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The purpose of the article is to outline the insights provided by Alan Fox in Man Mismanagement in relation to the rise of the New Right political economy and the spread of unitarist managerialism. The article assesses the contemporary work and employment relations implications of mismanagement arising from a “second wave” of the New Right ideology from 2010 in the UK.

Responding to the Special Issue on Alan Fox, the article focuses on Alan Fox's book Man Mismanagement, considering industrial relations developments arising between the 1st (1974b) and 2nd (1985) editions relating to the political rise of the New Right. It reviews various literature that illustrates the contemporary IR relevance of the book and Fox's insights.

The New Right’s ideology has further fragmented work, disjointed labour rights and undermined collective industrial relations institutions, and macho mismanagement praxis is even more commonplace, compared to when Fox wrote Man Mismanagement. The stripping away of the institutional architecture of IR renders the renewal of pluralist praxis, like collective bargaining and other forms of joint regulation of work, a formidable task.

The value of the article relates to the identification of dramatic historical industrial relations events and change in the UK in Alan Fox's book Man Mismanagement, most notably relating to the rise to power of the Thatcherite New Right in 1979. Originality is evidenced by the authors’ drawing on Fox's ideas and assessing the implications of the “second wave” of the New Right in the contemporary industrial relations (IR) context of the 2020s under the conceptual themes of fragmented work, disjointed labour rights and undermined collectivism.

To date, only two counties in the United States have filed for bankruptcy protection: Orange County, California (1994) and Greene County, Alabama (1996). This case study pertains only to Greene County. Although economic decline due to a loss of gaming revenues was involved, financial mismanagement was the primary causal factor for Greene County’s fiscal stress. This research chronicles an impoverished rural Alabama county whose legislative and administrative decisions resulted in its fiscal stress and municipal bankruptcy. The Greene County bankruptcy case was closed in 1999 and the County continues to operate under a fiscal recovery plan. However, the County has yet to comply with the miscellaneous provisions of the bankruptcy plan that could improve the financial management of the County.

To shed light on the political economy aspect of post‐conflict reconstruction in Iraq and illustrate how bad governance and economic mismanagement has devastated a country once endowed with abundant natural and human resources.

The wealth of heritage, culture, and economy that Iraq enjoyed is highlighted. The paper presents a brief overview of economic mismanagement, corruption, and political blunders of Saddam Hussein's regime, which led to sapping the country of its wealth and degraded its human resources. In view of that, the political impediments to the reconstruction process are outlined. Hence, the significance of democratic and participatory approaches to sustainable development.

The paper reveals that the years of oppressive, myopic, and self‐serving policies of Saddam Hussein's regime have incapacitated Iraq and its people. Income per capita in 2003 was less than 15 percent of its value in 1980 and Iraq's debt amounted to about 600 percent of national output. The paper also indicates that international, regional, and local politics has been the primary hindrance to Iraq's reconstruction and development.

If history is any guide, the peoples of all non‐democratic and corrupt regimes throughout the world ought to heed the lessons imparted by the Saddam's model of governance, that is, sustainable economic development and improving the standards of living can best be attained through democratic and participatory governance.

The purpose of this study is to answer the research question: How do cooperative organizations perform when created by government fiat in an emerging market? Through the use of institutional and agency theory, this paper presents a comparative analysis of the efficiency of the cooperative form of organization and investor-owned firms-investigating how the social–political structures in a community affect the efficiency of cooperatives vis-à-vis investor-owned firms. This paper also attempts to offer a better understanding of how government quality and organizational size influence performance outcomes between different organizational forms specifically in the Philippines.

The empirical analysis of this study was conducted among electric distribution utilities in the Philippines. Firm-level data was generated for 133 distributors, consisting of 119 electric cooperatives and 14 investor-owned companies. Panel data regressions were ran to test all hypotheses.

Cooperative organizations operate at a less efficient rate than investor-owned firms in the Philippines, even when controlling for firm-specific factors such as size, customer density and profitability. In addition, the efficiency of these cooperative organizations is more strongly influenced by the quality of the local government than investor-owned firms.

Positive externalities generated by the propagation of cooperatives on local communities may be based primarily on our understanding of how cooperatives have functioned largely in western contexts. Within the context of Southeast Asia, where national socio-political structures may be more dysfunctional, this paper observes that there is an equivalent negative externality caused by the tendency of cooperatives to replicate the political mismanagement of the community around it.

A second authority structure, called a management system, is emerging in the technological milieu of the information age. The new construct, that operates in a framework of Judaeo‐Christian ethics, must replace the political system. This latter mechanism is the original authority structure which has traditionally been bounded by situation ethics. Supplanting the political system with the management system is an essential condition in the knowledge‐based economies of advanced societies if they are to achieve their full productive potential.

The presence of political corruption possibly predates the historical record. For years, it was viewed as an artifact of political development, a common malignancy that nations would naturally reject as a function of their respective national maturations; this was one of the underlying theses of the American progressive movement. However, this cleansing has been neither as straightforward nor as natural as its proponents would argue. An anti-corruption coalition established in the 1990 under the umbrella of Transparency International (TI) has brought a new light on the world of political corruption. TI annually publishes a Corruption Perception Index that in 2001 ranked over 90 nations in terms of their perceived political corruptions. Peter Eigen, the TI Chairman, observed that “There is no end in sight to the misuse of power by those in public office – and corruption levels are perceived to be as high as ever in both the developed and developing nations” (Transparency International Press Release, 2001).¹

Aims to examine the changes to budgetary control and performance monitoring in the context of a series of World Bank sponsored public sector reforms.

The paper uses a longitudinal study of a state enterprise (the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC)) in which the World Bank‐sponsored reforms were imposed. This paper especially draws on the dialectic of control from structuration theory.

The paper shows that budgetary practices at the GFDC did not change substantially, with the exception of the reporting practices. Budgeting remained politicised, delayed, directionless and ineffective. Reporting to the monitoring agency did not make any positive changes to accountability and performance and was thereby unable to serve public interests.

With hindsight, the authors wished they had undertaken more in‐depth investigations of workers' and farmers' roles in whole performance contracting scenarios and public sector reforms at the GFDC. The failure so to do was mainly because of a shortage of time and the difficulty of obtaining relevant data.

This paper has raised a number of important but neglected issues concerning the public sector reforms in less developed countries (LDCs) for aid agencies and policy makers.

This paper demonstrates the usefulness of Giddens' idea of the dialectic of control in the contextual study of management controls, including budgeting and performance in the public sector in LDCs. Also, the paper makes an important contribution highlighting the public interest role of management controls especially in the context of public sector reforms.

In line with contemporary trends in the developing world, countries in South Asia are under pressure from both political and civil societies and the international donor community to recast their administrative systems. New tools and practices in public governance have been advanced to remedy structural deficiencies, procedural flaws, managerial incompetence, and weak accountability in the public sector. International organizations emphasize the need to improve the relationship between governance and socio-economic outcome; and accountability, transparency, probity, predictability, and participation are acknowledged as essential ingredients for effectively managing development. This article focuses on two South Asian countries (Pakistan and Bangladesh) and examines the various measures adopted by their governments to reshape governance and public management in recent times.

Adoption of new public sector management (NPM) is commonplace in both developed and emerging economies. One premise of NPM is that an effective accountability mechanism is in place. It is argued here that where bad management and corruption are present, this fundamental accountability mechanism may fail for two reasons. These are considered further through the situation existing in Fiji in relation to problems experienced at the National Bank of Fiji (NBF). The demise of the NBF provides an example of a country where NPM has been introduced, where poor management and corruption are entrenched and where accountability has not worked because parties do not provide a proper account of their actions. This scandal illustrates the need for proponents of NPM to consider the context into which the system is being fitted, such as poor management, the extent of corruption and presence of political favours, when considering the net benefits likely to arise from its introduction.

Business cycle theory is normally described as having evolved out of a previous tradition of writers focusing exclusively on crises. In this account, the turning point is seen as residing in Clément Juglar's contribution on commercial crises and their periodicity. It is well known that the champion of this view is Schumpeter, who propagated it on several occasions. The same author, however, pointed to a number of other writers who, before and at the same time as Juglar, stressed one or another of the aspects for which Juglar is credited primacy, including the recognition of periodicity and the identification of endogenous elements enabling the recognition of crises as a self-generating phenomenon. There is indeed a vast literature, both primary and secondary, relating to the debates on crises and fluctuations around the middle of the nineteenth century, from which it is apparent that Juglar's book Des Crises Commerciales et de leur Retour Périodique en France, en Angleterre et aux États-Unis (originally published in 1862 and very much revised and enlarged in 1889) did not come out of the blue but was one of the products of an intellectual climate inducing the thinking of crises not as unrelated events but as part of a more complex phenomenon consisting of recurring crises related to the development of the commercial world – an interpretation corroborated by the almost regular occurrence of crises at about 10-year intervals.