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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that an implication of Holcombe’s (2002) model is a “revolution trap.” This paper extends Holcombe’s model adding Klein’s concept of entrepreneurship as judgment concerning the use of heterogeneous political capital. The authors use the case of the USA presidential election of 1800 to demonstrate the utility of the extension, and to discuss how political entrepreneurship served to prevent a revolution trap. The political entrepreneurship of 1800 established the precedent of peaceful transition of power in the USA, which opened the door to the rapid economic development of the early nineteenth century.

This is a historical case study using letters, newspapers, pamphlets, and other pieces of empirical evidence to highlight an important moment of political entrepreneurship.

Many contemporary observers predicted that the USA would devolve into continuous revolution, which the authors argue Holcombe’s (2002) model predicts. However, political entrepreneurship ended the revolutionary period in the former British North America. Moreover, the political entrepreneurship ending the election crisis established the precedent of peaceful political succession. This precedent comparatively elevated the returns of productive, market entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990). As a result, the USA experiences a prolonged period of entrepreneurially driven economic growth.

To the authors knowledge, no one has developed the implication of a “revolution trap” from Holcombe’s (2002) model, nor has anyone applied Klein’s (2008) model to extend Holcombe’s model of political entrepreneurship. Although the disputed presidential election of 1800 has been extensively researched, no one has analyzed the election and its resolution from the perspective of political entrepreneurship.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of sovereign entrepreneurship, which is a special kind of political entrepreneurship.

This paper uses qualitative methods/historical survey.

Sovereignty is rooted in self-enforced exchange of political property rights. Sovereign entrepreneurship is the creative employment of political property rights to advance a plan.

Because a polity’s constitution is determined by its distribution of political property rights, sovereign entrepreneurship and constitutional change are necessarily linked. The author illustrated how sovereign entrepreneurship can be applied by using it to explain the rise of modern states.

In addition to studying instances of sovereign entrepreneurship in distant history, scholars can apply it to recent history. Sovereign entrepreneurship can be especially helpful as a tool for doing analytic narratives of low-n cases of political-economic development, especially when those polities attract interests for being “development miracles.”

This paper uses treats sovereignty as a political property right.

This paper aims to explore individuals’ economic empowerment and political empowerment association and the moderation role of entrepreneurship development programs on this relationship in the context of post-revolution Tunisia, which is a newer developing democracy.

The study uses a quantitative approach based on econometric modeling. A questionnaire was designed and administrated to a stratified random sample of 343 participants in the Entrepreneurship for the Participation and Inclusion of Vulnerable Youth in Tunisia program, funded by the United Nations Democracy Fund and implemented in rural northwestern Tunisia between 2017 and 2021. A coarsened exact matching method is also applied for robustness analysis.

The analysis shows that when individuals have enhanced economic decision-making agency and are involved in economic networks, they are more likely to demonstrate higher political empowerment. It also shows that expanding rural individuals’ economic opportunities by providing entrepreneurial resources, such as entrepreneurial training and microcredit, strengthens individuals’ economic empowerment and political empowerment association.

The study provides practical implications for policymakers in newer developing democracies. Citizens’ political empowerment and inclusion in rural areas could be promoted by developing entrepreneurship development programs, which could help reinforce the citizens-state relationship and establish more stable social contracts. The research also provides practical implications for the international development community, donor agencies and program designers through duplicating similar programs in other countries with weak central government structures (i.e. post-conflict environments, post-revolution).

The research attempts to contribute to the ongoing debates linking entrepreneurship, economic empowerment and political/citizen empowerment. It focuses on a Middle East and North Africa country, Tunisia, characterized by socioeconomic issues and low civic participation.

Inspired by the debates among economists about the role of beliefs and informal institutions in economic development, the purpose of this paper is to derive and test different hypotheses about the ways beliefs about the market economy, institutions and policies, and productive entrepreneurship are intertwined.

The paper derives from the literature three hypotheses unified around the idea of (political, cultural, and market) entrepreneurship. The paper then tests these hypotheses by running various country-level regressions intended to check the relationships between formal institutions and policies (measured by World Governance Indicators and by the Economic Freedom of the World index), productive entrepreneurship (measured by total factor productivity form the Penn World Table), and different kinds of market beliefs from the World Values Survey (WVS).

The sociological hypothesis says that more pro-market beliefs provide incentives for innovation by recognizing entrepreneurship as a dignifying activity. The political hypothesis says that people with more pro-market beliefs will demand, and therefore live with, more pro-market institutions and policies. The “Schumpeterian” hypothesis says that it is market institutions that make it possible for entrepreneurs to run against anti-market beliefs, and innovate. The results support the Schumpeterian hypothesis, mainly because market beliefs predict institutions and policies as well as productivity very poorly, while formal institutions and policies make a much better job of this.

The paper contrasts three different hypotheses concerned with the broader consequences of political, cultural, and market entrepreneurship and tests them by making use of the time structure of the observations found in the WVS.

Previous literature has clearly demonstrated the need for sound government policies or “institutions” to promote and support entrepreneurship in a country. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of one such institution – political stability – in boosting entrepreneurial endeavors. A politically stable nation will have lower risk and transaction/contracting costs, and higher levels of government transparency, predictability, and accountability. Thus, the paper should expect that with greater political stability there should be a greater degree of entrepreneurial activity.

Using dynamic panel estimators (System GMM estimators) and considering multiple proxies of political risk, our results confirm this hypothesis. Such estimators handle challenges associated with panel data efficiently.

The paper's results show that greater political stability for a country does indeed lead to an increased rate of entrepreneurship and wealth creation.

Entrepreneurship is critical to the process of economic growth and development. To prosper, countries must unleash the creative talents of their citizens through the decentralized process of formal private sector entrepreneurship. New legal businesses create jobs, opportunities, wealth, and goods and services that make a nation grow. Sadly in many nations, this process is stifled and poverty is the result. While previous research has examined which types of specific policies matter for promoting entrepreneurship, the paper considers the different question of how the stability of political institutions impacts the rate of entrepreneurship.

Gender equality levels opportunities for men and women and reduces the initial capital constraints women often face, and yet as entrepreneurship opportunities for women open up in more developed and egalitarian societies, fewer women are choosing entrepreneurship. This paper explores this contradiction as it relates to female economic and political participation in the context of business regulation efficiency.

Drawing on panel data from 89 countries from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey and the Global Gender Gap report, we use random effects regression to examine relationships. Analyses included 252 country-years, and all data used during analyses were at the country level.

Results suggest that equality in economic participation narrows and political participation widens the entrepreneurship gender gap, but a country's business regulation efficiency moderates both relationships negatively.

This study does not distinguish opportunity- and necessity-driven entrepreneurship, and does not consider the survival rates of enterprises and their industries.

Findings are pertinent to policymakers interested in advancing female entrepreneurship. They also apply to female entrepreneurs who must begin to recognize the diversity in work-life preferences among women and men.

A theoretical model is informed by two competing theories, suggesting that in the context of female entrepreneurship, removal of economic and political participation barriers, combined with business regulation efficiency, intensifies the entrepreneurship gender gap.

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate researchers’ interest by acquainting them with some aspects of the entrepreneurship literature they may not have known.

The paper is a non‐meta‐analytic literature review of several literatures in entrepreneurship.

The entrepreneurship literature is vast and can be found in every discipline where humans and their behaviour are the object of analysis.

Because the entrepreneurship literature is so large and widespread, the paper reviews only a small, deliberately chosen sample of the literature.

To the authors’ knowledge, no one has previously written a unified review of the market entrepreneurship, political entrepreneurship, and public choice.

While common sense suggests that corruption will likely have a negative impact on the economy as it raises the cost of doing business, research on the topic showed inconsistent results (positive, negative and neutral). This paper aims to verify whether corruption has a “grease” or “sand” effect on the wheels of entrepreneurial rates and under which conditions corruption will have stronger or weaker effects.

Using institutional theory as the basis for the hypotheses, generalized least squares estimation is conducted to empirically examine the role of corruption and political discretion in entrepreneurship in a sample of 93 countries.

Countries with higher levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of firm creation. However, this negative effect of corruption is weaker when there are higher levels of political discretion.

This is the first evaluation of the moderating effect of political discretion on the negative impact of corruption on entrepreneurship.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the concept of public business models and develop a theory for the process of developing and managing public business models.

This research synthesizes insights from various fields into a set of theoretical ideas that lay out what public business models are, to what extent they differ from commercial/industrial business models, and how they are developed and managed by public entrepreneurs.

Developing and managing a business model is an entrepreneurial task that has been missing from the public entrepreneurship literature. Public entrepreneurs perform these tasks using public and private resources, leveraging public institutional systems, and developing capabilities that differ in several dimensions from private entrepreneurs due to the nature of public goods and existence of quasi-markets where public business models are developed and used.

This chapter opens new avenues for research in public entrepreneurship by suggesting that (1) public business models form the foundation of public entrepreneurship, (2) public business models differ from commercial business models not in their functionality but rather in their scope and design, and (3) public business models co-evolve with public institutions to maintain their legitimacy and value creation potential.

This chapter equips public entrepreneurs with new insights into enterprising behaviors and the dynamism of value creation and capture in public ventures.

The current study represents the first attempt to directly incorporate the notion of business models into the public entrepreneurship literature.

To discuss political entrepreneurship as a capability to enable durable insider action research projects.

The two authors utilize auto‐ethnographic methods in order to evaluate and draw inferences from their own actions as insider action researchers. The paper draws on action research theory and theories on political entrepreneurship.

Political entrepreneurship is an important factor behind success or failure in action research projects, but has, despite this, been scarcely discussed in the action research literature. Findings indicate that a political entrepreneurship repertoire consisting of capabilities to find red‐hot issues for one's research, to use the inside of the organization in the research efforts, to use and diffuse the research results, and, finally, to work on the positioning of one's relational platform.

The study is based upon case studies in two organizations. Its implications may be further developed through studies in a wider array of settings.

The study provides valuable knowledge for organizations intending to participate in (insider) action research as well as for (insider) action researchers.

Political entrepreneurship in action research is scarcely discussed in action research theory – and hence the paper addresses an important research gap. Moreover, the presented implications have a certain practical value for organizations and researchers.