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This paper examines the effectiveness of the social and political factors as the determinants of antidumping duties against the transition economies. The empirical evidence shows that protectionist pressures tend to be strengthened against them with low labor standards, although protectionist tendencies with respect to social dumping are not so apparent in actual impositions of antidumping duties. There is a weak evidence that the different degrees of democraticness influenced the protectionism against the transition economies during the late 1990s, while such an effect is not found during the period of 2002-2006, as the concerned countries passed the initial stage of transition.

The insulation of globally mobile workers into communities is often influenced by political considerations within the host country. Most studies examining this area have focused on how expatriates and globally mobile workers seclude themselves into insulated communities when working abroad. This perspective does not take into consideration political and societal factors that often pressure globally mobile workers into secluded communities composed of people similar to themselves. This study examines how host-country political imperatives can help create and maintain insulated communities of foreign workers.

This study is based on a case study methodology that examines the J-1 Visa program in the United States and how it has, in many instances, evolved into a de facto guest worker program that secludes foreign workers into insulated communities. The case study includes interviews with five J-1 administrators at sponsoring organizations that employ J-1 recipients.

This study finds that political pressures do have an impact on the insulation of J-1 recipients into secluded communities in the United States. This is largely accomplished through the legal requirements of the program, pressure from sponsoring employers on the government and the significant political and economic ties that the United States maintains with the home countries of J-1 recipients.

This is one of the few studies to examine insulated communities of globally mobile workers from a political perspective. It is exploratory in nature and recommends that further studies be conducted.

Hunger strikes have a long history in efforts to achieve social change but scholars have made few comparative, empirical, or theoretical contributions to understanding their dynamics and connections in the social movement and nonviolent action literature. We examine hunger strikes from 1906 to 2004 with a comparative perspective, elaborating on its use as a tactic of nonviolent change. Using data assembled from the New York Times, Keesing's Worldwide Online, and The Economist we analyze how, when, where, and why hunger strikes occur, and by whom they have been utilized to seek change. In general, findings reveal that hunger strikes over the last century have been widespread phenomena that are typically small, brief, and relatively successful tactics against the state. Several themes emerge regarding hunger strikes including their appeal to the powerless and emergence when few political opportunities exist, their significance for third-party mobilization, and the role of emotions in the protest dynamics. Taken together, the power struggle involving the hunger strike is an important example and extension of “political jiu-jitsu” as presented by Sharp (1973).

Purpose – The main purpose is to provide ideas about an intellectual framework for considering the role of “economic factors” in conflict and to suggest some potentially useful future areas of research. I selectively reference some relevant findings from the other chapters in this volume.

Methodology/approach – This chapter is speculative, but raises important issues. It might seem that economic factors should be considered “hard” constraints on the dynamics of large-scale conflict and peace, whereas political factors are “soft.” I propose the opposite. I argue that we should consider political factors as causally primary and economic factors as contingent on them. I present statistical analyses that call into question some recent research on the apparent primacy of economic factors in international conflict.

Findings – These models challenge a strong belief in the primacy of a “capitalist peace” or “economic peace” over political factors such as democracy. But my purpose here is no more than to suggest that this is a promising area for further inquiry. Economic factors are of course hugely important, but they are filtered through norms and institutions, which are political creations. If the basic logic of my thinking holds, similar results would be obtained for studies of civil conflict initiation and escalation.

Originality/value of paper – This chapter raises the issue of the appropriate place of economic and political factors in understanding organized conflict at various levels of analysis. It suggests how the chapters in this volume help advance thinking about the relationship between economic factors and conflict in this context and provides some novel empirical results to suggest the plausibility of the argument that economic factors may be less theoretically fundamental than political ones.

Despite existence of a constitutional demarcation of functions and finances between the centre and the states, it is alleged that the centre-state funds transfer systems in India have a political bargaining aspect that goes beyond the normative considerations. This paper makes an attempt to investigate if the political system allows to evolve a simple, equitable, objective and rule-based system of transfers. The aim of this paper is to explore the political economic determinants of discretionary fiscal transfers in India.

This paper is based on a panel data set of 28 Indian states for the period 2001–2014. After diagnostic checking for fixed effects/random effects, the authors prefer to use fixed effects regression with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors and Arellano–Bover/Blundel and Bond system estimation model that uses moment conditions in which lagged first differences of the dependent variable are instruments for the level equation.

The findings of this study reveal that fiscal performance, economic capacity and political alliance are significant but some other political determinants such as bargaining power and election years are not significant in influencing discretionary transfers.

Considering the limited availability of literature on federal finance, the present paper is an addition to the existing research, especially on a crucial issue concerning extra-constitutional fiscal transfers in India. Analysing a balanced panel comprising all the Indian states and examining the role of various political-economic determinants makes this paper topical.

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test propositions on location and entry mode decision making by foreign direct investors in the Middle East region.

Case study approach, based on in‐depth interviews with decision makers of multinational companies operating in the Middle East.

The results show that foreign investors in the Middle East prefer to maintain the highest level of ownership and control permitted in a country, even in the face of political risk.

Location and entry mode decision making has typically been studied using quantitative methods. This research uses a case study approach and develops a new model of entry mode decision making, demonstrating that experienced foreign investors do not view joint ventures as an effective mechanism to manage political risk, but prefer to keep political risk management in‐house.

International business theory leans heavily on neoclassical economics, ignoring its unrealistic assumptions and the many changes in the environment. The chapter calls for a revision of the theory to a contingency theory. The major contingent elements analysed are the political system, business–government and NGOs relations, industries, regimes, ownership patterns, the degree of reliance on ethical behaviour, the institutional environment and social norms.

The American agricultural economist Marion Clawson advised the Israeli government during 1953–1955. Clawson, a protégé of John D. Black and Mordecai Ezekiel, criticized the government for ignoring economic considerations, and stated that Israel’s national goals – defense, Negev Desert irrigation, immigrant absorption via new agricultural settlements, and economic independence – were mutually contradictory. His major recommendations were to improve the realism of Israel’s agricultural plan; end expensive Negev irrigation; enlarge irrigated farms eightfold; freeze new settlements until the number of semi-developed settlements falls from 300 to 100; and limit new Negev settlements to 10 over 5–7 years. Thus, Clawson ignored political feasibility and made value judgments. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Minister of Agriculture Peretz Naphtali rejected Clawson’s recommendations because they ignored Israel’s national goals. By September 1954, Clawson shifted towards greater pragmatism: He acknowledged that foreign advisors should not question the national goals or make value judgments, and sought common ground with the Ministry of Agriculture. At his initiative, he wrote Israel Agriculture 1953/54 in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Israel Agriculture was a consensus document: Clawson eschewed recommendations and accepted that the government might prioritize non-economic goals. In proposing Israel Agriculture, Clawson made a pragmatic decision to relinquish some independence for (potentially) greater influence. Ultimately, Clawson was largely unsuccessful as an advisor. Clawson’s failure was part of a general pattern: Over 1950–1985, the Israeli government always rejected foreign advisors’ recommendations unless it was facing a severe crisis.

The justification of punishment is an age-old debate which continues unresolved. In late twentieth century several attempts were made to reconcile the two opposing justifications: retributivism and consequentialism. But these attempts focused narrowly on merely one manifestation of punishment, i.e.: criminal punishment carried out by the state. To the extent that these mixed justifications are successful, they relate to only one (undoubtedly important) manifestation of punishment. But clearly punishment can occur in many different institutional contexts, and the institutions in each context vary dramatically in complexity and relevance. I recommend analyzing punishment in its manifold manifestations.

The purpose of the paper is to review the issues involved in determining the appropriate speed of adjustment and the sequencing of economic reforms, and to develop a checklist of key guidelines for policymakers as a basis for their decision‐making process.

The paper develops a conceptual framework based on a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature, and the practical experience of the authors in this area.

The analysis in the paper shows that the optimal speed and sequence of reforms is country‐specific. But key policy considerations can help guide policymakers in the design of their reform strategy.

The arguments favoring a shock approach or a gradual approach are not absolute. Each country has to choose the proper speed of adjustment and sequencing of reforms by examining country‐specific factors. A thorough case‐by‐case analysis is needed before a decision on the appropriate timing and sequencing of reforms can be made.

The analysis in the paper leads to key reform guidelines for policymakers – covering areas such as prerequisites and resource constraints, political economy considerations, credibility and sustainability of reforms – that are instrumental in developing a well‐sequenced strategy.