funding sources. The two acts work in tandem to promote accountability and transparency in political party funding and sources.

This study is limited to Malawi's Political Parties and Access to Information Acts. Only the South African related acts have informed the paper. However, several acts within developing countries would have greatly aided the paper.

The implementation of the two pieces of legislation has implications for the balance between disclosure and non-disclosure of political party funding. Oversight functions and credible human resource capacity are needed in both political parties and government enforcement institutions.

Oversight functions by the Administrator-General through the Registrar of Political Parties and the Malawi Human Rights Commission are key to the implementation of Malawi's Political Parties and Access to Information Acts, respectively. Proper enforcement of the oversight functions is expected to result in an open, transparent and accountable Malawian society.

Various players are needed in the accountability chain to protect disclosure and non-disclosure of information. Very little information is known on the powers, functions and duties of office bearers capable of enforcing legislation to keep political parties' funding clean. Little is known on how the citizens can access information regarding political parties funding.

This paper aims to assess the Section 12 of the Political Party Funding Act No. 6 of 2018 of South Africa with a view of recommending good records management practice.

This paper is based on a literature review and an analysis of political funding access to information and records management literatures.

The study found that a lack of good records management practice is hindering transparency in government practice in South Africa. Furthermore, the enactment of the Political Party Funding Act No. 6 of 2018 has created the potential for South Africa political parties to start applying good records management practices.

This research is limited to Section 12 of the political parties funding Act No 6 of 2018 to promote accountability transparency.

The effective implementation of the Political Party Funding Act, 2018 will contribute to the preservation of records with financial, historical and cultural values.

The implementation of the Political Party Funding Act No. 6 of 2018 Section 12 is expected to lead an open, transparent and accountable South African society through the establishment of a a records management programme.

This paper raises important considerations around ensuring compliance and accountability in government recordkeeping within the context of recent legislation. While discussion around the importance and use of records management is not new, the legislation brings an opportunity for fresh discussion within a national political context.

The purpose of this paper is to examine politically exposed persons and major Greek political parties' funding sources as well as the anti-money laundering regulatory framework for political parties' funding sources.

This paper aimed at investigating data about Greek political parties' funding by identifying new problems and developing solutions.

The main findings are that Greek political parties' major sources of revenues are public subsidies and bank loans. Also, data show that two major Greek political parties cannot easily repay their bank loans (especially PASOK) and must renegotiate terms with banks and must agree for a new, long-term and lower payment schedule at a lower interest rate. Extending the period of repayment is necessary for viability of debts, and banks will protect themselves against default and total losses of about 253.1 million euros from the two major political parties. Public subsidies are the only collateral that Greek political parties offer to banks.

As a result of research, structural changes are necessary to immediately be made in order to cope with politically exposed persons and political parties' corruption and funding in Greece, especially during the current fiscal crises. Greek political parties need to raise funds from other sources than only public subsidies. Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework have to stop conduit contributions and force banks to apply Know Your Client Principle for donors. Also, to include on Suspicious Activity Report a checkbox of “Political Finance Violations”. Establishing a code of conduct informing employees of the risks and subsequences of political corruption, creating a culture of honesty and high ethics and implementing Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with corruption in political parties' funding can help to recover ill-gotten assets. Finally, implementing Business Principles for Countering Bribery and UK Bribery Act will increase transparency in funding of Greek political parties.

The paper examines corruption and funding sources of Greek political parties, especially during the period 2009-2011, suggesting policy measures to deter and detect money laundering and illegal funding to politically exposed persons and political parties. Findings offer important measures for political analysts, government and society as a whole. A stable political system is prerequisite for a healthy society and for economic growth.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the reasons why Law no. 195 of 2 May 1974, which established a system of public funding for the Italian political parties, introduced a system of controls that was light touch in nature.

The paper integrates the theoretical framework on regulatory space, proposed by Hancher and Moran (1989), with that of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) to explain the peculiar nature of the system of controls introduced by the Law. Moreover, a set of primary and secondary sources is used to provide a full comprehension of the context, of the relationships among the actors involved in the regulatory process, and of the nature of the regulated issues.

Besides showing that the nature of the output of a regulatory process can be understood as the effect of the peculiar configuration of the regulatory space in which it takes place, the study also sheds light on the role that legitimation can play with regard to the other features of the regulatory space, namely on its ability to strengthen or to limit their effects on the output of the regulatory process.

The paper deals with accounting and political parties which is a much underexplored topic in the field of accounting history. In addition, from a theoretical standpoint it contributes to extending the theoretical framework by Hancher and Moran (1989).

A primary tool for managing the democratic risks posed by political donations is disclosure. In Australia, corporate donations are disclosed in government databases. Despite the potential accountability benefits, corporations are not, however, required to report this information in their annual or stand-alone reports. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the quantity and quality of voluntary reporting and seek to add to the nascent theoretical understanding of voluntary corporate political donations.

Corporate donors were obtained from the Australian Electoral Commission database. Annual and stand-alone reports were analysed to determine the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures and compared to O’Donovan’s (2002) legitimation disclosure response matrix.

Of those companies with available reports, only 25 per cent reported any donation information. Longitudinal results show neither a robust increase in disclosure levels over time, nor a clear relationship between donation activity and disclosure. The findings support a legitimation tactic being applied to political donation disclosures.

The findings suggest that disclosure of political donations in corporate reports should be mandatory. Such reporting could facilitate aligning shareholder and citizen interests; aligning managerial and firm interests and closing disclosure loopholes.

The study extends the literature by evaluating donation disclosures by companies known to have made donations, considering time-series data and theorising the findings.

This paper aims to investigate the prevalence of corruption in Ghana to understand how and why it has turned public procurement into a mere money-making scheme instead of a means to provide needed public goods and services.

The study focuses on Ghana as a case study and mobilizes the monetization of politics lenses. Data are collected via interviews with key officials across the procurement sector (including the government, donors and civil society), documents, documentaries and news articles.

The findings suggest that the increasing costs of elections and political financing coupled with the costs of vote-buying, which has become informally institutionalized, intensify corruption practices and, consequently, turns public procurement into a mere source of cash for political ends. Political appointments and legalized loopholes facilitate this by helping to nullify the safeguard accounting and other control institutions are designed to provide. Likewise, enduring poverty and rising inequality “force” citizens into a vote-buying culture which distorts democratic premises that may drive out unscrupulous politicians; thus, perpetuating capture schemes. Civil society's efforts to remedy these have had little success, and corruption and inequality remain rife.

The main practical implication of the study lies in the need for a gradual demonetization of elections, and the consideration of the fundamental function of public procurement as a policy instrument embedded in economic, social, cultural and environmental plans. Additionally, given the connectedness of the various corruption issues raised, a comprehensive system-based approach in dealing with them would be more effective than a piecemeal approach targeting each issue/problem in isolation.

While extant literature has examined the issue of endemic corruption in developing countries using state capture, few have attempted to explain why it remains enduring, particularly in public procurement. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on corruption and state capture theoretically and empirically by drawing on monetization of politics from political science to explain why corruption and state capture endure in certain contexts (with Ghana as an illustrative example) which reduce public procurement to a cash-milking scheme.

This paper aims to investigate how money in politics contributes to corruption in Malaysia.

This study used in-depth semi-structured interviews to collect primary data. The interviews were conducted with two elite groups comprising seven politicians and seven corporate leaders. Data were then analysed using a thematic analysis approach.

The findings indicate how money in politics contributes to corruption in Malaysia. Various types of corruption in the country are identified, namely political donation, bribery and money politics. This study also provides evidence of the underlying factors driving money politics.

This paper offers valuable insights to policymakers and enforcement agencies for vigorous prosecution or appropriate sanction against the perpetrators. Especially on the weak regulation of political finance in Malaysia, this paper provides insights into how the weakness is used to manufacture corruption.

This paper provides evidence of how money politics cultivate corrupt activities, which are relatively sensitive and controversial by nature. The rarely obtained views from the elite groups provide a significant value to research.

This chapter discusses the growing use of social media during election campaigns in Ghana. It examines how social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter became preferred tools for voter engagement, mobilisation and campaign for political parties and their presidential and parliamentary candidates in the 2020 elections in Ghana. It establishes that social media are gradually surpassing traditional/legacy media as the preferred media choice for political mobilisation, civic engagement and political communication in Ghana. The chapter reviews the European Union Election Observation Mission (EOM) report through social media affordance lens. This chapter attempts to answer two critical questions: To what extent did political parties and presidential candidates in Ghana use social media in electioneering campaigns during the 2020 elections and, which social media platforms were highly preferred by political parties and presidential candidates in engaging the electorate? The EOM's data indicators show the prominence of Facebook and Twitter as significant in political party campaigns during the period under study. Preliminary analysis also points out that the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) and their presidential candidate, Nana Akufo Addo including the opposition National Democratic Congress and their leader, John Dramani Mahama, spent thousands of dollars on Facebook advertisements for extensive voter mobilisation.