Search results

The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs.

Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management.

The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms.

This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies.

Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards.

The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs

Using a meta-regression analysis, we quantitatively review the empirical literature on the relation between effective tax rate (ETR) and firm size. Accounting literature offers two competing theories on this relation: The political cost theory, suggesting a positive size-ETR relation, and the political power theory, suggesting a negative size-ETR relation. Using a unique data set of 56 studies that do not show a clear tendency towards either of the two theories, we contribute to the discussion on the size-ETR relation in three ways: First, applying meta-regression analysis on a US meta-data set, we provide evidence supporting the political cost theory. Second, our analysis reveals factors that are possible sources of variation and bias in previous empirical studies; these findings can improve future empirical and analytical models. Third, we extend our analysis to a cross-country meta-data set; this extension enables us to investigate explanations for the two competing theories in more detail. We find that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory, a transparency index and a corruption index explain variation in the size-ETR relation. Independent of the two theories, we also find that tax planning aspects potentially affect the size-ETR relation. To our knowledge, these explanations have not yet been investigated in our research context.

This paper aims to conduct a meta-analysis regarding the association between political connections and the cost of debt and tests for the moderating effect of the level of creditor protection on this relationship.

Keywords used to collect relevant empirical papers include “political connections, political ties, and political connectedness” from the one side, and “cost of loan finance, and cost of debt” from the other side. The search yields 24 published empirical papers from 2005 to 2022.

Findings show that there is a significant negative association between political connections and the cost of debt; this relationship is more pronounced only for countries characterized by a strong level of creditor protection. This moderating effect is further confirmed using meta-regression.

Findings are relevant for policymakers and managers in settings where relationship-based capitalism represents a prevailing feature as they highlight the important legal and institutional characteristics when considering the impact of political connections on the cost of debt. The paper also discusses some limitations inherent to this stream of research and proposes future research perspectives.

Mises (1949[1963], p. 692) explains that market-failure justifications for state actions, such as economic regulation “ascribe to the state not only the best intentions but also omniscience.” He then points out that neither assumption is valid: government is not benevolent since both, those who are employed by the state and those who demand state actions, have subjective self-interests, and it is not all knowing since knowledge is widely dispersed and the cost of coordination is infinitely high, particularly without market profits and prices as coordinating mechanisms. Furthermore, Mises suggests that dropping either assumption undermines the conclusions that state intervention is necessarily desirable even if some sort of market failure is actually identified. Austrian economists in the Mises tradition have tended to focus on the knowledge problem in their challenges to regulation, however. Many Austrians obviously recognize the interest problem, of course, but they often assume it away in order to illustrate that government interference with markets is not desirable even if it is well intended. In contrast, public-choice analysis tends to focus on the interest problem as source of government failure, although some public-choice analysts also obviously recognize the knowledge problem. Indeed, this difference in perspective is so pronounced that Ikeda (1997, p. 240) explicitly distinguishes between Public Choice and Austrian political economy by suggesting that the Austrian approach assumes benevolence on the part of government officials, while the public-choice approach assume narrow interests.¹ Ikeda (1997, p. 150) also suggests that the separation of these two approaches is justified because “Austrian political economy and public choice are each capable of standing on their own [so] public-theorists…find it optimal simply to continue to pursue their research along the line of either the former or the latter approaches.” The following presentation questions this assertion. Instead, both assumptions should be dropped, and the resulting integrated Austrian-public-choice model should be expanded to include assumptions about the relationships between regulations, property rights security, and both market and political behavior.²

This study examines the relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and managers' ex ante strategic choice on firms’ fixed and variable costs structure, i.e. cost rigidity and the moderating effect of government contracts and political connections.

Using a sample of 4,162 US firms during 2003–2019 and EPU measure from Baker et al. (2016), the authors examine the association between EPU and cost rigidity using multivariate regression analysis. The authors also examine the moderating effects of government customers and political connections using the subsampling method.

This study finds that increases in EPU leads to higher cost rigidity, suggesting that managers tend to look ahead and make an ex ante commitment to invest more in fixed costs to avoid congestion costs in anticipation of future product demand during EPU. The study also finds that the presence of government customers and political connections moderates the need for adopting greater cost rigidity.

This study measures firms' cost rigidity based on archival data. Future studies could utilize managers' cost structure choices using firms' internal management cost structure forecasts data to measure cost rigidity to examine the relationship between cost rigidity and EPU.

This study demonstrates that managers tend to make a proactive commitment to invest in fixed inputs when facing demand uncertainty from EPU to avoid congestion costs. This study also highlights the value of having government contracts and political connections by demonstrating that managers are less concerned about the congestion costs, hence weakening the impact of EPU on cost rigidity when they have government as major customers and/or political connections.

This study extends the management accounting literature by documenting that cost rigidity is related to EPU and that the relationship between cost rigidity and EPU also depends on whether the firm has government as major customers and/or political connections or not.

This paper aims to investigate the political cost hypothesis and the effects of political sensitivity-induced governance in the US bond market by using yield spreads from bonds issued by a diverse sample of US government contractors.

Fixed effects regression analysis is used to test the relation between the political sensitivity of government contractor firms and their cost of debt.

Results illustrated that government contractors with greater political sensitivity are associated with larger yield spreads, indicating that bondholders require a premium when firms endure the costs of increased political oversight and the threat of outside intervention, reducing the certainty of future income. However, despite the overall positive impact of political sensitivity on bond yield spreads on average, the authors found that the additional government oversight is associated with lower spreads when the firm is facing greater repayment risk.

Despite the benefits of winning a government contract, this paper identifies a direct financial cost of increased political sensitivity because of additional firm oversight and potential intervention. Importantly, it also finds that this governance is valued by bondholders when faced with increased risk. Firms must balance their desire for government receipts with the costs and benefits of dependence on those expenditures.

This paper contributes to the literature in its exploration of political sensitivity as an important determinant of the cost of debt for corporate government contractors. Specifically, the authors document a significant risk premium in bond pricing because of the joint effects of the visibility and importance of government contracts to the firm.

The effect of political connections of agency costs has attracted considerable research attention due to the increasing recognition of the fact that political connection influences corporate decisions and outcomes. This paper aims to explore the association between corporate political connections and agency cost and examine whether audit quality moderates this association.

A data set of Bangladeshi listed non-financial companies is used. A usable sample of 968 firm-year observations was drawn for the period from 2005 to 2013. Asset utilisation ratio, the interaction of Tobin’s Q and free cash flow and expense ratio are used as alternative proxies for agency costs; membership to Big 4 audit firms or local associates of Big 4 firms is used as a proxy for audit quality.

Results show that politically connected firms exhibit higher agency costs than their unconnected counterparts, and audit quality moderates the relationship between political connection and agency costs. The results of this paper suggest the importance of audit quality to mitigate agency problem in an emerging economic setting.

The findings of this paper could be of interest to regulators wishing to focus regulatory effort on significant issues influencing stock market efficiency. The findings could also inform auditors in directing audit effort through a more complete assessment of risk and determining reasonable levels of audit fees. Finally, results could inform financial statement users to direct investments to firms with lower agency costs.

To the knowledge of the authors, this study is one of the first to explore the relationship between political connection and agency costs, and the moderating effect of audit quality of this relationship.

The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of local political uncertainty on the asymmetric cost behavior (i.e. cost stickiness) for listed firms in China.

In this study, the authors manually collect the turnover data of prefecture-city officials as a measure of exogenous fluctuations in political uncertainty and obtain firm-level financial information from the China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. To perform the analysis, the authors augment the traditional cost stickiness model by including the interaction terms of the prefecture-city official turnover, and firm-level and prefecture-city level control variables.

The authors find that political turnover leads to a higher degree of cost stickiness, implying that firms retain slack resources when political uncertainty is high. Moreover, the effect of political turnover on cost stickiness is more pronounced for firms residing in regions with weaker institutional environments, and firms that are privately owned and with smaller size. The authors further provide evidence that policy uncertainty and the threat of losing political connection are two underlying channels. Overall, this study documents that the local political process is an important channel that influences corporate operational decisions.

This study provides the first piece of evidence on the relation between political uncertainty and cost stickiness at the local government level. Moreover, the authors propose and demonstrate two underlying channels through which political uncertainty affects firms' asymmetric cost behavior.

This work aims to check the validity of the hypotheses of the agency, signalling, political costs and proprietary costs theories in the disclosure of information online. More specifically, to determine the prevalence of the purposes alleged by those theories, we analyse the effect of industry concentration and other factors on an index of items of information disclosed on corporate web sites, in its entirety as well as its breakdown into information whose elaboration and disclosure is compulsory and information whose elaboration and disclosure is voluntary.

First, a content analysis of the quoted non‐financial Spanish companies' web sites was carried out. To do this, three disclosure indexes were created and applied. Then three causal models were estimated by applying a linear regression, taking several factors into consideration.

The findings emphasise the relevance of the hypotheses of political costs theory as the main explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure of information on the internet by quoted Spanish firms. In particular, the hypothesis that the greater the firm's monopolistic power, the more visible the company is and the more political costs it faces. To reduce these costs, such companies have an interest in disclosing greater amounts of information.

The researchers have analysed only one year of data from one country, but this analysis is significant because the motives which lead a firm to disclose information can be very different depending on its geographic location, especially if the factors which determine disclosure practices are associated with the political costs that the companies face.

This is the first study to examine the effect of industrial concentration on the disclosure of information online.

This cross-border study’s main purpose is to examine whether there is a significant association between political institutions and the cost of debt. In addition, it also investigates whether this association is moderated by the country’s corruption levels.

This study uses a unique cross-border data set comprising 45,848 firms from 117 countries from 2002 to 2017 to investigate these research questions. Further, the authors use the two-stage least squares method to mitigate issues of endogeneity.

This study finds that political institutions are significantly associated with cost of debt. Specifically, the cost of debt is lower in countries with stronger democratic institutions, smaller government bureaucracies and higher adherence to the rule of law. Further, this association is strengthened by low corruption levels.

This study provides new insights into the relationship between political institutions and the cost of debt. Overall, the results reveal that democratic institutions, government bureaucracy and the rule of law are significantly associated with cost of debt. This association is stronger in countries with low levels of corruption and consistent with Transparency’s International notion that accountability and transparency by government political institutions promote sustainable economic growth.