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This purpose of this paper is to discuss the relationship between political independence and operational impartiality in regard to the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). Against this background of western orthodoxy, it asks whether a non-western country with high levels of corruption (Vietnam being an example) can find another pathway in its efforts to effectively combat corruption.

An exercise in qualitative conceptual clarification and theoretical speculation, drawing upon practical examples.

It is argued that it is important to distinguish between de jure and de facto political independence, and that neither can be fully understood unless they are considered in relationship to other key values, particularly operational impartiality, public accountability, and systemic legitimacy, and in the context of bureaucratic politics. There is little coherent theoretical knowledge available about the relationships among these variables. Such values are central to western notions of “good government” but are much less institutionalised in non-western jurisdictions with high levels of corruption. The question is raised: can such countries, Vietnam being one example, develop effective anti-corruption strategies which because of the nature of their own political system, cannot depend on political independence for its ACAs?

Attention is drawn to some conceptual and putatively theoretical issues relating to the effectiveness of ACAs, and which have received little explicit attention in the relevant academic literature.

The paper aims to explore whether different models of public sector audit exist in China without adhering to the goals and objectives of public sector audit systems in democratic jurisdictions.

The study is based on a single embedded case study involving multiple methods of data collection including public documents, semi-structured interviews and site visits. The research methods and the analytical framework of the study draw on the concepts of political competition, public sector accountability and audit independence.

The study finds that the Chinese National Audit Office’s (CNAO) objectives derive from the neo-classical economic discourse and not from ideas of public accountability, as is the case in democratic parliamentary jurisdictions. The study finds that public sector audit in China functions in ways which are similar to that of internal audit. The CNAO may provide limited political and public accountability for Chinese public officials indirectly by enhancing their managerial accountabilities.

The study goes against the prevailing view that supreme audit institutions which are part of the executive will lead to poor accountability of the public sector and increased public sector corruption.

The study suggests that enhancing managerial accountability in non-democratic (and pseudo-democratic) jurisdictions through public sector audit can by itself be of significant benefit. Further, such enhancements may also strengthen public sector accountability.

This paper fills a research gap by exploring public sector audit independence in a developing country with a unitary system of government.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the role of political risk in real estate and to specifically examine the implications in Scotland of continuing uncertainty caused by political events.

The primary research links the political timeline around the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 to time series of a combination of individual investment transactions, measures of sentiment from investment agents and yields. The analysis distinguishes between UK and overseas investors.

The political risk over six years ebbed and flowed with the changing probability of constitutional change but ultimately it has been a cumulative dampener on investment in Scotland. An element of the political risk can be deemed to be specific risk linked to UK institutional fund mandates that stems from concerns about possible forced sales with independence. In addition political risk is in the eye of the beholder with overseas investors in Scotland unfazed by the prospects of independence.

The short-term impact on investment of the Scottish “neverendum” is very similar to that for independence. The consequences are depressed investment and development that seem set to continue at least until the constitutional hiatus begins to be resolved.

This is the first study to explicitly examine the impact of political uncertainty on the real estate sector.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the construction of the meanings of auditor independence (AI) in an oil‐rich autocratic state with an ideology straddling liberal market capitalism and Shari'ah (Islamic teachings).

The concept of AI was explored using Blumer's interactionist approach or the Chicago School of Symbolic Interactionism (CSSI). Multiple methods were adopted in collecting and interpreting data: document analysis, personal professional experience, observation and interviews with auditors in two audit firms in Saudi Arabia.

Using discourse analysis, the paper demonstrates that auditors construct the meanings of independence in appearance and in fact through their social interactions at three levels: micro (personal self‐reflexivity through ethical reasoning and reputation of individual auditor); meso (organisational culture through range of commercial activities and image management) and macro (through political, de jure, and socio‐economic structure).

The paper contributes to the auditing literature by providing insights into the construction of the meaning of AI in a context different from the dominant Anglo‐American discourse, as well as transition and emerging economies discourse. The paper also contributes to the CSSI research methodology by extending it to consider interactions not only within an organisational context, but also within the context of a country.

The study focusses on explaining why advocates for reform to state audit in the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1980s, focussed on improving the links between the new National Audit Office (NAO) and Parliament, rather than on traditional notions of audit independence. The study shows how this focus on the auditor's link to Parliament depends on a particular concept of liberty and relates this to the wider literature on the place of audit in democratic society.

Understanding the issue of independence of audit in protecting the liberties and rights of citizens needs addressed. In this article, the authors investigate the creation of audit independence in the UK in the National Audit Act (1983). To do so, the authors employ a neo-Roman concept of liberty to historical archives ranging from the late 1960s to 1983.

The study shows that advocates for audit reform in the UK from the 1960s to the 1980s were arguing for an extension to Parliament's power to hold the executive to account and that their focus was influential on the way that the new NAO was established. Using a neo-Roman concept of liberty, the authors show that they believed Parliamentary surveillance of the executive was necessary to secure liberty within the UK.

The neo-Roman republican concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, the preservation of liberty and democracy.

Public sector audit can be a fundamentally democratic activity. Auditors should be alert to the constitutional importance of their work and see parliamentary accountability as a key objective.

The neo-Roman concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, preservation of liberty and democracy.

The paper aims to examine disputed interpretations of “key meanings” between the audit regulator and Big 4 firms during a highly contentious regulatory debate, showcasing their use of “strategies of resistance” to achieve their intended outcomes.

A qualitative analysis is performed of the discourse in a South African audit regulatory debate, set within the country's unique political and historical context. The analysis is informed by the theoretical construct of a “regulatory space” and an established typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures.

The study’s findings show how resistance to regulatory intentions from influential actors, notably the Big 4 firms, was dispelled. This was achieved by the regulator securing oversight independence, co-opting political support, shortening the debate timeline and unilaterally revising the interpretation of its statutory mandate. The regulator successfully incorporated race equality into its interpretation of how the public interest is advanced (in addition to audit quality). The social legitimacy of the Big 4 was then further undermined. The debate was highly contentious and unproductive and likely contributed to overall societal concerns regarding the legitimacy of, and the value ascribed to, the audit function.

A deeper appreciation of vested interests and differing interpretations of key concepts and regulatory logic could help to promote a less combative regulatory environment, in the interest of enhanced audit quality and the sustainability and legitimacy of the audit profession.

The context provides an example, contrary to that observed in many jurisdictions, where the Big 4 fail to actively resist or even dilute significant regulatory reform. Furthermore, the findings indicate that traditional conceptions of what it means to serve “the public interest” may be evolving in favour of a more liberal social democratic interpretation.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the difference in the development of the central bank in two states in transition from communism to capitalism and from being parts of the Soviet Union to being independent states.

Data and theoretical analysis were gathered from various sources in order to evaluate the approach to central banking taken by these two countries.

Substantial variations were found in the resulting monetary policies and rates of inflation which demonstrate the differences in the institutions developed and illustrate the importance of independence for the central bank.

The contrasting experience of Belarus and Estonia, both of which gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, provide examples of success and failure in this endeavor, thus providing valuable insight to those involved with transitioning economies.

Discusses the difficulties that lie in the way of moves towards monetary union in the European Community: convergence criteria, attitudes towards various forms of possible political union, German unification, the location and independence of an independent European Central Bank, “cohesion” provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, and the Delors Budget.

The purpose of this paper is to explicate how newly independent nations combined local and international resources to plan and build large engineering projects aimed at enhancing economic development. It discusses the key factors and issues related to the planning and building of the Akosombo Dam and related townships from 1962 to 1967.

The assessment is based on the archival information from the Volta River Authority together with other archival government data and interview transcripts before, during and after the completion (from the 1950s to the 1960s) of the Volta River Project (VRP).

The paper presents insights from the VRP in newly independent Ghana and demonstrates how multiple international firms combine with host country stakeholders to usher in one of the most important engineering projects in post-colonial Africa. It also highlights how poor bargaining power and weak integration of the project outcome to future development objectives, with negligence by succeeding political actors, could inhibit the full achievement of intended long-term project outcomes.

Most of the conclusions are drawn from a single project within one country and would need to be supported by additional multi-country research. The study also presents an opportunity to explore how lessons learnt could influence policymaking in new, large and complex infrastructure projects.

The paper reviews antecedents, processes and outcomes of a major post-independence infrastructure project in a sub-Saharan African country.

This paper aims to analyse the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country‐specific factors, using a path‐dependence approach?

The paper performs an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks' prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities).

The paper concludes that supervisors in central banks are more likely to be publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely to be funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank‐oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime.

In general, the paper does not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition.

The paper analyses the financial governance of banking supervision in a sample of 90 countries world‐wide. The empirical analysis focuses on the financing rules and identifies factors that explain the differences between supervisory authorities.