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This study aims to investigate whether socially responsible businesses with corporate social expenditure are less prone to engaging in tax avoidance. The study also examines whether political connections moderate the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance.

The study uses ordinary least squares to analyse the panel data of all 30 listed banks on the Dhaka Stock Exchange covering 2012 to 2020. The study uses a set of alternative variables to check the robustness of the findings.

Confirming the corporate culture theory, the study findings indicate that the higher the firms’ CSR expenditure, the lower the tax avoidance. Contrarily, the moderating effect of political connection weakens the role of CSR in tax avoidance, implying that political relation makes the firms socially irresponsible. Besides, the findings document that firms with strong political connections are more likely to be tax aggressive by weakening the role of CSR. The findings imply that firms with weaker political connections are more socially responsible than firms with strong political ties.

The study provides the bank management and regulatory bodies valuable insights to take necessary actions so that they can easily monitor whether the banks follow their instructions regarding CSR and tax payments. As the politicians make the firm socially irresponsible, the regulatory bodies and bank management should not keep them or their relatives on the board.

The study contributes to the CSR and tax avoidance literature considering the moderating role of political connections in Bangladesh banking sector.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between political connections and the over-indebtedness of firms in the construction industry. Furthermore, this study explores the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanisms with monitoring intent on this relationship.

This study uses the data from China’s listed construction firms for the years 2010–2019 to run the fixed-effect regression. This study constructs the optimal capital structure mathematical model by following the trade-off approach.

The research results show that most of China’s listed construction firms are surprisingly over-indebted in the long run. This study affirms that political connections positively impact the over-indebtedness of China’s listed construction firms. However, corporate governance can alleviate the impact of political connections on the over-indebtedness of China’s listed construction firms.

There were limited studies to discuss the relationship between political connections and the over-indebtedness of construction firms, and no particular attention has been given to the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between political connections and over-indebtedness. Moreover, in calculating the over-indebtedness of China’s listed construction firms, this study considers the financial characteristics of China’s construction firms when building the mathematical model of optimal capital structure, which makes the calculation results of over-indebtedness closer to reality.

This paper aims to present a catalogue of the influential aspects resulting from a bibliometric meta-analysis of political connection literature.

This study undertakes a bibliometric meta-analysis review of political connections literature, covering 138 research papers from 2000 to 2020 using the visualization of similarities viewer program.

The authors identify six research groups: the value of political connections; political connections and finance; political connections in banks; political connections and debt; management and political connections; and political connections and governance. This study discusses each stream through a cartographic analysis, including co-authorship, countries and time networks.

This study makes an important and novel contribution to political connection literature. So far, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is the only bibliometric study on political connections. This study is the first to use network analysis and community detection to understand social clustering and to identify main research steams in political connection literature.

This study investigates, from a resource dependence perspective, the effects of domestic private firms' political connections and economic power on their labor law compliance in China.

This study used data from a large-scale nationwide survey on Chinese domestic private firms, the Chinese Private Enterprise Survey collected from 2004 to 2012, to examine factors of interest that affect firms' compliance to labor laws. Hypotheses were tested using OLS regression models with robust standard errors.

The results indicate that domestic private firms' institutional political connections specified by the presence of a union or a Chinese Communist Party committee is positively related to firms' labor law compliance, and firm owners' formal political connections indicated by their membership in the People's Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference have a somewhat negative effect. The post-hoc analysis shows that firm owners' political representation at the county and city levels is negatively related with labor law compliance, while the political representation at the national level is positively related to labor law compliance. Moreover, the economic power of a domestic private firm is related positively to its labor law compliance. Finally, although the authors did not find evidence that the 2008 Labor Contract Law increased labor contract coverage, it did increase pension coverage after 2008.

The present study reveals a more refined relationship between domestic private firm owners’ political connections and the degree of labor law compliance. It also demonstrates that the economic power of domestic private firms has a positive effect on their labor law compliance. This implies the importance of the contribution of domestic private firms to economic and social development in China, warranting continued support of the development of the private sector in China.

This study adds to the sparse literature on the determinants of domestic private firms' labor law compliance in China. It also sheds light on whether political connections and the rising economic power of Chinese domestic private firms influence their compliance with labor laws.

Given the interest in better understanding the economic effects of political connections and political corruption on auditor behavior, this paper aims to review empirical studies in the accounting and finance domain dealing with these topics.

Keywords used to search for relevant studies include “political connections or political corruption” with “audit fees, audit report lag, audit independence and audit opinion.” This paper consults several editorial sources including Elsevier, Electronic Journals Service Elton B. Stephens Company, Emerald, Springer, Palgrave Macmillan, Sage, Taylor and Francis and Wiley-Blackwell. The search yields 16 published studies since 2006.

The review reveals that the majority of studies dealing with the economic effect of political connections are conducted in an Asian setting. Political connections increase the likelihood of receiving a favorable audit opinion and they are associated with higher audit fees longer audit delays. However, they can compromise auditor independence. Studies dealing with the economic consequences of political corruption on auditing are mostly based in the US setting. The findings of the reviewed studies suggest that political corruption is associated with higher audit fees, longer audit delays and increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion.

The synthesis suggests that political connections can adversely (compromise auditor independence) or beneficially (reduce the likelihood of issuing a going concern audit opinion) impact auditor behavior depending on the legal, institutional and cultural characteristics prevailing in a particular setting. Political corruptions increase audit assessed risks leading to a higher probability of issuing a going concern audit opinion and increased audit effort (audit fees and audit delays). It should be noted here that the literature linked to political corruption and auditor behavior is still in its infancy and much remains to be learnt if this stream of research is examined outside the US setting.

The review discusses the political connections and political corruption literature specifically devoted to auditor behavior. It identifies some limitations of this literature and offers guidance for future research avenues.

The purpose of this paper is to ask the following question: is there a link between being politically connected, the quality of governance and the company’s ownership structure?

The author then examined Canadian companies from the S&P/TSX index for the year 2015.

Political connectedness is significantly associated with lower quality of governance in relation to shareholders’ rights; ownership concentration is associated with lower quality of governance in relation to the overall governance, board of directors, shareholders’ rights and compensation structure indices; ownership structure does not mediate the relationship between political connections and quality of governance; and number of political connections through the executive is associated with less risky governance practices in relation to compensation structure; in other words, when members of the executive are politically connected, the firm adopts better compensation practices.

The time limitation is the main weakness of this study and probably the cause of observed mitigated results.

The author hope that the results will inform regulators on the need not only to further regulate the business-politics relationship, but also to consider the specific traits of concentrated ownership companies and the most critical aspects of corporate governance in politically connected firms, such as shareholders’ rights, particularly those of minority shareholders. For example, an intriguing case to investigate in the Canadian context would be Pierre Karl Péladeau’s foray into Quebec politics and the controversy ignited by his political bid in light of his position as majority shareholder (75 percent) in communications giant Quebecor Inc.

In fact, the results shown that concentrated ownership firms have lower governance quality than non-concentrated ones. Furthermore, in a concentrated ownership context, the minority shareholders’ rights could be threatened. In this sense, the results also shown that shareholders’ rights seem to be the most critical governance issue for the politically connected Canadian firms. These results are therefore the indication that Canadian financial market regulators must take action about politically connected and concentrated ownership firms in order to further protect minority shareholders’ rights.

This study makes a double theoretical contribution by enriching the literature on corporate governance and by providing one of the first investigations into the direct and comprehensive relationships between political connections, governance and ownership structure.

This paper aims to examine the association between political connections, political uncertainty and audit fees. The authors use various measures of political connections and uncertainty: political connections (civil and military), political events (elections) and a general measure of political stability (i.e. a world bank index).

The authors measure the association between political connections, political uncertainty and audit fees. Audit fees reflect auditors’ perceptions of risk. The authors examine auditors’ business risk, clients’ audit and business risk after controlling for the variables used in prior audit fee research.

Results indicate that civil-connected firms pay significantly higher audit fees than non-connected firms owing to the instability of civil-political connections. Military-connected firms pay significantly lower audit fees than non-connected firms owing to the stable form of government. Furthermore, considering high leverage as a measure of clients’ high audit risk and high return-on-assets (ROA) as a measure of clients’ lower business risk, the authors interact leverage and ROA with civil and military connections. The results reveal that these risks moderate the relationship between political connection and audit fees. Election risk is independent of risk associated with political connections. General political stability reinforces the theme that a stable government results in lower risks.

The authors combine cross-sectional measures of political uncertainty (civil or military connections) with time-dependent measures (general measures of political instability and elections).

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the earnings quality of politically connected firms is affected by changes in political stability and government effectiveness in a developing country.

This study uses a sample of 2,073 firm-year observations from 349 firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012 to examine how political stability and government effectiveness affect the earnings quality of politically connected firms, relative to non-politically connected firms. A two-stage model is used to address self-selection issues in the choice of firms to establish political connections.

This study finds that increased government effectiveness reduces the benefits of political connections, requiring politically connected firms to be more responsive to market pressures and resulting in higher earnings quality. However, increased political stability enhances the certainty of benefits from political connections, reducing the need for politically connected firms to respond to market pressures and resulting in lower earnings quality.

For policymakers, these results indicate that different dimensions of political and economic development can affect the incentives of firms with political connections in different ways.

This study finds that the earnings quality of politically connected firms increases as government effectiveness improves, but it decreases as the political environment becomes more stable.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of political connections on earnings quality by simultaneously controlling the firm characteristics; to test whether Pakistani firms’ ownership, specifically family ownership, plays a significant role in political connections–earnings quality association; to draw a conclusion about the agency theory in the context of Pakistan.

A quantitative approach was used to examine the influence of political connections and family ownership on the earnings quality of listed firms in Pakistan. The study uses historical data from 238 active non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange during the period of 2009-2015. The final data set comprises more than 1,600 firm-year observations from ten major non-financial industry classifications. To enhance the robustness of the empirical relationship, the study used several proxies of earnings quality in conjunction with robust regression methods and diagnostic checks.

The present study’s findings are consistent with the findings of the studies on agency theory previous literature, where politically connected firms have significantly lower earnings quality as compared to non-connected firms. The results also indicate that family firms have superior earnings quality than non-family–controlled firms. Furthermore, family ownership moderates the negative influence of political connections on earnings quality. This implies that family ownership diminishes the costs of political connections and improves the earnings quality of the firm.

This study is different from previous research in three respects. First, it examines whether family ownership concentration has a moderating influence on the relationship between political connections and earnings quality. Second, it uses a robust methodology and extensive data set to examine the influence of political connections and family ownership concentration on earnings quality. Further, this study is the first to analyze the nexus between financial reporting quality and the political business environment in the context of Pakistan.

Using the evidence of Chinese outbound mergers and acquisitions (M&As) enacted between 2006 and 2014, this study aims to investigate the role played by home political connections on the cost implications of Chinese multinationals. It also examines whether home political connections – at different levels and of different configurations – impact the operational cost of Chinese multinationals.

The data were analysed using a multivariate regression model. To examine their heterogeneous effect on Chinese multinationals, the political connection data were further split into higher and lower level political connections and in chief executive officer (CEO) and chairperson political connections.

This study implies the negative effect of home political connections on the internationalisation of Chinese multinationals. At the same time, the impact of lower-level political connections is stronger than that of their higher-level counterparts. Moreover, CEO political connections have a stronger effect on the operational costs of Chinese multinationals than their Chairperson equivalents.

By unravelling the “black box” of Chinese internationalisation from the social exchange perspective, through the informal political connection networking ties between Chinese firms and the government, this study advances emerging market multinational theory, contributes to the understanding of the heterogeneous nature of political connections and sheds new light on social exchange theory from the perspective of the emerging phenomenon of Chinese internationalisation.